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

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MCGEORGE BUNDY

Were Those the Days?

THE TURBULENCE of the American university today has so many causes and needs so many cures that it defies comprehensive assessment. War, race, revolution, reaction, numbers, money and lack of money, meaning and lack of meaning—it is no wonder that analyses abound while solutions are few. Nor is it any wonder that many of the older members of university faculties have taken to looking back at the time before the turmoil as a kind of golden age. I am without direct experience of university life since 1960, but I share the view that the earlier time was a good one. So I have welcomed the suggestion of the editor that I might usefully ask myself what we thought we were doing in the 1950's, and since I would like to be concrete, clear, and sometimes personal, I have asked that question about the place I know best. I was at Harvard, as a teacher and then also as a dean, from 1949 to 1960. It was a happy time. What was it about? What was good and bad about it? And does it have anything left to say in the 1970's? I am strongly of the view that universities have nothing to live for but the future, and I would reject entirely the notion that they are likely to solve their current problems by trying to make the clocks run backward. But history too is for the future.

It may be useful to begin with some things that were *not* so in the fifties—because some people who were not there have been allowed to believe a good deal of nonsense in recent years.

First and foremost, the university was not the tool of its trustees, the Corporation. They did not run the place in the interest of the ruling class. Marx was not unknown in the university of the fifties, only out of date, and one reason for his lack of influence was that everyone could see for himself that the university

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itself simply was not run in accordance with Marxist principles. The university's ruling class was not the Corporation—nor even the rich alumni. There was no single ruling class, but if there was a single center of gravity, it was in the faculty. When there were contests between the interests of the faculty and those of the more conservative members of the Governing Boards, the faculty won.

The most notable of these cases, in the 1950's, was that of a former Communist in the senior faculty who made the mistake of pleading the Fifth Amendment before an investigating committee and was then attacked by Senator Joseph McCarthy. The case was not an easy one, for the usual human follies were involved, and when a man does unwise things, little men can make a big case against him if they want to. (This is one moral of Philip Stern's first-class account of the tragedy of Robert Oppenheimer.) There was a prolonged debate, and there were moments of uncertainty before the matter was settled by a firm decision not to fire the man involved. Men say now, and rightly, that the result owed much to the courage of the two chief administrators successively concerned, Paul Buck and Nathan Pusey. But we must add that the Governing Boards in this case simply did not behave like monolithic tories. Those who were not in their meetings (and the separation of powers at Harvard then was probably too sharp) cannot tell who deserved most honor, but it would surprise me a lot if a most important servant of justice in the Corporation was not a careful corporation lawyer, Charles Coolidge—and in the Overseers a nonlover of mushy liberals, Joseph Alsop.

But with all regard for the courage and coolness of administrators and trustees, what was decisive in political terms, in this case as in the general resistance of Harvard to McCarthyism, was the feeling of the faculty. Looking back now, I am inclined to guess that it was never quite as close a case as it seemed at the time, and that even if the behavior of our colleague had been a lot worse than it was, he would not have been fired. No professor on permanent appointment had ever been fired for political reasons, as far as we knew, and a target of Joe McCarthy, whatever his political offense, would have been a shameful place to start.

This one case does not prove much by itself, after all. McCarthy was not the idol of any part of the Harvard community. Perhaps there is more food for thought in the running contest of the 1950's between the Economics Department and the Board of Overseers. This little squabble began in the late forties, when a few Over-

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seers tried to block the appointment of Kenneth Galbraith. Mr. Conant prevented them, but the case led to a prolonged dialogue on the question of "balance" in the Department of Economics. This dialogue continued through most of my time as dean. It was an intellectually dreary affair, and it had very little political meaning either. Certainly most members of the Harvard Economics Department were liberals, and certainly varieties of political and social belief are healthy in social science faculties. But a much more critical point than either of those was that appointment to the Harvard faculty was traditionally and deeply grounded in the affirmation of the personal intellectual excellence of the individual proposed. The proponents of "balance" did not understand the importance of this standard, and so all their share of the dialogue came to nothing. There was no appeal beyond the test of excellence. Faculty members themselves might often have other considerations in mind; not every nomination that came forward in my time reflected a disinterested and detached commitment to the highest academic standards; professors have friends and feelings, like other men. But the departments always accepted the duty of pleading their proposals on the high ground of excellence, and they never tried to override—although they often resented—an administrative rejection that stood firmly on the same high ground. So it was easy for the faculty to fend off the crude but zestful efforts of the Overseers' Committee to impose a conservative or even extract the nomination of one by the department. On the secondary ground of "balance" the committee never had a chance, and the comedy came to a timely close when a new chairman of the committee and a new chairman of the department decided to make peace. It was a pleasant irony that this new chairman was the most "liberal" of liberals and most "Keynesian" of Keynesians, Seymour Harris. The committee made the illuminating discovery that he is a lovable man, and it even raised some money for him. The argument over "balance" disappeared. Professor Galbraith remained, except when on leave.

Does this contest seem trivial? No doubt. But what is important about this trivial matter is that it is all there was. At no other time and in no other way, throughout that time and as far as I know for years before and after, was there any attempt by any of those formally responsible for the government of Harvard to control what was taught there. The Governing Boards did indeed choose the president and confirm the deans he nominated, and

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the deans and the president (probably in that order in these matters) did have important powers of nomination and of rejection in the choice of faculty members. Their judgment was certainly not infallible. But it was always a judgment based on the same commitment as the faculty's—a commitment to individual excellence.

But surely the Corporation had the money power? Indeed yes, if we mean the power, and the will, to say to every unit in the institution that it must not live beyond its means. The Corporation also had formidable powers in the assignment of unrestricted funds, and in choosing the directions for Harvard's corporate fund raising. It shared also in the setting of tuition levels and of salary standards, although in these matters the main initiative lay with the administration. These are great powers, and the case for vesting them in *some* fiduciary group is strong, but what deserves emphasis here is their limited nature. The Corporation had great power in weighing the claims of different faculties, but within any given faculty it seldom tried to allocate resources as between competing claimants. That task fell mainly to the deans.

But surely the deans were constrained by the choices of the rich? So they were, in the sense that what the rich really wanted, if Harvard wanted it too, was likely to happen sooner than the undertakings without patrons. Music and rare books had rich friends in my time at Harvard, more such friends than international affairs or undergraduate science. Yet here again we must be careful. Harvard never took a gift or endowment that was unwanted by the affected part of the faculty, and Harvard gave to no rich man the right to say what Harvard should *not* do. Generous rich men could and did build towers of special delight, but they could forbid nothing. Most of Harvard's new money, both from the rich and the not-so-rich, even when given for a specific purpose, was directed toward the very things the academic community most wanted. It is the *Loeb* Drama Center, but the *faculty* wanted it first. And throughout this time the decisive dollars, in the broad choices of each faculty, were the unrestricted dollars, and most of these dollars were controlled by the deans.

Between patrons and scholars, to be sure, there is always a certain tension, and some scholars are more at home in the work of attracting money than others. This has been true in every age of history, and under every conceivable form of university government; it is a consequence of the fact that learning does not auto-

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matically pay for itself. Our concern is not with the inescapable troubles of getting money—but rather with the question whether money bought intellectual control, in the Harvard of the fifties. It did not.

The most striking illustration of this point came in the teapot tempest over the Arnold Arboretum. This twenty-year contest between the Harvard Corporation and a group of patrons of horticulture was finally settled in favor of Harvard by a close vote of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. All sorts of issues were involved, and all sorts of feelings, but the practical question was where to put a botanical library and herbarium. On this question most of the scholars were passionately on one side, and most of the rich were passionately on the other. The scholars won because they carried the Corporation with them. The President and Fellows proved willing to endure very rough treatment from very old friends, partly of course because they were strong-minded men who disliked being told to change their honest judgment, but mostly because the question as they saw it was fundamentally one for decision on professional grounds: among the available lawful choices, which would serve the cause of learning best? On that question the Corporation properly followed the scholars, not the rich.

If the university was not the tool of the Corporation, still less was it the instrument of the political powers of the day. In particular it was not under the sway of Washington—neither the federal dollar nor the seductions of political power had Harvard in thrall. Partly this was the product of the same strong spirit of independence that moved the university in the quarrels reported above, but mostly it was a matter of high academic statesmanship and foresight on the part of Mr. Conant.

As the university began to consider its role in the new world that followed World War II, Mr. Conant laid it down as a first principle that no senior appointment on the Harvard faculty should be dependent on financing beyond Harvard's own control. In later years, we bent this rule a little at the edges; we were prepared to support parts of the salaries of some of our senior men with some external money.[1] But we respected the basic principle: never a year passed, in the budget cycle, that we did not ask ourselves whether we could carry the full cost of X or Y or Z, if the external source ran dry. And always we knew that we could.

Thus by a single strategic decision Mr. Conant separated the

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question of federal funds from the most critical single power in the university: the power of permanent appointment.

There remained many other hard questions in our relations with the government, and as the years passed, the size and importance of the federal connection steadily increased. We were protected during this expansion by two more wise judgments of the age of Conant and Buck. One was a general rule against the acceptance of classified contracts, and the other was a self-denying ordinance against the development of any large defense-related installations of the sort that were popular—and may well have been necessary—at M.I.T. and Cal Tech and California. Our largest government-supported enterprise, by far, was the Cambridge Electron Accelerator—and the defining fact of high-energy particle physics, in political terms, is that this kind of science has no "pay-off" at all. The electron accelerator was a gamble on the continuing viability of the curious alliance between the A.E.C. and the Congress in support of this particularly costly and "impractical" kind of intellectual excellence. But all concerned understood it so, and the professors involved remained Harvard or M.I.T. professors. The *accelerator* depended on the government's help; the *professors* did not.[2]

Our business with the government was the product of choices by our faculty, not the other way around. I remember no contracts or grants that did not arise from a professor's own interest. As in dealing with the rich (or with foundations), so in dealing with the government some men were more effective than others, and the fields of science were not all equally fashionable. But to a very large degree our scientists, when they went to the government for help, were met by juries of their peers. I remember no strong feeling that the government as a whole was better or worse than any other outsider. But of course the inside money—"our own" money—was always the best of all. This fact itself may say something important about the faculty's confidence in the Corporation, which had final authority over that money.

The government did give us some trouble in other ways. It was constantly tempted by the notion that it could measure the productivity of our professors—or at least the number of man-hours they spent on the job. It was also niggardly about overhead, and so its grants did carry a cost that we may have not reckoned completely. We may have been drawn too much into supporting the unseen expenses of our governmentally financed scientific explo-

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ration with our own precious institutional money. But if so, it was a kindly error. These were good years for American science, and although it is probably impossible to prove the correctness of any judgment on the relative claims of science and literature, it is certain that in the fifties Harvard's scientists were worthy of what they got. The humanities were certainly in some trouble in the fifties, but that trouble usually had an intellectual, not a fiscal, root. There were untroubled humanists among us, and it was not mainly contracts or grants that made them happy.

Finally, the university was not the tool of the military-industrial complex, or the C.I.A., or a foreign policy establishment. The principal centers of concern for international and area studies were run by men with minds of their own—usually chosen from within the university faculty and always from among academic men by academic men. The oldest and largest of these was the Russian Research Center, whose leading members had widely divergent views of both Soviet reality and American policy. The youngest of them, the Center for International Affairs, was led by Professor Robert R. Bowie and was distinguished from the outset by a catholic interest in the company and counsel of both professional practitioners and producing scholars with widely varied attitudes on the questions of the day. It was true that Mr. Bowie had once left Harvard to work for Foster Dulles, but on the one occasion that Mr. Dulles came to work for Mr. Bowie in a faculty seminar at the Center, it became entirely clear that there was little agreement between the Secretary and the scholars.[3]

There can be no denying that there were contacts between our centers and the government. We welcomed these contacts, and the prospect of a constructive relation to public policy was not absent from the thoughts of those who strove to make the centers flourish. Nor am I asserting that the scholars in these centers thought it their business to begin with the assumption that Washington was always wrong. All that I am saying is that the opposite assumption would have seemed equally preposterous. What *was* assumed—and I think entirely correctly—was that in the world of the fifties there were great new areas of study which belonged in the foremost American universities and which were needed so much that a special effort was warranted. What was decisive to us was the importance of the subject to the university, not its importance to Washington.

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It is true that some members of the faculty—and the Governing Boards—disapproved of undertakings like the Russian Research Center. Their argument did not rest on the false notion that Harvard was selling out to outsiders, but rather on the belief that subjects so contemporary, and kinds of social science so uncertain in permanent value, were not a proper part of the university's business. I remember hot arguments with the Overseer Joseph Alsop, who believed that Harvard had no business diverting scarce scholarly talent from the study of the Emperor Wu Ti to the study of the Emperor Mao. His objections had nothing whatever to do with his politics, or those of Harvard's professors. He simply thought that the enterprise was not appropriate for Harvard. As he is the first to point out, Harvard rejected his advice. In other universities, notably Yale in the time of Whitney Griswold, there was a view more like Alsop's, if less ferocious. Here was an interesting and honest difference of judgment on the relevance of a given kind of knowledge, and the propriety of a given kind of academic organization. The arguments are as old as the university, and they may be part of its future too. The important fact about them, in the fifties, was that they occurred inside a shared assumption that the university would be free, either way.

I have belabored these matters because it is absolutely fundamental to any understanding of what was good or bad about us in the fifties that the Harvard faculty, both individually and collectively, existed in a state of real and extraordinary freedom. The men who had contracts had them because they wanted them; the men who consulted with government were all volunteers, and sometimes only half-welcome in Washington. The men who built the new research centers were doing what they thought needed doing, in the service of learning. With the very same freedom other men refused contracts, avoided consultations, and ignored the centers. The mainspring of choice and action was in the members of the faculty.

Moreover it is a reversal of reality to suppose that prestige and power (both already slightly suspect words in that time) were accorded mainly to those who were most entrepreneurial. The center of gravity remained in the whole company of professors and associate professors. The running of institutions and the direction of centers were always auxiliary enterprises whose meaning was measured by the degree to which they engaged the serious concern of a significant number of senior scholars.

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The extraordinary freedom of the senior faculty was sustained by tradition—but still more by the universal commitment to the ideal of excellence in learning. The freedom of those men, and their authority in the academic choices of the institution, was not merely an inherited right—it was one which was held to have been earned by election in a highly competitive contest. Here again the fifties were in debt to the work of James B. Conant. Building on the best of a tradition he knew from inside, he created a process of deliberation and discrimination in the making of senior appointments which literally forced the asking of an arrogant question, every time a vacancy was filled: is the candidate who is proposed the best man *in the world* for this job? Even its true believers found the process a shade pretentious, but its stimulating effect cannot be overstated; it was a strong, if not infallible, protection against mediocrity and a persistent stimulus to "think big." It was our habit to ask ourselves, about every really first-rate scholar everywhere, why he should not be at Harvard. Very often there were good answers in terms of his own preferences—and even our own. But sometimes the asking of the question would lead to a really remarkable appointment. And although not everyone we wanted came to Cambridge, very few indeed chose to leave. In the decade of the fifties the number of resignations from the senior ranks of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences averaged less than one a year. The faculty had persistent soft spots, and no department was quite as good as it supposed. But collectively it was probably the strongest academic company anywhere—or if not, it was the one that others claimed to match. Its own opinion of itself was plain.

Much more important than comparison with others is the direction of change inside, and the faculty seemed to be getting stronger and better every year. "A rising tide lifts all the boats," and the 1950's were a decade of extraordinary expansion in American higher learning. The real pay of professors, which had been held down through two decades of depression and war, moved rapidly upward, and Harvard continued to stay in the van. The struggle for new resources was unending, but once again Harvard was particularly lucky. Her traditional ties to the rich gave her unusual access to private money, and at the same time her advantages of established strength made it easy for her to do well in the new competition for federal and foundation funds. The rising tide of the fifties lifted the better boats most.

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One special and beneficial effect of the general academic prosperity was the sharp reversal of the balance of academic supply and demand which had dominated the 1930's. Mr. Conant's stern process of selection had been in part a necessary counter to a dangerous tendency to protect the merely good man in a time of economic trouble. Its consequence, in the thirties and forties, was a good deal of tension and even suffering among younger men who knew that "up or out" more often meant out than up—and out into a cool hard world. But as the fifties advanced, it became more and more clear that "out" often meant "up" as well. More than one talented young man made it his highly successful business to show Harvard from afar the weakness of its judgment, thus following the honorable precedent established in an earlier decade by the great economist Paul Samuelson, whom Harvard failed to keep when it could and never was able to win back from happiness downstream at M.I.T. The number of attractive opportunities elsewhere varied from field to field. In Slavic studies at one time it seemed impossible to keep the graduate students in Cambridge long enough to learn the language before they took permanent appointments elsewhere; in less fashionable languages the going was harder. But one large element in the general happiness of Harvard in the fifties was that Harvard itself was not the only pleasant prospect for the junior faculty.

So far we have been talking of faculty, but the fifties were a relatively happy time for students too—or at least so it seemed; one should probably leave final judgment to those who were students themselves, and perhaps one should make a reservation about graduate students, whose degree of happiness was at least as varied as the quality of life in the dozens of different departments. Certainly by all the external measures, the students—especially the undergraduates—were outstanding. Here again the tide of the fifties and the administrative foresight of one man were in harmony. In college admissions even more than in faculty appointment, the determinant of success is more often in the quality of the applicants than in the skill of the selection process, and no committee of admissions, however perverse, could have admitted a bad class from the Harvard candidates of the middle and later fifties. A rising tide was helpful here too—more and more people wanted first-class college experience every year. But still more helpful was the leadership of Wilbur Bender, the Dean of Admissions, who did more than any other one man to make the

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excellence of Harvard attractive to the able young. How he did it, he himself might not have been able to say—and indeed toward the end of our decade he found himself in trouble with some senior scholars for saying it the wrong way. They heard him as anti-intellectual, when what he really had in mind was that even very able boys do not, in America, wish to be *only* intellectuals, so that a college which wants the widest possible choice among the most promising young men must seem to be more than a haven for bookworms. Fashions and expectations have changed since Bender's day, but these changes do not reduce the importance of his achievement: by delivering Harvard from a reputation (largely undeserved but very strong) for what a later analyst has called effete intellectual snobbery, he made the place a Mecca for young men of much promise and talent.

The students were excellent, and they too were free. Their freedom was not the same as that of the faculty, although of course they had the same personal liberty and the same right of political action or inaction.[4] Theirs was the freedom of open time and open choice—not the freedom of intellectual commitment confirmed by permanent appointment. It is a very different kind of freedom, and in many good colleges, in many happy times, the freedom of the student and the freedom of the faculty have not had very much to do with one another.

But what made Harvard different in this decade, as Professor Samuel Huntington has persuasively argued, was the degree to which the free concerns of the students did in fact overlap with those of the faculty. Obviously only a few undergraduates really aspired to a life of monastic intellectual endeavor; more students honored the scholarship of the great names than sought to imitate them. In the fifties, as before and after, it was altogether too easy for clever young men to get B+ or A— on the basis of verbal facility and sensitivity to the instructor's tastes. The university was not usually fooled by such people, in the end, but they very often fooled themselves too long.

Still Huntington is right when he says that to a remarkable degree

> There was a shared consensus on what was important and what was not important, on what the standards of achievement were, and how one ranked individuals in terms of those standards. Intellectual distinction and scholarly achievement were what counted, and with this general consensus in values, there was also a general acceptance of the system for

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measuring achievement of those values on the part of both students and faculty.[5]

So freedom and the pursuit of intellectual excellence were married by the fact that this pursuit was something the individual respected. Not everyone shared in these values; some were not excellent at anything, and no one was perfect. Still the place had room for all kinds of people and for all kinds of effort, and if the atmosphere was demanding, it was also catholic. If the "smell of the lamp" was an attractive fragrance to the young, as Huntington remarks, it was not the only scent on the breeze of freedom.

At its best, and certainly in its institutional interest, in those years, the university was loyal to the ideas of two men who symbolized the values we honored. It was Robert Oppenheimer who used to tell the new professors at the Princeton Institute that "here you have nothing to do but your best," and it was Mr. Whitehead who had said it for us all when he said that "the justification for a university is that it preserves the connection between knowledge and the zest of life, by uniting the young and the old in the imaginative consideration of learning." We were willing to be measured by these tests.

But how close did we come? With all its freedom and all its talk of excellence, how good was Harvard *really* in the fifties? Others must judge that, and in any case the degree of our success may be less interesting and instructive for the seventies than a look at our failures and inadequacies.

I pass by the conventional complaint against the universities of the fifties: that they were indifferent to the great human and social crises of the age. It is true that on some specific issues the charge is justified—in particular we were too slow, at Harvard, to understand our role as a corporate citizen in Cambridge and Boston. But for the most part this complaint is little more than an attempt to charge against one part of society a myopia which was general at the time. We believed too easily that steadily expanding legal rights would lead to equal opportunity, and that the standard remedies of liberalism would meet the national problem of poverty. But I do not find it surprising that 1955 lacked the painful knowledge of 1970, and after all the university world was far less complacent than Eisenhower's America as a whole. The universities in general, and Harvard in particular, were generat-

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ing their full share of the ideas which were the basis of the later legislative revolution of the years 1963-1965.

Our more interesting failures were not in our part of the nation's politics—they were in the distance between our own ideals and our performance. In the first place, we were not as academic as I have so far suggested. The centrality of the faculty which I have asserted was sustained by a whole series of tacit bargains on lesser matters. We did not sell out on defense contracts, but we did let the Governing Boards control the honorary degrees. (Damn nice of us, I can hear them mutter.) To most of us—certainly to me—it seemed an excellent bargain: let the Governing Boards control the honors of Commencement, and let us handle the rest. Not every professor agreed. I remember that in the year that the Governing Boards made an honorary doctor of Mr. Sinclair Weeks, Professor Galbraith was not amused. To me it seemed a small price—especially as in that particular year it looked as if those in charge had carefully placed Mr. Weeks on their right flank (he was President Eisenhower's Secretary of Commerce) so that his conservative virtue would protect them in their not exactly hasty decision that Justice Felix Frankfurter too was worthy.[6]

"The Happy Observance of Commencement" belonged mainly to the Governing Boards and the alumni, and it cost a pretty penny, but who deserved a party more? The Corporation and the Overseers were all volunteers, of course, and no one in his senses could feel sorry for men who so obviously enjoyed what they were doing (we are in the fifties still). Nevertheless many of them worked hard at their job, and collectively they bore witness for us to the alumni and to the world. It was no trivial service—should they not have a great day once a year? After all, many of the rest of us enjoyed Commencement too, and many of our own kind were honored.[7]

A more expensive compromise was our support for intercollegiate athletics. Mercifully I have forgotten how many hundred thousands it cost us, every year, to provide the undergraduates with an array of athletic facilities that few of them would ever encounter again. In principle Robert Hutchins was right when he took Chicago out of intercollegiate football. But in practice? I never believed Harvard would have been better if we had saved these hundreds of thousands each year, but I could not prove it, then or now. The best I can say in our defense is that the only

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Committee of the Faculty with a waiting list was the Committee on Athletic Sports, and that there was almost no member of the committee who did not become a lobbyist for one or another costly and obscure athletic activity. We avoided polo, but that's about all.

More serious issues of policy also connected us to our boards —and not always to the disadvantage of learning itself. The faculty could not act alone when it came to great questions like the size of Harvard College or the relative claims of undergraduates and research. The Corporation had chosen Mr. Pusey at least partly because it wanted a man who would care for the College, and it chose wisely. The greatest of his fund-raising efforts was called A Program for Harvard College, and while it reinforced the central faculty in a hundred ways, it was built around the needs of the College itself. Just as important, and perhaps surprising to the young of a later decade (the College may have a collective memory, but the undergraduates of any given time do not), was Mr. Pusey's firm opposition to all those forms of academic snobbery which might, without him, have made the College of the fifties and sixties a second-class unit in an increasingly doctoral, and even postdoctoral, institution.

It is not at all clear—even in these later days—that it was wrong for the faculty to be required to share these wider powers. To make learning the central business of the university is not necessarily to assert that the most learned should make all the decisions. The decision, for example, on *access* to the place of learning is too important to go unshared. There are obvious risks in alumni influence, and the Harvard I knew was lucky in the relative maturity of her graduates, who never seemed to accept the notion that admission should be governed by the laws of inheritance. But in defending the idea of a college that was not merely a feeder for the Ph.D. mill, the alumni, the Governing Boards, and above all the president of the 1950's were trustees not only for the Harvard of their time, but also for a generation then unable to vote. Younger members of the university who now feel concern for issues of governance will be lucky if they do as well in speaking to the future needs of those who are as young today as they were in 1953.

One of our more serious failures seemed to us then little more than quixotic: it was the great difference between appearance and reality in some of the very issues that have stirred strong feelings

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in the sixties. We were not troubled by the fact that much research was supported by money from the Department of Defense; we *knew* the research was uncontaminated, and we *knew* we were not limiting but expanding our real freedom by accepting the money we did on the terms we did. Similarly, we *knew* that the Governing Boards were not engaged in thought control for a ruling class, so we did not bother about the fact that in form they had vast powers over appointment and promotion. We did not worry much about governance—none of us—faculty, students, alumni, or governors—because the real interests of all were being adequately met. And so, it now appears, we stored up trouble for the future.

Both the funding and the governance of the seventies will almost surely need to correspond more closely, in their forms, to what is real. Thus the Mansfield Amendment seeks to take the Department of Defense out of "pure" research, and those who are now reconsidering Harvard's governance will probably wish to rearrange things so that power and responsibility not only are, but are seen to be, where they belong. But just as Senator Mansfield incurs an obligation to consider who *will* pay for pure research, so the agents of change at Harvard will need to ensure that as they sharpen the visibility of power and responsibility, they do not extinguish either or both. Irresponsibility and powerlessness are not likely to produce or preserve a good university.

The gravest of our academic failures were quite simply academic. Taken on our own terms and measured by our own standards, we were not as good as we thought we were—none of us, faculty, students, administration. The fame of Harvard covered us all with its radiance, and we all too easily assumed that the honor paid to us because of Harvard was no more than our personal due. The really ruthless critics among us were too few, and the self-critics fewer still.

We paid a special price of complacency as a consequence of the genuine severity of our competitive process. Too many undergraduates assumed that because they were at Harvard they were excellent, and too many (even one would have been too many, and there were more) of the men who won permanent appointments gave in to an exaggerated view of their own qualities. No place, not even Harvard, could make a dozen new permanent appointments each year in the central faculty and have them all extraordinary. Sometimes the best available man was not really very good. And even for very good men, the honor and freedom

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of a Harvard permanent appointment were usually more than they had yet earned. Undergraduates were given the prize of admission for their promise, not for their performance, and to a high degree it was the same with men who received permanent faculty appointments. The majority did not misunderstand these matters, but a minority did exist.

The administration—and here I mean mostly myself—may have been too gentle. We may have listened with too much sympathy to the claims of departments that this or that field could not be left "uncovered" even though the available tillers of that field seemed undistinguished. We might have done better to steer more sternly by our own chosen star of excellence. My own sense of the way our appointments turned out—and I recognize that this is a most subjective and uncertain comment—is that we did better when we picked a man because he was remarkable in himself than when we took a man who was defined as "very good in his field." And more than once we may have missed a hesitation or qualification in the recommendation such that its real reading should have been "very good—in his field."

Such good men were dangerous to the university and only partly because of their lack of high intellectual quality. More serious was the danger that precisely because of their limited gifts they might cling very tight to the protection affected by the "field." This phenomenon is even more pervasive in the American higher learning as a whole than it is at the leading universities. It is the seamy side of the bright pattern of proud belief in what one is doing which is the mark of all true disciplines while they are young and strong—of microbiologists, for example, in our decade. When this pride turns defensive, the danger flags are flying. Only too often defensiveness is the chosen escape of the second-rate.

Here we are brushing against the most difficult question of faculty organization that I know—one which I believe is more deep-rooted and serious than most of the general issues of university-wide governance now so much discussed. We are now touching the matter of the department. The departments in our day were clearly indispensable; much more often than not they were agents of honorable labor and conscientious choice. Yet when a department went on the defensive, it could do very great damage both to itself and to the rest of the university.

I am not sure I know how to explain what I mean by "defensive" here. Certainly there is no rule which says that the depart-

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ment was always wrong and the dean's office always right, and I remember one splendid rumpus in which the offended members of the department now seem to me to have been more right than wrong. Another word more appropriate than "defensive" could be "insecure," but I am wary of amateur psychoanalysis. Perhaps it is better to discuss the concrete signs of the trouble. It was a bad sign, for example, when a department was resistant to the suggestion that it might consider some very remarkable man from far away. There might in fact be good reasons not to go after him, but a strong department would state them confidently, not fearfully. It was also a bad sign when a department resisted grade A men in new subjects while doggedly proposing grade B men in old subjects—for here the shape of the field was determining the quality of our work, when the quality of our work should have been helping to reshape the field. Finally, it was a bad sign when a department showed persistent hostility to efforts at connection and reinforcement across departmental lines, or to the development of cognate disciplines. First-class men welcome other first-class men even if they do different things in different ways. Such reactions are defensive and yes, insecure; they are dangerous to the vitality of the faculty, and we did not do enough to overcome them.

Another characteristic of an excessively defensive department was its tendency to a narrow and arbitrary pedagogical style. To make one's students run the course one has run oneself is only human, but it can be a most arid way of teaching. To bolster a discipline by holding to irrelevant requirements can well arouse suspicion that the discipline will not stand on its own merits. These tendencies have a particularly damaging effect in graduate study, but in the fifties graduate students were too easily frightened by academic authority, so it was the undergraduates who complained first.

But I remember that when the *Harvard Crimson* began to attack specialism—was Christopher Jencks the first?—I was unsympathetic. It seemed to me obvious that the requirements of departments and the interests of undergraduates would not always coincide, and in my experience lively and imaginative students had never had more than a useful amount of trouble in imposing their own tastes and concerns on the requirements. I was not all wrong, but perhaps I overlooked the worm in Professor Huntington's apple. If academic standards and purposes were so widely accepted

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among students, then the students might be justified in asking hard questions about a curriculum which they could bend to their real needs only by outsmarting it. Students who demanded a curriculum shaped for all undergraduates, and not for would-be specialists alone, were paying to the life of the mind a tribute of high concern and engagement. Not to provide such a curriculum was to run the risk that the less rebellious students, in their acceptance of existing patterns and their new admiration for the world of learning, would be taught as much of the ways of pedantry as of the arts of imaginative learning. Before the fifties ended the undergraduate curriculum was ripe for wholesale reform, but neither the faculty nor the dean was ready. We contented ourselves with marginal changes designed to open things up a little, and in our reliance on the ingenuity of the individual undergraduate we missed an opportunity to capitalize on seriousness before it turned sour in disappointment.

Yet it is not clear that we could have done much more even if more of us had seen the dangers of inaction. Too many professors liked their own situation as it stood, and most of them approached the question of curricular change from the standpoint of its impact on their own teaching. Most departments were even more self-centered—in defending a department, as distinct from one's own courses, one transmutes self-interest into service of the discipline. Against such formidable forces there was no equal power moved by concern for educational effectiveness in the college as a whole. Harvard had her share—perhaps more—of remarkable teachers in those years, and the ancient traditions of elective courses and of undergraduate offerings by eminent men spared us the worst forms of curricular rigidity. Moreover in the General Education program we had an opening to diversity which was ably exploited by gifted administrators and imaginative teachers.[8] But among professors only the Dean of the Faculty then had an overriding duty to think about the college curriculum as a whole, and even if he had been more farsighted, he was not enough.

The individualism of professors and the self-centeredness of departments were not limited to curricular questions, nor was this the only area where the dean was lonely. The same pattern existed in the allocation of resources. In the budgetary process the dean dealt directly with every chairman and with every director, and in salary matters he dealt directly with every individual professor. In form his powers were great, but in practice they

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were severely limited. Existing financial allocations were seldom reduced from year to year; only at the edge of growth was there much room for administrative initiative. Still this limited power was one of the few available instruments for change in the faculty as a whole, and it is a hard question whether it was good that it should be exercised by a single individual in negotiating with some fifty separate budgetary units. The method had obvious virtues—celerity, simplicity, and accountability, together with an absence of direct conflict between contenders for funds. Much trouble is avoided when chemists do not have immediate influence on the budget for the main library, and when the humanists do not control the laboratory accounts. If his door is open and his mind not shut, one man is as good as a committee—and maybe better—at taking a detached view of the comparative marginal value of the laboratory or library dollar.

But this was budgeting by bits and pieces—more like fifty separate bargains than a single master plan. It took care of the barons well enough, but did it serve the kingdom as a whole? The annual budget, of course, is not where major policy is made: that happens when you appoint professors, or build Houses, or change from courses to seminars or tutorial or back again. In these larger processes the dean was not alone; the decision would engage the President and Fellows above him and the faculty around him. But even then it was only part of the whole that was engaged—the nearby scientists in an advance toward biochemistry, the Council of Masters in planning a new House.

The case for general planning is easily made a decade later. We have all learned a lot about cost-effectiveness and about the need for thinking systematically about alternatives. It seems doubtful that our ancient methods are good enough for today. Our ways were not bad in their own time—the barons are not the whole kingdom, but it is nothing without them, and we served them fairly well. In the basic politics of the institution, the dean was their agent, and if they had been strongly dissatisfied with his performance, he would have been expendable. But the system was designed for fair weather, and for a season in which it still made some sense for barons to stick to their own fields. But what if there should come a need for drastic changes in resource allocation—a time when crisis would require less for the departments and more for the whole—a time when the *faculty*, not the individual professors—and *learning*, not isolated fields—would need a new

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freedom and power? And what if all this should happen in times when the fair weather of financial fortune might have changed?

This tension between the individual and the community had its match in another: between the claims of excellence and those of humanity. The freedom of the institution was a freedom based on highly selective appointment of faculty and admission of students, and the commitment to a primarily academic excellence implied a continuing process of competition. Ideally one was competing with oneself, not with others, but practically it could not always be so. The unspoken question after Oppenheimer's injunction to do your best was "Better than who?" and only too often the competition was just down the hall. Competition in cleverness is not the best single basis for a happy human community, and there was too much sharpness and not enough kindness, too much pride and not enough generosity, too much striving and not enough helping in the Harvard of the fifties. The qualities I have opposed to each other are not in fact opposites; there were men who combined them—even combined them all. But really first-class scholarship is rare, and in its pursuit Harvard was willing to tolerate much human imperfection. As a result there were more fine scholars than large human beings—and the university's rigorous commitment to academic achievement made it an intrinsically uncomfortable place for good men who lacked that record. Only too often the place was destructive to those who sensed themselves inadequate by its primary standard, and while in fact the long-run judgment of Harvard on her members was not as narrowly academic as it seemed, the men who had the personal stamina to prove their value without formal scholarly productivity were few. There were not enough whole men among us at any rank, and there was not enough modesty.

That last paragraph is too harsh. There was great civility in the Harvard I knew, great devotion from colleague to colleague, and a sense of enjoyment in the collective quality of the place which was pervasive and uplifting. If in one sense we were egotistical and competitive, in another we were sustained—and we sustained one another—by a common belief in what the university was for. What I have said about our human imperfections is true, but it is not the whole truth. Our frailties were partly offset by the values that our life at Harvard kept insistently before us. Because we were at Harvard, on the whole, we did better. In a

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stable time our weaknesses were not turned against us. In the fifties Harvard was good for us.

Or so we believed—but here I come to a final ambiguity in this subjective recollection. We may have believed it too well. We were proud of Harvard; were we perhaps too proud? We accepted the end of learning and the standard of excellence. Did we not sometimes assume that to accept them was to achieve them? Harvard's standards were generally high—but the church is never wholly Christian, and the academy is never all it aims to be. Did we not often allow our pride and our affection to trap us in Mr. Whitehead's famous fallacy of misplaced concreteness —did we not attribute to the university, and thus also to ourselves, the values it and we could only *aim* at?

I think we did make this mistake—and I think we encouraged one another to make it. We may well have been the best in the country—but we foolishly supposed that made us good enough.

Does this evocation of a time long past have any meaning for the future? The reader will probably already have matched his own present views against the assertions and assumptions of my look back, but I would like to make my own try at pulling a few currently relevant thoughts out of this past.

I jump the sixties with only two comments by the way. It is a long jump, but the difference between what one knows from intense and direct experience and what one knows at second-hand from others is great. I know little of the genuinely new generation which is now emerging into faculties as well as student bodies. If in other fields of activity I too have experienced the sixties, still it is an experience that is not academic.

Indeed that is my first by-the-way comment. I was in the government for the first half of the sixties. The government was not the university—and not even an extension thereof. The point seems obvious enough, but in subtle ways a great many people forgot it in those years. Especially at Harvard there was a tendency to suppose that because a Harvard man was President, and a lot of professors were down there with him, somehow the university was running the country. Some of the professors may have contributed to this impression by confusing their academic and their political roles. Some of those in the universities who were critical of the Kennedy administration from the left made it a point to send their sharpest arrows at the administration's academics—which was

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fair enough, but which tended to make the targets seem more important than they were. These were specific examples of a more general tendency—a tendency of the university community, especially at Harvard, to assume that somehow "we" were in charge. President Kennedy was enormously popular in the Yard, and Harvard understandably thought of him as in some sense "hers." The President enjoyed his connection to Harvard, but he talked about it much more in Cambridge and among Harvard friends than he did elsewhere. He never supposed that he had won the Presidency in order to turn the government over to the university. It was men, not professors, that he took with him to Washington, and the men who mattered most came from many places besides Cambridge.

Indeed the Kennedy administration, in its real life, was a denial of what it may have seemed to be from Harvard Square. It showed that Washington and Cambridge were two worlds, not one. Individuals could and did move from one world to the other, and in some fields of knowledge—notably economics, natural sciences, and law—there were intellectual skills that were equally (though not congruently) relevant in both places. But the end of the university is learning itself, and the end of government is good political action. They are two different things, and it is deeply dangerous to confuse them.

Even more dangerous, at least to the university community itself, was the tendency, evident from the beginning but much stronger as the decade wore on and Vietnam became the largest single issue, to suppose that because there were men from universities in Washington, the administration must be specially accountable and responsive to the academic community. Seen from Washington this was merely the usual reaction of any honestly angry constituent; but when studied as an element in the state of mind of the university world itself, it was not so ordinary. It suggested that there was something more in all this than the understandable and comical local error of supposing that it was Harvard (or even, still more comically, the Harvard faculty) that had been elected President in 1960. What was suggested was that *whoever* had been elected, the university world *ought* to be in charge down there. And this was too much, so much too much that it raised serious questions about the judgment of the men who talked this way, and of their understanding of what both governments and universities are about.

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Nothing is plainer, of course, than the right of any citizen or group of citizens to as much political activity and influence as they can win by fair means.[9] And it was certainly true that the men and women in the college and university world were a growing force in the nation. Finally, there could be no doubt that on many subjects the best experts turned out to be professors; I share Carl Kaysen's view that academic physicists have often proved more practical than engineers, and academic economists more long-headed than bankers. But all these things taken together did not and could not give the campus a natural right to run the government—any more than they made it the inevitable tool of others. Both the process of government and the realities of the university were and are much more complex than that.

Government in America is the product of forces which multiply every decade; we are not a simpler but a more complex society, as time passes, and the number of the groups that are effectively heard increases every year. Ironically it has become a cliché to speak of the Establishment just at a time when there is no such thing, in any serious sense—if there ever was. In government today the influence of men from universities is only one of many influences—from farms, from labor, from varied and conflicting business interests, from the military-industrial complex and also from the scientific-technical complex—from Dallas and Chicago and Los Angeles, as well as from New York.

Moreover, the influence of the university world itself is not and cannot be monolithic. The economists may be the best example: there are excellent men with quite opposite views who are at once ornaments to their institutions and influential participants in or critics of the decisions of government. Arthur Burns and Walter Heller do not speak for a united academic constituency. Among scientists too there are sharp differences over policy, even over policy toward science itself. There will usually be more professors in Washington under the Democrats than under the Republicans, but they are there, under both parties, as individuals on government jobs, and not as agents of a united academy.

I should emphasize that I am not concerned here with who was right and who was wrong on any of the great political issues of the sixties. For the purpose of this discussion I will gladly assume that Washington was dead wrong on Vietnam from start to finish, and that every academic critic was dead right. I am also prepared to assume that every professor who touched government,

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whether serving on leave or consulting under contract, became an instrument of misguided policies. Even on these assumptions, it would not follow that it is right to confuse the university with the government. Indeed the precise criticism that is rightly directed at those activities in universities which have reflected the interests and purposes of government, and not those of the university, is that they are wrong in principle. But the university world cannot have it both ways, and should not want to. Neither the errors nor the needs of government, however important they may be, are an excuse for confusing the academic community with the political battlefield. Students and professors can and should go back and forth, but they cannot be in both places at once.[10]

My second by-the-way comment is shorter, and even more sweeping. It is that the violence that has wracked our universities, in the last five years, is almost surely not a permanent phenomenon. If I am wrong in this point all bets are off on the future of the American university, because no serious academic community can be sustained over time in the face of continuous obstruction by force and threats of force—whether from revolutionaries or reactionaries. Precisely because this is so, I believe that the present troubles will prove temporary. The men and women of all ages who constitute the college and university world of our country really do not want the universities torn up, nor do they want people beaten up. What a great many of them do want is change, and change in the American academy does not require violence (although it may well require other forms of protest). Processes of academic government which worked well enough in times of less strain have been shown to need their own changes in recent years, and in the stresses and strains of unexpected and startling events there have often been breakdowns of confidence and trust where they can least be afforded—between faculties and administrations or between trustees and students. Moreover, these stressful events have sometimes produced painful divisions within one group or another. But I believe that these divisions are temporary, and that while there will be a much more open process of decision and action in the happy university of the future, violence and threats of violence will become rare, atypical, and nondivisive, simply because the academic community as a whole will be against them. The hardest test here will be where it has been all through American life since our beginnings: in the struggle to end racism. Not everything that every angry young black calls

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racist really is, but the burden of proof will remain on the white American because of our history.

These two comments have one common consequence which is of the highest importance to the future of the university. To the degree that violence subsides and that the university community *as such* is kept separate from political conflict, the danger of attack upon the freedom of the university from outside will be reduced. No institution which depends on society for its resources will be allowed—as an *institution*—to choose sides in the general contests of the democratic process, and violence by the privileged is an uncommonly unpopular phenomenon. If it be true, as I believe, that both politics and violence must be restrained in the academic world for reasons that are intrinsic to the nature of the university, it is also true that when violence spreads and the university is politicized, society as a whole turns hostile—and in a prolonged contest with society as a whole the university is not a likely winner.

Turning back to the fifties, I will assert that we were right on one absolutely vital point: we knew what the university was for: learning. The university is for learning—not for politics, not for growing up, not even for virtue, except as these things cut in and out of learning, and except also as they are necessary elements of all good human activity. The university is for learning as an airplane is for flying. This is its elemental and defining purpose. There is both affirmative and negative reason for this purpose: no other institution has this mission, and no other mission justifies the university.[11]

One word is not a philosophy of academic life, but to begin with the right word is crucial. I choose "learning" rather than "scholarship" or "education" because "scholarship" puts too much emphasis on faculty alone, and "education" too much on students. Moreover, "scholarship" suggests what the scholar does to knowledge, and "education" suggests what someone does to a student. "Learning" suggests what professors and students do with knowledge, with thought, and with one another. Whitehead had it right and I repeat him: "uniting the young and the old in the imaginative consideration of learning." What helps with that is good for the university. What hinders it, hurts. For the academy this is the first and great commandment.

Our correct identification of learning as the true purpose of

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the university does not mean that the subjects we identified as worthy in the fifties should be definitive in the seventies. To some extent our fields were already dated then, not only because of the defensiveness of some departments and the nervousness of some professors, but because in each generation now the changing shape of what matters will necessarily outrun the individual skills of all but the most imaginative and flexible scholars. There is a sense in which the thirty-year tenure of the average professor necessarily implies some obsolescence in the kinds of learning that any given faculty is good for. There have been many explosions of knowledge since the 1950's, and the range of what belongs in the higher learning has widened every year. If we accept, as I think we should, the additional notion that learning itself, considered as a process, may be a more inclusive form of activity than the rather sharply defined process of intellection that most of us had in mind fifteen years ago, then we have a still further extension of the meaning of our central purpose.

Yet all these are additions to that purpose, not changes in its nature. Old fields do not usually lose their meaning when new ones appear, and a new emphasis on sensitivity, insight, feeling, and commitment as elements of learning can never mean that the use of reason and the appeal to evidence cease to be focal parts of the process. The truth, in the academy, is never hostile to reason, and it is one of the errors of what Professor Theodore Roszak calls the counter culture that it sometimes makes rationality itself the enemy; in every academy, even in dissent, that posture is absurd.

If learning is the defining end, then freedom is the defining means—the freedom of both faculty and students. And that freedom is essentially a freedom in relation to learning. Many other freedoms inhere in humanity and in citizenship, and neither the university nor anyone else should interfere with them. But the defining freedom in the life of the university itself is the freedom of learning, and that means also, for both student and professor, freedom of choice in *what* to learn.

In the fifties, as I have suggested earlier, we understood the learning-freedom of the professor better than that of the student. The beginnings of student complaint were heard too little. The sixties have seen an intensification of competitive pressure and external constraint (even without the draft), and of student resistance to the fact that these forces increase the sense of involuntary servitude to a required framework of learning. It is an in-

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teresting question how much students may exaggerate in these matters, and unless human nature has been repealed, there is sometimes an element of simple sloth in their dissatisfactions. But these are marginalia. The central fact is that there is no freedom when people do not *feel* free, and it follows that the liberation of the student, in relation to learning itself, is essential.

It is easier to state this need than to meet it, and I intend no essay on curricular reform. No amount of freedom can remove the demands which learning itself imposes. There are undoubtedly better and worse ways of learning physics or Russian, but no wholly effortless process has been devised or is likely soon. No university, not even the largest, can offer the best of learning in every field. Because it is true that not all serious learning is academic learning, the university and the student both face problems of connection and interconnection with experience outside the academy. All these limitations modify what can be achieved by internal curricular reforms—but they certainly do not make that reform unimportant.

Perhaps the best one can do in a brief compass is to define the freedom of the student as Kingman Brewster has done in setting the goal of a university of volunteers. People should enroll in a university because they want to learn there and they should stay only as they continue to want that. The achievement of that objective requires much more than curricular reform—it requires changes in external constraints, in the ease of transfer, and in many of the lesser priorities of students themselves. It may also require a nice discrimination between the freedom to choose a way of learning and the lack of freedom to neglect the work it demands. No serious form of freedom lacks demands. But the end of learning requires a free will to learn, and a free choice of what to learn. Any other answer makes the student less than a full member of the university—and as such it denies his fundamental academic rights.

The most important single change we need is a shift away from the deeply corrupting use of college as an escape from the draft. To treat the university merely as a refuge is bad enough when neither conscience nor fear is engaged. But when the young feel bound to the campus because the choices outside are odious —between fighting a war they hate and rejecting an America they still love—then the pressure on collegiate existence becomes extreme. It is good that the draft is now by lot; it will be better

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when all required military service occurs before college; and it will be best of all—for the country as well as the university—when we can get back to voluntary military service.

In comparison to the draft, ease of transfer from college to college may seem a trivial matter. It is not. Unless things have changed in recent years, the colleges and the undergraduates are the victims, here, of a vicious circle of reinforcing constraints. The colleges—especially the selective ones—do not like to lose the young men they have enrolled—and so they set up around their undergraduates a set of barriers which seem to say that the only way to make it is to make it here. Some of the more imaginative places are quite permissive and encouraging about time off, but not usually about transfer. Moreover, these places respect each other's feelings (except in the original battle over candidates for admission), and so they look warily on each other's candidates for transfer. It is not easy to go to Harvard by way of Yale, or vice versa, and the constraints apply far beyond that single narrow rivalry. Because these habits are deep, and undergraduate mores still conform to them, students themselves do not easily turn to the notion of transfer. If they don't like it where they are, they may grumble, or turn inward, or drop out, or even seek reform, but they do not ordinarily vote with their feet by going to another college. As a result there is some statistical support—or there was ten years ago—for the frequent view of admissions officers that transfer applicants are usually peculiar people who have failed somewhere else. The real records of real transfers in my time at Harvard were impressive—better on the whole than those of the men we had to start with. But we could never get the admissions committee to act on this evidence. Transfers in the fifties were like immigrants in the twenties. We *said* they had equal opportunity, but we did not really mean it. Ninety-five per cent of our space was held for those who were ready to begin at the beginning.

My objection to this exclusiveness grows only partly from my certainty that Harvard lost many fine students by simple backwardness; that is a merely parochial matter. What troubles me more is that I do not see how the learning-freedom of the modern student can truly be protected if the opportunity of transfer is not greatly enlarged. No contemporary college, however lively and untrammeled, can hope to suit the learning style of every freshman who has been charmed by a catalogue or by second-hand stories. Moreover it seems wrong, in matters so intimately related

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to the process of growing up, to deny to those who ask for it the bittersweet discovery that wherever you go you take yourself with you. It seems to be a fact of life, among the young of the rising age, that the picaresque mode has special meaning, and this mode has an ancient association with the world of learning. Finally, the enormous sorting-box of selective admissions, throughout the country, is bound to be very crude; literally tens of thousands of young men and women, every year, register in colleges that are just plain wrong for them. Some city and state systems have a serious and effective concern for correcting these unavoidable errors. It is one of the less admirable consequences of their intense self-concern that many of our "best" colleges do not.

The freedom of the student cannot be allowed to replace the freedom of the faculty. In our fierce and effective concern for *that* freedom, in the fifties, we were right. It is one of the encouraging elements of the current turbulence that almost no one seriously argues that there is any lasting good in limiting the freedom of the professor in what he learns and in what he says about that learning. In theory some white radicals denounce academic freedom, and in anger some black militants would abridge the freedom of those they consider racist. But, *in practice*, especially where real professorial freedom has been a tradition, there is little of this sort of thing. Students have a right not to listen to any particular professor, and that right deserves protection in curricular arrangements, but there is no net gain in any scheme of reform which constrains the man of learning in his most fundamental right and obligation—to learn and teach as he thinks right.

We were right about learning as the end, and about freedom as the means. We were also right about excellence as the standard, although here again our use of the standard should have been broader, and our process of judgment more humane.

I do not know how far this point needs to be pressed today. To us it was self-evident; Harvard tried to stand for quality, and centrally that meant the quality of learning. Nothing less would do, and if that could be achieved, much would be forgiven. So when we failed to meet this standard we found ourselves gnawing at the problem of change with something of the same frustration that is now felt by a new generation with different problems.[12] Today it may be different, so a few words in justification may not be superfluous.

The underlying reason for aiming high, in a university, is the

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consequence of doing anything else. The old saw that if a thing is worth doing at all, it is worth doing well, applies with extraordinary force to the higher learning; there, if a thing is not done well, it is often better not to do it (which is why the critics of the American academy are right when they complain that the mores of the profession have encouraged the publication of an endless stream of mediocre works of scholarship). When President Lowell declared war on the Gentleman C, he was acting in the correct and powerful conviction that the basic attitude toward learning which it represented was a denial of the purpose of the institution. As long as your purpose really is learning, your standards must be high. It is only by having high standards that one can judge competing claimants. The test of excellence is a practical necessity wherever funds are limited, space finite, and openings few, and this is the inescapable condition of the private university.

There are affirmative reasons for high aim, of course. One truly great scholar is worth two departments full of ordinary men, and among undergraduates there is no substitute for the reinforcing effect of living among contemporaries who have quality. The expectation of excellence can be crushing, but it can also be extraordinarily liberating. The object of any good community must be to try to minimize one effect and maximize the other.

One further and more contemporary justification of the standard of excellence in the purpose of learning is that it provides a means of resolving differences that might otherwise be reduced to vulgar political conflict. An outsider has the impression that a great deal of what passes for modern political thought on troubled campuses today has not been adequately subjected to the test of serious analysis. And of course the same thing is true, at any given time, of much of the conventional wisdom of the academy. But the test of analysis does exist, and the standard of excellence can be sustained. The university must recognize the man who is first-rate in learning even when—indeed especially when—his political or social or intellectual judgments are not popular, and whether that unpopularity is with colleagues, or students, or trustees, or the general public, and what is true of individuals is true also of whole schools of thought. If the academic marketplace is lively, if freedom is real, and if the test of excellence is sustained, the university can be the best possible place for the good idea—old or new—to prove itself. What will not face this test is unworthy of honor and deserves to be cast aside.

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I know that embattled scholars, old and young, left and right, may be indisposed to believe that there are standards of judgment on the quality of learning which are independent of politics. I also know that it is not hard to frame limiting cases where the immorality of a learned man becomes decisive. A scholar who seriously argued that nuclear warfare would be a healthy occasional corrective to human slackness would fall in this category for me, as did the men who surrendered their consciences to Stalinism a generation ago. But I do not think that such extremes of corruption are the interesting or defining elements of academic judgment. They are no more than the hard cases which tend to make bad law. The conservative and the liberal—indeed the reactionary and the radical—have an equal interest in preserving the common ground of respect for serious and responsible learning, and the beginning of wisdom is to accept the notion that learning and commitment are not opposite—only different. Professor Marcuse seems not to agree, and neither does Governor Reagan; the difference between them is that Professor Marcuse should know better (and perhaps he even does).

Learning, freedom, excellence are all good, but they are not enough—not enough even in the fifties, and plainly not enough today—not even if we assume that political conflict is kept out of academic life and that violence subsides. Let me now commingle the lessons of our earlier weakness with some speculative assertions about what the university needs today. And while no one word or phrase will summarize my notion, the one that comes closest is the concept of wider concern and commitment to the academic *community* as a whole. The time has passed when the academic man who did his own thing well has done enough. The extraordinary freedom that the great universities have accorded to their members now requires a new level of responsible participation in the life of the institutions as a whole. Excellence that does not connect itself to the concerns of others is no longer good enough.

The ways and means of action in the academic community as a whole are complex. The current debate on academic governance is important, and a substantial rearrangement of the ways of deciding things is almost surely needed in many institutions, as part of the process of strengthening the sense of community. But the agenda of community is even more important than its ways and means.

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Because it is relatively easy and straightforward, I will put first the establishment or re-establishment of confidence in the university as a corporate citizen which in the service of its purpose of learning does not neglect its obligation to its neighbors. The new concern here, which often comes first from students, is surely right. There can be plenty of argument over the shape and size of these obligations. The rights of neighbors are no more absolute than those of the university, and a glance at the past history of any university in America will suggest that it would not make sense to assume that every nearby tenant has a lifetime right of occupancy. But what does make sense is to face these questions openly and generously—and in particular to accept the obligation of assisting in relocation.

It is equally sensible, and indeed inescapable, to face similar questions on the national scene. Here, in most cases, the current issues are subject to reasonably effective answers simply by adhering to the university's own tests of learning, freedom, and excellence. It has never made sense, for example, to give academic credit for a learning experience as thin in quality as the R.O.T.C. curriculum. Even in the fifties we knew that; we made some slight progress in lifting the standards and reducing the credit, and if there had been more responsiveness in the Pentagon we would have done more. Nor can it be said that the particular form which R.O.T.C. has taken is necessary to give the armed services and interested undergraduates access to one another. Those who have used the issue simply for its political value and especially for its potentially radicalizing effect may deserve little sympathy, but by its own standards the university has fallen short here. I have already expressed myself on the issues of secrecy and large governmental laboratories. Both tend to violate the standards of academic freedom—one by locking things up and the other by putting financial control and policy guidance outside the academic community.

The largest questions of community are to be found inside the university itself, and they have to do with learning. Here it is the faculty most of all that must change, and the change will not be easy. Two general paths to change are possible: the appointment of new men, and the regeneration of a faculty by an internal process of study and action. Both are slow and hard, and the prospects for movement vary from time to time and place to place. At the Ford Foundation we try to keep an eye out for important and

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promising curricular reform, and we find surprisingly little so far. But the stirrings do exist, and they have important features in common: they reach beyond departments; they enlarge the student's own freedom and responsibility; they engage and respond to serious student opinion; they do not aim directly at scorecard merit; they aim to produce more learning, not less, in every sense of the word; they succeed only to the degree that they engage faculty support; and most of them are still timid—since they make only a marginal and fractional attack on the most traditional and least rational lockstep of all: the standard lecture course.

Of the rising generation of younger faculty men and women I know too little to speak firmly. No doubt they are as varied as we were twenty years ago, and no doubt also they are as inevitably marked by their experience of the sixties as we were by the forties (both politically and academically, but here I speak academically). One senses in the vanguard—certainly in the social sciences and perhaps elsewhere as well—a healthy distaste for merely departmental learning, and a rising recognition that learning is never inanimate—that it is learning *by*, as well as learning *about*. It is at least possible that excellence and a deep concern for the effectiveness of learning will be found more often together than apart, and it is also conceivable that more and more often the really first-rate appointment will be one that requires a department or division to stretch its view of what the "field" is and is becoming. It cannot be easy for young scholars to combine—as learning of this kind requires—an intense intellectual mastery of analytic tools and techniques, with an equally intense imaginative perception that the old molds do not fully contain the new problems. Many will slip off into a kind of scientism which brings an appearance of precision by the abandonment of reality, and others will attempt to make rhetoric or sentiment substitute for thought. But I think the highest excellence will be found when there is both intellectual mastery and imaginative breadth. It has usually been so in the past.

The curriculum that is wider than the departments and the excellent appointment that is both broad and deep are examples of a kind of general faculty responsibility which may be needed still more urgently in the allocation of resources and in academic planning. It will no longer be enough that only the administration thinks of these matters as a whole. I do not feel certain that faculties should take their part in this work on a university-wide

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basis—true professional schools will probably do better on their own. But something broader than the department—less subservient to the particular interests of the barons—will be needed if the faculty is to bear a large part of the future burden of financial choice. In private institutions, and I think increasingly throughout higher education, there will be hard choices in the next decade. New undertakings will be needed, and many of them. That will mean that old ones must be dropped. It is also quite likely that men of learning will need to be ready to defend their freedom at some financial sacrifice. Even if violence and politicization are contained, there will be big problems in paying for higher education, and the high cost of excellence is not likely to be matched in our society by a corresponding readiness of hard-pressed public authority to pay more for it. The very best scholars—without regard to their politics—are likely to face the same hazard in our society that is faced by others who seem like a self-selected elite.

It will not be easy to engage the faculty in the basic financial judgments of the university while avoiding beggar-my-neighbor politics and ordinary logrolling; once again I state a problem of government without attempting to solve it. The American professor has had a rich two decades. Both his own expectations and the necessary expansion of the administrative apparatus make it less than simple to reconnect academic and financial responsibility. Yet I cannot avoid the feeling that precisely this reconnection is at the heart of any effort to make the idea of community come true.

Whatever the ways and means of such a reconnection, one can see that when it succeeds, almost by definition, there will be some resolution of the tensions and strains that we have seen in the sixties between administrations and faculties. However the responsibilities are arranged, the two will be brought closer together. Here I have a difference with Clark Kerr, who has argued in an admirable essay that the politics of power in the university is a zero-sum game.[13] I think not. Indeed I believe the reverse is more nearly true, at least for the seventies, and that the one way that both administrations and faculties can increase their capacity to take action in the interest of the whole academic community is that they should do it together. I even believe that such a common effort may be the necessary means by which these two races of men, now so often separated, may learn to overcome the weaknesses with which they so often charge each other. Administrations

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can lose sight of the central purpose of learning, and faculties *can* be irresponsible. In a shared attack on the real issues of choice and of resources they can learn from each other and from the task itself.

Community implies humanity, and the one last requirement that I would set for the good university of the future is that it must do better than we did in the fifties in the simple business of respecting the dignity and humanity of all its members. This is hard, because the demands of excellence are severe, and the requirement of judgment real. But somehow we must separate ourselves from the excesses of the last two decades. It is true that the university must prize and reward excellence in learning, but it is emphatically not true that excellence in learning is the one true test of human quality. A failure to make this distinction is responsible for much human suffering—and a resulting destruction of usefulness—among faculty members, and its destructive effects among students may be greater still, leading them too easily either to despair because they interpret some academic failure too broadly, or to a cynicism about learning that is derived from a quite proper refusal to give it total pre-eminence in all human concerns.

I look again to the faculty for the necessary leadership in reasserting the claims of humanity. I look to them because any other agency will be understandably mistrusted, not only in the faculty itself but also among students. The deans of students, the administrative advisers, and the rest of the student-oriented staff that works with dedication to be helpful to the individual undergraduate, in our good colleges, is necessarily somewhat suspect, in the current framework of opinion, because it does *not* represent learning, and of course it often happens, for most understandable reasons, that these staffs develop a certain anti-academic bias. Students themselves have plenty of humanity, but in their case too there is great danger that learning and humanity may be falsely set in opposition to each other. Only the men of learning can reassert the claims of humanity without running that risk.

Learning, freedom, excellence, community, humanity. It is a lot to ask, and there is nothing in the past or present of the American university which should lead us to delude ourselves about the prospect of perfection. This is a merely human institution we are considering, and the mark of man on any ideal is the mark of imperfection. In the happy academy of the fifties we understood

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this harsh truth about the world; our favorite moral philosopher was Reinhold Niebuhr. But now we know it about the university too; its time of trouble is, in that hard sense, a reminder of its humanity. But these troubles do not dim the light of right purposes, standards, and concerns. These the university must live by. When it does, the interesting question will not be a comparative or a superlative: Is it better? Or is it perhaps the best? The interesting question will be at once more modest and more absolute: Is it good?

References

1. There was even one extraordinary case—that of the great von Bekesy—in which we let the Navy pay the whole bill. His work on the human ear was pure science, and eventually he won the Nobel Prize. So much for the notion that all defense-supported research is bad.

2. In 1970 the future of the C.E.A. appears to be in some doubt—the big machines are being pinched by a budgetary squeeze in which particle physics is less favored than reactor research. To me this seems a reasonable result if the choice must be faced; the riddles of the universe are less important right now than the crisis of clean energy. But it was not wrong for Harvard physicists to study the riddles while they could—and I suspect that Harvard physics will be able to shift its collective attention, if necessary, as well as any.

3. Which is not to say that Mr. Dulles was all wrong. He was defending his policy over Quemoy and Matsu, and that particular encounter does not look as bad now as we thought it did then.

4. It was of course one of the mysteries of the decade that students were not politically very active—much less active, indeed, than the faculty. And it does no good to blame Joe McCarthy; he was a spent force by 1955, and the low point of student activism owes as little to him as the high point of 1968 owed to the other McCarthy. Both men were much more symptoms than prime movers.

5. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Changing Cultures of Harvard," *Harvard Alumni Bulletin* (September 15, 1969), p. 53.

6. Its delay in honoring this greatest of Harvard's teachers was not the best of the Corporation's performances in the age of Conant; was this the long shadow of the Sacco-Vanzetti case?

7. We did not always enjoy the same moments as the alumni. The speech I remember best was a prose-poem by Erwin Panofsky on "The Ivory Tower." The speaker had a heavy accent and an incurably allusive style. He was witty and brilliant, and he said a great deal about the Idea of the University, but not all the older graduates followed every word as they sat in the afternoon sun.

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8. The irony of this program was that in the name of unity—the common fundamentals of liberal education—it in fact provided escape from the departments and a constantly widening range of choices. It seemed best at the time to leave the theory unchallenged because of its good practical results, but we may have complicated things for those who came later.

9. "By fair means" is an escape hatch which I put in because of the unfair political influence that exists in many places outside the academy—mostly the influence of money.

10. It may have been one of the advantages of the 1950's, from the point of view of a right understanding of the role of the university, that very few members of the academic community thought of the Eisenhower administration as an extension of themselves. This advantage may mark the early 1970's too.

11. I here skip over the question of relative assignments and roles between colleges and universities and academic research institutes like the Princeton Institute or the Brookings Institution; all of them, for my present purposes, are at one in their basic mission—all are for learning.

12. It strikes me that this may be one reason for the recurrent and endlessly inconclusive discussion in Cambridge of the undergraduate foreign language requirement. It is set at a level which assures nothing more than functional illiteracy, and as such it seems a disgrace to a great university. But neither the faculty nor the students can take seriously the notion that all undergraduates should really know a foreign language. Yet should they know nothing of any? The faculty used to worry its way around this one—leave it alone—and suffer—because whatever else this arrangement might be, it was not excellent.

13. Clark Kerr, "Governance and Functions," *Dædalus* (Winter 1970), pp. 108-121.

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WALTER P. METZGER

The Crisis of Academic Authority

THOUGH THE academic wars have lately slackened, this nation would be rash to conclude that its campuses have been pacified or their local regimens made secure.[1] Recent experience should teach it that the level of military activity varies with the issues and the season, and with the size of the fighting cadres, which are subject to attrition but can be refilled. It would also be deluding itself if it believed that only a few of its campuses had been unruly—and these for unusual local circumstances. Only several years ago, when Berkeley faced its troubles all alone, one could reasonably assume that its troubles *were* its own, that they stemmed from its peculiar combination of brilliance, Bohemianism, and bureaucracy. Since then, the spread of such travails has weakened the credibility of such diagnoses. True, the larger and more urban institutions still report a greater number of intense engagements, but smaller institutions in less dense environments are also subject to disruption (witness, the recent disturbances at predominantly Negro institutions and at bucolic women's colleges) and site and scale advantages no longer guarantee the quiet life. Nor, for that matter, do first-rateness, antiquity, or tone: if Yale and Princeton have managed so far to emerge unbloodied, the carnage at Harvard makes it evident that there lies no protective magic in patrician manners and elite sodality, and that sanguineness at Old Nassau or New Haven would be entirely premature. Indeed, the only local characteristics that still seem to matter, as predictors of tumults in the offing, are those that have come to obtain quite widely: a requirement of high test scores for admission (especially high *verbal* test scores—there appears to be a strong association not only between mind and militancy, but between volubility and volatility); a rich supply of liberal arts

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courses (especially in the humanities and social sciences—there also appears to be a connection between the indeterminacy of a subject and the indocility of its subscribers); and a large enough contingent of black students to make the assertion of racial consciousness a collective rather than a lonely task. When only one of these conditions is met, the authorities of a college or university have reason to rest uneasy; when all of these conditions are met, the very foundations of authority may be threatened, as they were at Cornell University, where the administration yielded to a show of student gunmanship, and at Columbia University, where the administration toppled after it summoned force.

Yet the crisis of academic authority is not completely pictured, however it may be sharply highlighted, by the violence that has entered campus life. The evidence of opinion surveys seems to indicate that for every student who wins a stripe in battle, there exists a myriad of students who impugn the moral basis of authority without going to the lengths of all-out war. One way of putting this is to say that the challenge to legitimacy is more extensive than the challenge to regulations. Another—and, I think, very useful—way of putting this is to say that the crisis of authority consists less in the rise of acts of disobedience than in the decline of the spirit of subordination. Lest this seem a narrower way of putting this, one would do well to remember that American institutions of higher learning, for all their reputation as collegial bodies, are riddled with asymmetrical relationships—that is, relationships between persons and groups of persons with unequal holdings of power, privilege, or prestige. These institutions pride themselves on being "special places," not for having banished all of life's disparities, but for having accepted only those based on just criteria and for having applied them to benign ends. Here, their spokesmen long have boasted, superordinates *act on behalf of* subordinates, *never at the expense of* subordinates: in a word, the asymmetrical relationships are *paternal*, not *exploitative*. Altruism motivates its men in power: trustees, like heroic soldiers, serve just for the honor of it; presidents, for all their official power, minister to the occupants of lower stations; senior professors, though judges of their juniors, also act as their guides and mentors; teachers work only to improve their students and, even on such occasions when they admonish them, do so only for the latter's sake. Nor is this goodness considered accidental. Colleges and universities, in the flattering light in which they have long

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beheld themselves, are presumed to ordain, by their very nature, the magnanimous use of men by men. Lacking the organizational goal of profit, they are presumed to be exempted from the harsh necessity of capitalizing on another's weakness to make gains. Set up to produce and distribute knowledge, the one commodity that appears to fulfill the giver even as it enriches the recipient, they are presumed to create a harmony of interests that the makers of other goods cannot attain. In addition, as home to a multitude of professions, they are presumed to incorporate the ethic that is the distinguishing feature of professionalism—obligatory service to the public, fiduciary duty to the client, conscientious devotion to vocation, even above the calls of self. Finally, as centers of free inquiry, they are presumed to accept the prohibitions that this function places on the use of power: no doctrinal commitments by the institution, no granting of internal rewards save by the neutral test of merit, no levying of internal punishments where the effect would be to chill or evict dissent.

What has happened in the last decade or so is that this rationale for academic inequalities, with its accompanying "special place" analysis, has ceased to be self-evident to college students; indeed, to many, it has become patently absurd and false. Not in all respects nor for an overarching reason: the incredulity of students, like their ability to be persuaded, varies with their temper, their circumstances, and their politics. Nevertheless, there does exist a core of agreement that can be described as follows: against the standing claim of academic authority that the asymmetries it fosters are *paternal*, impressive numbers of students now allege that those asymmetries are *paternalistic*—which is to say, ostensibly paternal, but in actuality exploitative.

No one close to the academic scene would ever regard this as a bland hypothesis, offered with civility and received with calm. The line between candor and rudeness is not so clear to the members of this generation that it can accuse the university of hypocrisy with words that never inflict a wound. Some students, indeed, are deliberately unsparing: those convinced that high-placed altruism is a cover under which high-placed interests get their way, those convinced that the exploitativeness of the university abets the larger exploitativeness of society, seem to fear that they would be tolerating grotesque evils if they were ever to practice gracious forms. The discussion is thus heavily laden with personal abuse and reprobation, and it would take more Iagos

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than are common within the precincts for those whose motives have been questioned to reply with an admissive nonchalance. Still, it would not be the first time in the history of the American university that particular trustees have been attacked for importing class biases into its councils, that particular administrators have been denounced for accepting tainted money and calling it a harmless gift, that particular professors have been scolded for hankering for the fleshpots on some richer Nile. What differentiates the current *ad hominem* assault from the previous ones is the structural analysis that accompanies it, an analysis that rejects the notion of the university as a constitutionally-benign place. Not in unison, but with great sonority, students now assert that the university is an employer, a landlord, a lender, and is thus as prone to exploiting the disadvantaged as is any profit-making enterprise; that the alleged mutualities of knowledge do not exist in the ordinary classroom, where things-to-be-learned are authoritatively superimposed on passive, sullen, and unwilling learners, nor do they exist in the library and the laboratory, where research is in service to the status quo; that professionalism is not at odds with the urge to self-advantage, but a sophisticated method of indulging it, through guild controls and restrictive licenses; that academic freedom is a shibboleth, first because it is not practiced, as the preponderance of safe opinions among scholars testifies, and second because it is not practicable, since the involvements of the university with society are so *ex parte* that the very call for institutional neutrality is in itself a disingenuous form of partisanship.

To many academics, these are very disturbing arguments, not only because they cast reflections on their own conduct, commitments, and claims to deference, but because they threaten, by their self-fulfilling power, to create the very evils they deplore. To certain adult imaginations, these animadversions of the young call up a terrifying Visigothic outcome: students reciting mistakes that teachers, if they still existed, would not dare to criticize; research in bondage to a single master—the party of radical social change; truth subordinated to virtue and virtue defined by a show of hands; authority everywhere defeated and raw power everywhere enthroned. But not every response is so apocalyptic—nor even so antagonistic; fully to appreciate the provocativeness of this attack, one would have to reckon with the approval it arouses (and the intramural tensions this in turn creates). Often there is

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consonance between the students and the younger faculty: this may be attributed to the absence of status loyalties that might cut across political and stylistic ties. When veteran authority agrees, it may do so because of its own divisions: thus, administrators, otherwise at cross-purposes with students, may join them in stigmatizing professors for coasting along on their tenure rights. But the variety of response has a deeper root. The student revolt against what were once the shared assumptions of the university faces the authorities within it, especially those of advancing years, with the prospect that they will leave without issue, their visions lost, their metier repudiated. The aging look to the young for validation: it is a cruel and often unbearable thing to find a cross and contemptuous rebuff instead. In that extremity, men may go to diverse extremes, some identifying with the young to gain its favor, others abandoning the young to return its spite. To pay heed to the faithless progeny without impersonating it, to contest its repudiatory doctrines without repaying it in kind, often takes unusual aplomb.

The purpose of this essay is to chart the possibilities of that middle course. What professional and institutional stands or policies would help reunite the university? is the ultimate question it poses. What is the cause of this disjunction and why has it come at the present time? is the proximate question it asks. It is easy to see why the search for an irenic agenda yields priority to a search for a causal frame. If we think of student oppositionists as enemies to be defeated, we are not likely to be curious about their motives. It is when we are convinced that all one-sided victories would be Pyrrhic that our interest in these matters comes alive.

The current corpus of explanation does more to whet than to satisfy that interest. Whosoever seeks will surely find, in the bourgeoning bibliography now before him, a wide assortment of speculations, each purporting to explain why college students are now so defiant of authority. He will find theories based on what students say, on what they feel, and on what they mean, whatever they say or feel; he will find age, status, class, and ideology treated as the crucial variables; he will find analogies drawn from the log of history, diagnoses from the clinical casebooks, taxonomies from the literature of social science. But he will also find conceptual confusion, for these interpretive schemes do not fit together; and he will also find an oversupply of polemics, for this literature ex-

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horts as much as it explains. The reasons for confusion are not mysterious. The study of students and student movements—until recently a rare excursus, only now a rapidly-expanding "ology"—has not yet had time to take stock of itself and gain coherence. Moreover, its contributors, who are mostly professors, bring not only their talent for analysis but their guilts and defenses to this subject, and it should be anticipated that those who start out by asking "why their base ingratitude?" and those who start out by asking "how have we offended?" will wind up in conceptual and moral disaccord. But the result is a compendium of rival theses and little synthesizing thought.

To use this organon, one has to, in a sense, create it—that is, evolve one's own criteria for identifying the most valid and most integrative interpretations. This is a far from easy thing to do, for many different interpretations offer stabs of insight, and some with hegemonic claims are contradictory. To illustrate: it has been argued by Lewis Feuer, a philosopher versed in history and psychology, that today's student movement is but the latest in a string of student movements whose force is derived from youth's desire to destroy and replace their elders, a desire that arises from unconscious wells.[2] Not the least of the merits of this thesis is that it alerts us to the long, if neglected, history of conflict between the young and old in school. To those who recoil from the fractious present by fantasying a peaceful past, this work is a salutary reminder that the annals of colleges and universities offer less a glimpse of Eden than of Armageddon. All over the world, at different moments, students have been riotous and revolutionary, one of the main striking forces against Establishments that are seen as bankrupt and decrepit. In this country, though student revolutionism is rather new, student riotousness is old—as old as the classical collegiate system which it eventually overthrew. In Feuer's view, these time-after-time upheavals have a timeless origin—the ineluctable struggle for the power that fathers wield and their offspring want. As a contribution to what might be called (borrowing from his mentor) the problem of "edification and its discontents," this psychoanalytic formula has a certain usefulness. Anyone over forty teaching twenty is aware that he is sometimes made the target of irrelevant or at least extraneous emotions, that at times certain wrangles in the classroom—for example, those over grading or course requirements—do get caught up in the struggle for independence

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that began but did not end at home. Standing *in loco parentis* (the thesis argues) is not only the lawyer's formula but the teacher's destiny; hence, the current student war against authority (it implies) is also a result of displacement and bears the same signature of fate. But does this predestinarian formula provide the unifying thesis we are seeking? For several reasons, we do not think it does. As whites teaching blacks will attest, many campus issues do not lend themselves to Oedipal explanations. Nor do such explanations square with what is known about the families of student radicals, which is that they are generally not repressive or authoritarian, but permissive and democratic, and that they exhibit, rather than caesuras, a great deal of intergenerational continuity, especially in the sphere of values and beliefs. To regard the academy as a stage for the playing out of familial psychodramas is to ignore or at least underestimate what the academy may itself contribute to the thematic substance of the play. Most important, a history that coalesces every student movement, here and everywhere, past and present, tends in the end to rob each of its historic character. The student movement in America today is surely less prankish and more principled than that which strained the control capacities of the old-time college. For all their superficial likenesses, the Russian student movement of the nineteenth century, which sought to modernize an agrarian, traditionalistic society, and the student movements in the West today, which seek to overturn an industrial, bureaucratic society, exhibit a difference of aim that amounts to a difference in kind. To see a cyclical recurrence of student movements, especially from a psychoanalytic viewpoint, is to make every youthful insurrection since the primal parricide come out looking very much the same.

Not every psychological explanation errs in this direction. To Erik Erikson, Kenneth Keniston, and other identity psychologists, the critical and unique fact about young people of today is that they do not pass directly to adulthood from adolescence but enter an intervening stage where, free from conventionalizing social roles, their moral senses may be perfected, and their personal identities defined.[3] Putting aside all the psychiatric nuances that embellish the argument but cannot concern us here, we can point to a number of ways in which this concept of youth serves heuristic functions. The freedom and protectedness of modern youth, which is much greater than that of youth in other eras, may ac-

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count for its greater willingness to take the risks—the risk of punishment for breaking laws, the risk of opprobrium for speaking out—that go with defiance of authority. The notion of a "psychosocial moratorium," which pictures youth as identifying with the oppressed other even as it seeks a more authentic self, may tell us why the New Left, and not the Old Left, joins political with psychological objectives—why, for example, the YPSL's and Young Communist Leagues of the thirties, which were tied to the kites of adult movements, cared less about inner liberation, and more about party discipline, than the youth-centered radicalism of today. And yet this thesis, though it gives as much to change and context as Feuer gives to mechanism and continuity, does not offer a conceptual touchstone either. In part, this is because it too has a limited range of reference—largely middle-class youth, and probably largely white. More than this, it is too tightly framed (in Keniston's work much more than Erikson's[4]) by a particular normative commitment—the belief that ethical capacities are enlarged by protracted societal abstentions. Married to another bias, as it is in a recent article on this subject written by the sociologist, Bennett H. Berger, the same deferment of adulthood can be called a prolongation of adolescence, and the same shielding from patterned social roles can be seen as personally and socially deleterious.[5] The inverted argument may be put as follows: modern societies (especially this one) subject their young to a debilitating combination of precocious instruction and prolonged dependency. "Earlier" and "earlier" is the slogan of our socializers: wealth and urban culture reduce the age of initiation into sex and drugs and consumer competence; television makes the world a village and brings youngsters abreast of what their elders know; parents, anxious under affluence, send their babies to nurseries to be socialized, and teach them in their households how to read. But "later" and "later" is the message of the corporate-technological economy: every occupation requires formal training and every formal training stretches out; those who do not submit themselves to lengthy schooling are banished from the sphere of work; the menace of conscription forces males to go to college or endure more dangerous delays. It may be possible to believe that persons wise to the ways of the world since they were toddlers but forced to wait for advanced degrees before they enter it will perceive that world with moral clarity. But it is much more probable that something else will follow when a

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colossal loss of innocence coincides with an equal loss of responsibility: a failure to recognize the achievements, as well as the deficiencies, of institutions; an ethic of absolute ends in pursuit of which any means are justified; and a strong inclination to delusion. Were we to have to choose one or the other as the capstone thesis, we might have to do so on the basis of our preference for its underlying bias. As we believe that college may be both a cordoned period *and* a waiting game, that college students may be variously idealistic *and* nihilistic, conscientious *and* unscrupulous, we would find it difficult to state a clear-cut preference. But we also believe that value compatibility ought not to be decisive in these matters, and so we resist this Hobson's choice.

These are not the only explanations that run in pairs. Professional educators in particular, but a host of other commentators as well, tend to favor "internalistic" explanations—that is, explanations that stress the incitations of the life that is lived in the university. Some who look for the causes of unrest in that arena find them in the dissentient subcultures—radical, mystical, drug-centered—that are bred in the all-encompassing "multiversity"; others find them in the larger youth culture, in whose counter-curriculum everyone enrolls though no one registers; still others find them in the formal course of study, which is deemed to be effective either because of the subversive creed it propagates or because of the multitudes it repels. At the same time, there are other analysts, such as Professor George Wald of Harvard and the authors of the Amherst Statement, who favor "externalistic" explanations—that is, explanations that seek the causes of unrest, not in the problems of the university, but in the plight of the entire nation: in the persistence of racial injustice, the presence of poverty amid plenty, the threat of nuclear disaster, and, above all, the appalling war in Vietnam. Both types of explanations seem to cast some light, but not in the same direction and not without leaving certain things obscure. Surely there is something to the notion that, in making the modern university, society built more dangerously than it knew. Assemble young people at their peak of energy; assure them of incessant contact over many years; drench them in the critical traditions of liberalism, radicalism, avant-gardism; let them savor books that are elsewhere inaccessible or forbidden; free them from all but sporadic labors; protect them with a measure of extraterritoriality—and you do create, wittingly or not, a social combustion chamber. Add to all else

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a number of contemporary ingredients—graduates and undergraduates mixed together, so that callow dissent may find polished leadership; immense enrollments in certain places, so that only a fraction of the student body may form a Jacquerie of thousands—and you increase the likelihood of ignition. Still, it is a fact that nothing very explosive happened during the two decades before the sixties; clearly, the stuff that composes the university does not have an invariant effect. Does it not follow that a greater potency resides in less recondite, less insular, and less unreasoned causes—in the sordid nature of the world that the old have made and the young must cope with? The "externalists" would surely say so and we would, up to a point, agree. The world with which youth must cope *is* sordid. And its perception that this is so may turn out to be transfixing, for each generation gets its bearings from the events that occur in its plastic phase. Here, indeed, may lie a clue to the gap that has grown between Americans of different ages: the use of military force against a far-off peasantry in brutal combat may have as much an imprinting effect on this day's young people as the use of national power to liberate Europe from the Nazis—that awful and yet much better war—had on their then-youthful sires. But externalistic arguments also seem inadequate, not so much for what they put in, as for what they leave out. If student dissension is simply to be understood as a way of requiting society for its own delinquencies, why does it also appear in developed countries where the same delinquencies are less apparent—in countries, for example, that are not involved in expeditionary wars, do not have serious race problems, do not make or idolatrize atom bombs? And why are student angers so diffuse that they extend not only to the war camps but the universities, and not only to profiteers and bigots, but to their poorer and fairer-minded dons? Granting the importance of the external stimulus, we must still ask, why the oddities of the response?

If nothing else, we gain from this partial review of imperfect arguments a clearer sense of the desiderata of our search.[6] The explanation we are looking for is one that would meet the following criteria: it would capture the passion and pervasiveness, as well as the more makeshift characteristics, of the current student movement; it would apply to all—and not just a few—of the major subgroups in the student cadre of disaffection; it would place the student revolt in history, but not in metahistory; it would incorporate—or at least not contradict—the keenest perceptions of

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other theses; it would synthesize—or transcend—the contrarieties of inner and outer; it would rest on no preconceived notion concerning the rectitude of youth. In the current state of this art or science, none of the going explanations, in my opinion, fully fills this bill. But I do believe that two, with proper explication, may come close to doing so, and it is with these that we shall hereafter be concerned. Both take a major world event as the diagnostic starting point: one, the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century; the other, the religious ferment of the sixteenth century. Both see a deep-seated force at work: one, the desire for social equality; the other, the quest for spiritual satisfaction. Both see the university as bearing the brunt of these potent forces: one because it defends paternalism in a clamorously egalitarian era; the other because it stimulates without fulfilling a demand for redemption and deliverance. We do not find these theses mutually exclusive. Indeed, we believe that, up to a point, they supplement each other, putting different pieces of the puzzle together, making different puzzling pieces more intelligible. But only up to a point; beyond that, their differing clarities and designs put us again to the necessity of choosing.

In a suggestive recent article, Herbert G. Gans, a sociologist, concluded that the "social protest of the nineteen-sixties has to do with *inequality*, with the pervasive inequities remaining in American life."[7] In his view, the war against "inequities" (what we have called asymmetrical relationships) is by no means confined to the campus, but is being waged all over the social landscape, and reaches generals, popes, and party oligarchs as well as pedagogues and deans. Moreover, as a free translation of his article suggests, the same tendency to expose the fallacies of paternalism can be observed on this broader plain. The poor who are not only unreconciled to their poverty but to the intrusive assistance of welfare agencies; women who are turning to a form of feminism that inveighs against sexual condescension as well as sexual discrimination; blacks who detect the stain of racism both in the white man's prejudice and his *noblesse oblige*—all are saying in effect what we hear the students saying: that asymmetrical relationships are in themselves objectionable, and cannot be saved by professions of good will. The question arises: Do students say this because they hear others saying it, is the university a victim of a rhetoric borrowed from the temper of the time? One could argue that, while the others have actually been mistreated by those

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who affect a benign authority, students, having no serious interest of their own at stake, can only take vicarious displeasure in what happens to these others in mismatched encounters. No doubt, given the heavy traffic of communication among antipoverty workers, leaders of black and women's liberation movements, and student activists of diverse kinds—and, of course, given the fact that students may also be poor, female, and black—there *is* some simulation based on social mimicry. But we shall understand neither the egalitarian thrust of students, nor that of the company they keep, if we simply regard the former as derivative, and the latter as the work of the deprived. For one thing, if only because they pay in time and money for a service that may or may not be worth the price, students, *as* students, do have material interests that are genuinely theirs and not another's. For another thing, within the other groups, those who decry paternal structures are not those whose material interests are most impaired by them. Indeed, quite often, the essence of their argument against paternalism is not that it is contradicted by abuses, but that it is a contradiction in terms—that it inflicts on the subordinated person the injury of powerlessness and dependency, the more egregiously the more he is indulged. What all this bespeaks is the growth of a new consensus concerning the right of individuals, not necessarily the least favored of individuals, to control the decisions that affect their lives. And this is surely part of a long-term trend, not an eccentric shift in fashion. The spirit of social equality that the French and American Revolutions loosened and that Tocqueville prophesied would conquer the western world has appeared in successive incarnations, of which we now seem to see the latest, if not the last. We do not fully understand the dynamics of this tendency, but it does seem to gain a certain momentum from itself (yesterday's attainment of a wider suffrage sets the stage for today's bid for direct democracy; yesterday's struggle for equality *before* the law provokes today's struggle for equality *through* the law), and from the rise of new social groups with an importunate self-awareness. It would appear that contemporary students constitute such a group: whether or not they should be termed a class (and their remoteness from the productive process or their transiency may, by definition, preclude that nomenclature), they do seem to display, like the emergent bourgeoisie and workers of other eras, a very strong consciousness of kind, a distinguishing dress and manner, an unwillingness to defer to their so-called bet-

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ters, and a desire to be actually, rather than virtually, represented in the governances of their time. To Tocqueville, the progressive realization of equality was a foreordained, even providential, tendency. As to this, I would rest agnostic, for it does not seem to have been altogether predetermined that higher education would go mass and thus nominate and concentrate new masses; that new media would come along to tell college students who they are and why they should think of themselves as distinctive; that the economy would grow at such a pace as to make millions of the able-bodied young dispensable and the cost of their numerous spas affordable; that a long period of high employment would befall and erode the habit of submissiveness that is ever the result of the threat of need. But the trend toward greater equality, once it is reinvigorated by the rise of new and assertive social groups, is surely difficult to reverse.

We have no difficulty fitting students who happen to be black into this frame of understanding. We cannot say the same, however, about blacks who happen to be students—that is, about the far greater number who define themselves secondarily in terms of status, first and foremost in terms of race. To accommodate *this* drive toward equality, we shall have to enlarge our paradigm of inequalities, which has thus far recognized only two—those which by intent and effect can be labeled paternal or exploitative. Clearly, this is a truncated sociology: any conventional handbook will dilate on the importance of another archetype, on that set of asymmetrical relationships in which the treatment of the lower by the higher is controlled by generalized rules that define the scope of their respective offices and that forbid, at least in principle, either an undue favoring of the one or an undue aggrandizement by the other. If we add the more circumspect bureaucratic form to our vocabulary of reference, should we not also inject, at the other extreme, a form that produces a dominancy so omnipotent, a subordinacy so unmitigated, that it also constitutes a special type? Here the conventional literature is less facilitating, but we cannot look at black-white relationships in this country, or at what we would take to be their foreign analogues, and not be convinced that a fourth class of asymmetry does exist. Borrowing terminology from St. Clair Drake, we would call these inequalities "victimizing" and the way in which they produce their effects a "victimization" process.[8] To elaborate briefly: in a victimizing relationship, as I conceive it, the superordinate group,

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through its monopoly of force and its control of cultural messages, compels the subordinate group to accept its derogatory appraisal of it. Victimization may thus be seen as a kind of subordination *plus*—plus the introjection of a judgment from on high that imperils one's necessary love of self—as a man (the judgment says, "child-like, brute-like, ineffectual and insensate"), as a woman (the judgment says, "ugly, by any permissible test of beauty"), as a human being (the judgment says, "of all mankind, the most servile and debased"). Where the ego is encased in a derived official identity (as it is in bureaucratic situations), where even the adverse judgments of superiors are presented in wrappers of affection (as they are in paternal situations), where the defeats that the subordinate experiences can be attributed to *force majeure* rather than to inherent incapacities (as they often can be in exploitative situations), such self-diminishments do not occur. In another respect, however, victimization can be seen as a kind of subordination *minus*—minus the recesses and planned cessations that other asymmetrical forms allow. In the nonvictimizing situation, the subordinated life may be lived occasionally—on the work-site, but not at home; or it may be interrupted—by a status holiday paid on credit or through the church's Sunday parities; or it may be limited to certain ages—after a status-diversified public schooling and before a status-indeterminate retirement, or from birth to the coming of legal age. By contrast, the life-space of the victimized is allowed no such zones of exception: if he is branded by his color, he will never travel in society incognito; if he lives in a *de jure* caste system, he will be kept out of equalizing institutions; if he lives in a *de facto* caste system, he will, upon admission to such institutions, find that they have ceased to work. Finally, victimization can be seen as a species of subordination without example, in that it alone (with the mild exception of paternal processes, when they are used to assimilate minorities) attempts to efface the subordinate's ethnic memory, especially of such traces of a group existence as may arouse any retrospective pride. To the question, "What groups in America have been victimized?" I would answer, in the hope that firmness might yield clarity, "not those who have had access to structured equalizers; not those who have not been denarcissized or emasculated; not those who have basked in the power of a former homeland, or have remembered the glories of their forebears, or have rehearsed through ritual and celebration the chosenness of their

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folk." In short, not students, women, old and new white ethnic groups; conceivably, American Indians, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos; clearly, American blacks.

To guard against a hardening of the categories—the sort of analytico-sclerosis that a too-terse analysis would invite—I take pains to point out that victimization and exploitation may well go on concurrently in fixing the destinies of certain groups. Persons convinced of their inferiority are less able to protect themselves against being plundered: this may have been one of the considerations that converted exploiters into victimizers and let slavery take root in the United States. Groups concentrated in menial positions where they are bombarded with unfeeling insults, groups too oppressed by poverty ever to buy an exempting furlough, may move from one process into another. Thus it was that colonial regimes, even when they sought only to beggar their subjects not deracinate them, wound up very often doing both. To say this, however, is not to dissolve the distinction between victimization and exploitation (after all, the most flagrant of all victimizing situations—the debasement and extinction of millions of human beings in concentration camps—did not have a significant exploitative objective), but to point to the double character of the current struggle of blacks to achieve equality. Having been victimized *and* exploited, they now aim at devictimization and de-exploitation—at two reparative goals, not one. Their different goals require different—and to some extent divergent—strategies. The classic strategy for ending exploitation is occupational mobility; the modern prescription for ending exploitation is to press for a reallocation of resources that would make that mobility more attainable. For the purpose of devictimization, which entails the purging of a negative self-image supplied by the dominant other and the replacement of it by a new sense of efficacy and pride, these are insufficient devices. "Making it" may carry the implication that one has abandoned the war against white invidiousness in return for the benefits of white preferment. Group pressure to get fair shares is more to the purpose of the healing psyche, but black encounters with white authority must not be suppliant or obsequious, no matter what benefit is at stake. This is not to suggest that devictimization, in this country, has a single, settled, and secure procedure. Historically, the main vehicle of devictimization has been decolonization. Cast out the alien larcener of your territories; give your own sort the dignities

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of state office, the governorships, the consulates, the ministries; replace the foreigner's *lingua franca,* whose every syllable asserts his primacy, with your own mother-taught tongue or tongues; be the judge of what is best and beautiful so that your own may look lovely in your eyes—these are the counsels that have bestirred the victimized in many lands, at many times. They bestir the blacks in America; but where the color ratio is so unfavorable, the area of settlement so dispread, the claim to ethnic precedence so disputable, what is elsewhere a unifying cause becomes here more a galvanizing example. Where the exorcism of historic powerlessness cannot be achieved by the hope of gaining sovereign power, devictimization takes substitute forms, seeks partial outlets. It turns the ghetto into a native territory that must be defended by its residents against snatch and seizure; it bids for autonomy in the local units of large-scale governing bureaucracies; it creates cultural and political institutions that work outside the established ones; it resorts to expressions of contempt and rage against the quondam "masters"; it develops a new ethnic nationalism even though no new nation is in sight. And, in consequence, it greatly complicates the strategy of equality. Full-fledged decolonizing movements, in seeking to eliminate the foreign ruler and all his works, appeal to the exploited *and* the victimized (to be sure, the thorough eradication of foreign influence is not so easy to accomplish, and the poor, unlike the mere humiliated, do not always prosper after independence). Quasi-decolonizing movements, on the other hand, permit the "foreign" regimen, with its massive wealth and tempting prizes, to remain essentially undismantled (though it may be significantly disturbed). Their effect, thus, is to open wide the question of whether integration or separation is the better strategy, and whether economic improvement and racial therapy can be jointly or must be separately achieved.

That the American academic system should become the target of these egalitarian forces seems at first ironic to anyone acquainted with other systems. By world standards, ours is an already remarkably open, comprehensive, uninvidious—and, in these ways, egalitarian—system. Unlike most other nations, we do not fix the educational destiny of students at any early age through tests that reveal their aptitude, do not assign them to intermediate schools that are either conduits to the university or educational cul-de-sacs, do not suffer bottlenecks at the point

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where high school graduates seek admission to studies of a higher grade. As a result, we accord a higher education to almost half of the age-eligible population, which is twice the proportion of our nearest competitor and eight to ten times the proportion of most major industrial states. Nor do we greatly constrict the passageways beyond that point: we do not tie academic performance tightly to career success (perhaps in no other country does the academic record count for so little in gaining entry into governmental service); we do not preclude admission to college in late career (perhaps in no other country is faith in the "late-bloomer" so conventional, the cult of the endless second-chance so enshrined). Uniquely inclusive with respect to numbers, our system is also uniquely inclusive with respect to fields. Elsewhere one may find pedagogy and engineering and agricultural science taught outside—and beneath—the university, or find journalism, marketing, and hotel management taught nowhere but on the job. Here, by contrast, there is hardly an activity of life that does not gain curricular recognition: to read the American academic catalogue is, at many places, to survey the whole American occupational scene. Finally, as outsiders have often noted, the psychological and social distance separating professors from students is relatively shorter in our system. The interspace in asymmetrical relationships is likely to be at its widest where university professors are few in number, devoted to the most prestigious subjects, and high in state official rank—as they were in the nineteenth-century German university. But the *Geheimräte* tradition will not flourish where professors exist in the hundreds of thousands with appointments from two thousand separate places, where they join large departments of instruction rather than occupy kingly chairs, and where anything from physical education to physics may be the science at their command.

And yet—here irony yields to dialectics—it would seem that these very features of our system make it more open to attack. A university already tempered by equalities tends to incite a yet more thorough egalitarianism. When the rate of admission is high, then the expectation of admission is also high, and the underrepresentedness of any group (blacks matriculate only a quarter of their age-eligibles) can more easily be laid to discrimination. When the curriculum is notoriously eclectic, any subject absent from its listings (black studies, though not Oriental or Jewish studies) will seem maliciously debarred. And when a faculty has

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been to a large extent plebeianized, any prerogative that it still retains (for example, co-optive power of appointment and promotion, control of curriculum and classroom) will tend to be seen as a vainglory or an anachronism. This sort of academic enterprise presents a variety of faces to its constituencies, with the result that each group-conscious element takes whatever image it can use. Student egalitarians tend to see it as a political society, in which they are entitled to all the rights that go with citizenship. Black egalitarians tend to see it as a mechanism that assigns social and economic rewards to the different races and must now be made to compensate for its long-lived bias against their own, or as a cultural facility that has served the *kulturkampf* of the white society and must now aid in the rebirth of the black. From each perception flows a line of action whose ultimate targets are not yet predictable. The drive for student citizenship now makes institutional governance its major target; whether it will go on to make professional autonomy its target (after recognition of the "third estate," comes the attack on "feudal" privilege?) is likely but is yet to be seen. The use of the university as a redistributive mechanism (through more open admission, more scholarships, the allocation to the neighborhood of its funds and manpower) is now being strongly pressed by black students; whether it can be easily acceded to at a time when tight finances require the academy to innovate by substitution, rather than (as it usually does) by addition, also remains to be seen. Black studies have moved into the curriculum, and white American historians must now concede that their general neglect of the black experience constituted an act of amnesia against themselves. But many questions on this cultural front remain to be answered, including the scope of these new courses. (Are they to be historic accounts of what black people saw and felt and thought, or asseverations of a black way of seeing, feeling, and thinking? Are they to be conventionally scholarly activities or the inspirers of a narrow ethnic chauvinism or perhaps still something else—something akin to what the Germans, under the heel of Napoleon, worked for at the University of Berlin when they attacked the universalistic culture of the French, preached the superiority of the Volk, defended intuition against reason, and created a philosophy that impressed the world?) These programmatic issues are in doubt, and will be so until the student movement and the black movement work out their waver-

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ing relations, and until de-exploiting and devictimizing objectives can be more firmly reconciled. But it is clear that, in the face of these perceptions, the ideal of the university as a "special place" in which authority reigns benevolently and knowledge is a neutral gift does not present a convincing claim.

Have we fully discerned the nature of the crisis of authority? Does it consist in the failure of authority to concede that the paternal ideology is played out, finished, like the Ciceronian *virtu* of the Federalist party, and for not dissimilar reasons? Does the solution to the crisis, then, not lie in admitting this, in conceding that academic asymmetries simply perpetuate a veiled opportunism on the one side and an inhibiting false consciousness on the other, and in embracing, gracefully, without nostalgia, the leveling spirit of the time? We would think so, if we did not think we heard, above the clangorous call for equality, another chorus of voices, mixing anguish with reproach. We think we hear: "We are lost in the wilderness of our unbeliefs, overwearied with our solipsisms; why, with all your learning, have you not provided us with a faith beyond ourselves?" Or: "We would admire the university you have painted, if we did not see the harlot underneath, taking cash for secret favors, perverting her talents to the warring state." Or: "We would be less adamant in our causes if you were less closeted in yours, less distant from the moral issues of our moment, less willing to put your sabbatical above our need." We accept the possibility that this is wishful hearing, that we may be like the rejected lover who, to assuage his vanity, solaces himself with the belief that he still is needed, and that with more attentiveness he would have won the suit. But is it reasonable to suppose that the young need no affiliations beyond themselves, or that they have turned away from the authority of learning, even one so professionalized and academized, without so much as a wistful look? Perhaps it is true that the demand for self-realization rises with an unprecedented urgency among the young in our society; yet it would still be unavoidably true that one can only find one's self by losing one's self, that the "I" nourished only by the "I" draws on a persistent emptiness. For some, a "cause" gives the subject its object: we do not hear blacks immersed in their movement or white Messianic revolutionaries giving voice to separation anxieties. For many, however, there is a desperate lack of appropriate means of self-transcendance. The institutions that once had served that purpose—the state, the church, the

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community—do not do so in societies such as ours where patriotism diminishes to a subculture, where God in all His guises perishes, where a migrating people sink no local roots. In this barenness, the young would be profligate indeed if, with an easy air, they dismissed the potential comforts of the academy. And more devil-may-care than we think possible: a generation so conscious of its own fragility—so early introduced to death, so defenseless in its contemplation of mortality, so aware of the megatonic missiles poised for fine-tuned firing into the human race—may find self-sufficiency a tragic circumstance, but can hardly, with Emersonian gusto, regard it as a heroic chance.

It is in the context of these reflections that we would place the last thesis to be considered in these pages—the view that, whatever else it may be besides, the student movement is at bottom religious, and as such bears significant resemblances to other major religious movements: the Great Awakening, the Methodist revival, and (my preference, following a provocative essay by Paul Goodman), the Protestant Reformation itself.[9] Let it be at once admitted that there are dangers in seeing the past as prologue and approaching the present with a sense of *deja vu*. Events greatly separated in time are bound to be in certain ways very different, if only because they supervene upon different stockpiles of experience. Still, things murky or unnoticed in the present may become much clearer when they are set against the past, and we think it worthwhile risking strained analogies in order to get at a clouded truth.

To start with suggestive parallels: it may be noted that the Protestant Reformation began amid signs of material and artistic progress that accompanied vast and disruptive social changes; that it was fomented by young faculty and students—scholars in or preparing for holy orders in the universities that were then a part of the Roman Church; that, after tentative and confined beginnings, in which it sought to regenerate church authority, it gradually grew more radical, until it challenged worldly authorities, and also more extensive, so that it escaped its breeding ground between the Rhine and Danube and became international in scope. Spiritual impoverishment in the midst of plenty, moral protest in the midst of change, a student movement that starts out small and then extends its reach—these strike a number of modern chords. There are also psychological likenesses. Goodman points to one of them: the resemblance between the Lutheran

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concept of alienation ("God has turned his face away, things have no meaning, I am estranged in the world") and the secular versions of alienation in the canons of Marx and Durkheim. General parallels can be drawn between the idea of a permanent revolution, now ascribed to Mao and Che Guevarra, and the idea of a perfected state of being—always intense, never lapsing—that was once called the Kingdom of Heaven that is Within; between the division of the world into friend and foe by the revolutionary true believer and the division of the world into saints and sinners by the religious true believer; between the distrust of reflective reason represented both by the new word "anti-intellectual" and by the old word "enthusiastic"—but these are perhaps too general parallels. More particular are the resemblances between the modern attack on scientific rationalism and the Protestant attack on scholasticism; between the current dabbling in esoteric religions and psychedelic phenomena, and the outbreaks of mysticism in the earlier era; between the current fear of the bomb and the Strangelove generals, and the fear of the diabolic set loose in the Lutheran and Calvinist mind. To all this might be added some interesting parallels in programs. We do not think it fanciful to suggest that the institutional issues of the sixteenth century have their modern equivalences: that the college is a secular church, to which students bring their hope of self-discovery, which is the secular counterpart of salvation; that courses in the liberal arts are functional substitutes for reform theology, in that they offer a critique of the world-as-given from the standpoint of some immaculate ideal; and that the alleged seduction of the academy by the social institutions of war and profit bear some resemblance to the alleged corruption by comparable forces of the Mother Church. Of course, the radical theologians of the past did not use the rhetoric of current critics. They complained about the sale of indulgences, not about the subsidy of war research; they attacked the venality of the clergy, not the sellouts of the professoriate. But this is only to admit an alteration of vocabulary. "The Church is in Babylonish Captivity" is the way they put it three hundred years and fifty years ago. "The University is a microcosm of society" is the idiom that expresses much the same idea today.

It is tempting to do nothing but uncover parallels. Before the Protestant tempest broke, for example, there had been a rapid increase in student numbers, in consequence of the building of

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many new universities. Knowing this, the California boom in higher education may be suggestively called to mind! And again: just after Martin Luther defied the authority of the Pope and Emperor at the climactic Diet of Worms, he decided not to shave or cut his hair. Perhaps some light on our own hirsuteness may be gleaned from this detail! But this is a geometric procedure that is likely to produce diminishing results. The critical purpose of the analogy, which is that of contemporary illumination, can better be served by concretely applying it than by repeatedly affirming it. And by applying it in conjunction with the equality model, whose clarifying power we have also argued but not put to the test of a specific case.

Columbia University, April 1968. The students called the societies behind the barricaded doors "communes," and by the third day of the week that shook the ivy, there were five of them: Hamilton, Avery, Mathematics, Fayerweather, and Low.

The first commune, in point of time, was Hamilton—named after an earlier revolutionary with whom, however, the society had come to terms. On the first day, the occupiers were racially mixed—white revolutionaries and black militants together. Very shortly, the alliance fell apart: after a night of squabbling, the whites were sent out into the early morning cold to colonize another building and the blacks had Hamilton to themselves. This was a fateful separation. An integrated demonstration would have been seen as a student demonstration; a segregated demonstration was seen as a black demonstration *and* a student demonstration and this gave the Columbia administration pause. For it now had to consider the consequences of calling in the police to storm an all-black citadel set up in a largely white university that stood cheek-by-jowl with Harlem, and the risk had to be very gravely weighed. This, plus the hostaging of a dean, brought the occupation of the buildings time and allowed the sit-ins to become, in a sense, institutionalized.

Why this break between black and white? The reasons touch upon many themes we have been considering. To many black students at Columbia, the world of the campus was already chokingly white: the courses in western civilization were courses in white western civilization, the leadership of the campus was white leadership. Their putative allies, the revolutionary fraction in the SDS, professed disdain for those courses and that leadership; but

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theirs was a white disdain, in which could be read a patronizing conceit. Nor was the strain simply brought about by color consciousness: the black students wanted to possess an area, a program, a reach of decisional power that would be entirely their own. For them, the building became a kind of country, the negotiations for its release a kind of foreign policy, the removal of the whites a kind of affirmation of their and their people's sovereign rights. If the devictimizing urge was one cause of fissure, the de-exploiting impulse, also running deep, was another. The white revolutionaries displayed a kind of Anabaptist hostility to worldly success that the black militants did not share and did not trust. Where the one regarded social mobility as an anaesthetic, the other saw it as a vital remedy, and felt that white rich men's sons in Skid Row clothes sneered at material possessions only because they could afford them. This difference between revolutionary pietism and worldly egalitarianism was pointed up by their different attitudes toward the authority of the president in the crisis. The black students wanted to face the "Man," both in order to redress their grievances and address their wrath. They sought, hence, a responsible and responsive adversary (it is interesting that, of all the student groups in the buildings, only the blacks did not call for the resignation of President Kirk). The white revolutionaries would not render the administration the tribute of being needed: in their view, the social system was congenitally corrupt and those who served to sustain it had to be discredited. The peculiar weakness of university authority, a sometime source of despair to the black students, was for the white students an opening to be exploited, a point in the organism where the redeeming poison might be inserted. The black students wanted more—much more—than could be gotten from a corpse.

Of all the pent-up societies in the buildings, the one in Hamilton Hall was the most austere, the most disciplined, in a way the most bourgeois. The students prided themselves on keeping the building neat—perhaps less to win respect from whites than to demonstrate to themselves their ascetic prowess. They created a tight collective leadership: tough men from the community arrived but left at the students' request, lest there be unneeded violence; the faculty negotiator (he came to them, not they to him) could not treat with particular individuals, lest there be a weakening of the front. The central committee set up schedules for eating, studying, relaxing—every vagary yielded to the common

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will. Speaking of that experience, one black student later reported that "it was the first experience of seeing only 'black,' of not shielding part of [our] personality from white observation . . . We felt freer and more human. Everyone was a 'Sister' or 'Brother' . . . For the first time I was definitely proud of my people for the courage my people were showing."[10] It was a devictimizing people's dream, actualized in a dwelling place, *pro tempore*.

Low Library, the second commune to be founded, was set up by the white émigrés from the first. Here, in the most luxurious of the new kibbutzim (the president's official suite), "liberation" meant desecration of the regal image. The white revolutionaries in charge smoked the president's cigars and sipped his sherry and ransacked his files for incriminating evidence, which they proceeded to disperse. The evidence they found showed that he was limited, human—not that he was imperatorial, diabolic; the Bolsheviks did much better when they rifled the secret folders of the Czar. In this commune, and in the one in Mathematics, which was also under the control of the revolutionaries, the children of the middle class were most successful in ridding themselves of their childhood inhibitions concerning property and privacy. In both, they affirmed the counterethic that Establishment property is theft and therefore eminently seizable, and that privacy is not a right that can ever be said to adhere in official persons.

If Low and Mathematics were the most revolutionary communes, Avery was probably the least. A group of architecture students refused to leave their building when the work of the day was done, and simply extended their period of study by closing up and holding what they called "design-ins"—drawing plans for the physical remodeling of Columbia and the city of New York. Most of their professors joined them in this protracted studio, so that at least when art snubbed its nose at law, the old *and* the young were doing it. It is said that the barricades of Avery were the best, allowing for critical stress points that would withstand the onslaught of the police but give way in an instant from inside. If this was so, then it was this revolution's only professional touch.

Finally, the Fayerweather commune, in which assembled the graduate students from the social sciences. Nowhere could one better see an original faith turned bitter than among these professional apprentices who in the very midst of their preparation turned against the authority of the school.

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Commune. The word evoked for outsiders the reign of terror in France in 1792, the uprising in Paris in 1871, the entire terrible romance of revolution. But we doubt that most students thought of anything so grandiose and cataclysmic. Most of the thousand sitting in, and most of their several thousand student sympathizers, were radical to one degree or another but were not political revolutionaries. The word "commune" to them seemed to incorporate two sorts of connotations. One came from the glossary of equality—commune, commonness, commonality. Doing important things together, in a way no higher authority would decide, was for many one of the major objects of the enterprise and for some its most ecstatic reward. Outside, they had been set upon by systems—the draft system, the course system, the grade system, the job system; inside, they themselves would be in charge of things, men and women unmanipulated and on their own. But though we must rate this motive critical—this desire of the young to transform themselves from direct objects into collective nouns—we do not consider it to have been the only working motive. These societies, after all, were established *in* the university—conveniently, but also to make a point. Though they were ostensibly open to all comers, they did not welcome nonbelievers and in fact did not include the majority of the students on the campus grounds. Their purport, as we see it, was to rebuke the society from which they had seceded, and to maintain, as a reprimand and example, a conventicle of the truly saved. Here the word "commune" takes on connotations from the lexicon of religion—commune, communion, the kindred quality of a holy commonwealth.

From both senses of the word emerged their polity: there would be, it was decided, complete "participatory democracy." All decisions would be made by commune members, rather than by leaders, even elected leaders. Though a Central Strike Committee was formed (it had its base in a well-appointed student union, where it had access to mimeograph machines and microphones, the gifts of the tyrannous administration), it was not given the power of attorney over any commune's or any person's fate. A devout egalitarianism; a radical congregationalism with a strong antinomian twist.

Every issue, from the most trivial to the most serious, went before the tribunal of these groups. Should the "men" and "women" signs be kept on bathrooms? (One group decided that such biosocial distinctions belonged to the preliberation era and

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should be dispensed with at once.) Should the girls serve as housekeepers for the fellows? (One sign urged women to reject that traditional role, unless they sought it "for creative expression.") Should we negotiate a settlement with the faculty? Should we stick to our original demands? What is the appropriate tactic in a situation that has never been put down in books? The range of issues was not incomparable to that of the Puritan's Bible state.

Also shared was the sense of danger. Every hour was immanent with the possibility that the police would come in force. A vast amount of time was devoted to courage-testing (should I leave when they come, should I sit, should I link arms, should I fight?) and to learning the arts and crafts of war (handkerchiefs soaked in water absorb tear gas, vaseline is protective against mace). Here at last was the relevant curriculum, the final realization of the Dewey principle that the school should be part of life! Added to this was the intoxicating knowledge that the entire world was watching. In one collective thrust, the students of Columbia University had jumped from zero to infinity, from the anonymous to the historical. Such leaps do not happen very often: astronauts and sweepstakes winners—and builders of religious Zions—may know what it is like.

No, the communes were not utopias, group solidarity was not an unmixed blessing, debate did not always engender wisdom, democracy did not, in the end, prevail. It turned out not to be easy to make a better world in youth's own image, especially on the spur of the moment and in so hostile an environment as marbled Fayerweather Hall. Cut off as they were from the outside, many students became acutely suspicious of outsiders. Friendly faculty members who came to speak were met with an almost paranoid hostility. (The same consequence of closure has been reported in the case of secluded villagers and prison inmates.) The group put tremendous pressure on the shy, the uncertain, the aberrant. Its tyranny was the demand for unity; its weapon was the charge of "cowardice"; its punishment was the use of scorn. (That peers may be as oppressive as superordinates is another truth that has elsewhere been discerned.) The continuous process of debate made a rational change of course impossible. Twice the Fayerweather group decided to accept a compromise and quit the buildings; twice they talked again and changed their minds; finally, the police arrived and put an end to talk. ("Participatory democracy" thus came to resemble what

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radicals most dislike about liberal methods—a kind of procedural fetish that serves to delay responsive actions, a case of verbal fiddling while the city burns.) Finally, it happened that the Central Strike Committee, which was dominated by the SDS and committed to the radicalizing of the student body, did manipulate the students to insure they would not leave before the "bust." (With all this will to equalize, the oligarchic tendency had its way.) What lessons did the participants learn? Some, in recollection, have described the commune as a nightmare, as a kind of *Lord of the Flies* ordeal. Many more (in my sampling of opinions) remember it as the highest moment in their lives. But very few who look back on a week of ecstacy say they would wish to repeat it. This, too, may be taken as a commentary on the nature of the liberated life.

Thus far, I have said nothing about the stated issues on which the Columbia student protest was based. Since those issues have been thoroughly canvassed elsewhere, I may be spared the task of rendering them in detail. The students presented six demands (the peremptory word "demand" was not then as familiar as it would become, and caused much stiffening in the administration and the senior faculty). The two main substantive demands were that Columbia break its institutional ties to the Institute of Defense Analysis, set up by the Department of Defense to evaluate weapons systems, and that it stop construction of a gymnasium which was to be located in a park on the border between Harlem and the university. Though the white revolutionaries raised these issues more to embarrass than reform the university, it would be a mistake to conclude that most of the students put them forward disingenuously. On the other hand, it would be equally an error to believe that these issues, taken literally, were enough to stimulate the insurrection. By the time the issue was joined, the question of Columbia's role in IDA was almost moot, since the university had already broken its operational ties to the Institute and was likely to move toward total severance. The proposed gymnasium would have provided a facility open to Harlem residents as well as to college students and could have been built without relocating tenants—considerations that had made many Harlem leaders favor the project when it had been first proposed. But the critical point is that these issues were *not* taken literally. The students made IDA stand as surrogate for every disappointment they felt over the university's indifference to (the words they used

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were "complicity in"; the university said "neutrality toward") the development of weapons for the war. The gymnasium stood for many things: Columbia's expansion policies (not worse perhaps than that of other eleemosynary firms bidding for scarce land resources in the area, but harsh and self-centered nonetheless), her insensitivity to race (reflected in many actual slights and perhaps in a number of imagined ones), and her very prominence and remoteness (in becoming a national and even international university, she had grown out of touch with her backyard). The institutional defenders of the gymnasium wrongly assumed that the only interest of the black community was in its de-exploitating consequences. No heed was paid to the devictimizing aspect: to many blacks, Columbia had become a white settler's city on the hill—a Salisbury, a Johannesburg, a Nairobi, and her entry on the green of a park to which the people on the native flats below laid claim was analogous to a colonial intrusion. In short, the issues of the student uprising were symbolic issues. And because they were symbolic they were exceedingly difficult to resolve. Men may compromise concrete issues with a you-take-this and an I-take-that, but they may fight to the death over symbolic issues, because the wants they express are so total, and defeat, being impossible to calculate, seems too frightful to bear. Fine points of theology, fought over in the Reformation period, were also symbolic issues and this did not prevent them from being devastating.

The Columbia insurgents, white and black, made another symbolic demand—that they be granted institutional amnesty. Much to their surprise, the mediatory ad hoc faculty group, which was attempting to stake out a third-party position and was prepared to be much less punitive than the administration, would not accede to this demand: it proposed that the discipline be easy, that a kind of amnesty *de facto* be allowed, but it would not accord the students amnesty as a right. Most of these professors knew, instinctively if not consciously, that to yield to this demand would be to admit that legal authority of the institution was illegitimate; and for them this would have been too jugular a cut. Not that this sort of admission could not be contemplated under any circumstances. Had the president of the university usurped his office, had the trustees violated academic freedom—that most cherished norm, had the administration been oppressive of the students instead of just peremptory and unresponsive toward them,

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these professors might have dissolved their ties, which habit and utility had so strongly fastened, to the annointed powers of the institution. They were not a group of company men, but neither were they a group of revolutionary putschists, and the thought that they would prefer to live in anarchic confraternity with the students, rather than in orderly relations with the administration, should have strained credulity from the start. Only when the police came was there a temporary break in the faculty on this issue; only then did a faculty committee take over the reins of the university, encourage the deposition of the president, and work toward the establishment of a new governmental form. The police turned out to be even greater jeopardizers of academic legitimacy than the students. By inflicting punishments when they had only the right to make arrests, they spattered the administration with the taint of their own lawlessness; by inflicting punishments brutally and indiscriminately, they kindled the outrage men reserve for rulers who prove to be heartless and uncaring. But still the faculty tried to stay within the established framework; even in the emergency, its tendency was toward reform.

Reform. This has been the watchword at Columbia, as it has been at many universities where academic men have labored to repair—or by precautionary actions to protect—the moral footholds of authority. What are the chief devices of reform? To which etiology is it attentive, to what perception of need does it respond? At Columbia, reform—unmelodiously but quite aptly called "restructuring"—has had two principal objects: the judicializing of internal student discipline (by means of clearer and more permissive rules of conduct enforced by tripartite tribunals using juridical procedures) and the democratizing of academic decision-making (by means of a unicameral central legislature, dominated by faculty and students and empowered to determine major policies subject only to the veto of the trustees). At other institutions, reform has also centered on the goals of limiting the exercise *of* power and of widening the avenues *to* power, though it may adopt more euphonic titles and invent somewhat different techniques (parallel rather than mixed campus-wide assemblies, students on governing boards).[11] It is clear that these structural changes—the first important ones that have come about since the academic reorganizations of the late nineteenth century—represent a partial accommodation to the students' interest in equality; it is also clear that the grounds for this accommodation are more

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often prudential than philosophical. Though a reading of men's minds is not always vouchsafed by a reading of their enactments, one may safely assume that exigency was the mother of these inventions, that the thrust behind the contemplative "shoulds" was supplied by some palpitating "musts." Certainly, the Columbia reformers, as they worked through the postbellum months of summer to avert another term of war, did not need the inspiration of social or educational theory to propose the broadening of student rights. The fury of the constables had forged a formidable alliance of student left, far left, and center; while this coalition held together, united by their common execration of a distant and seemingly punitive administration, the university would be torn apart. They had only to grasp the practical importance of weaning the moderates from the immoderates, of dividing in order to survive, to perceive that they had to institutionalize new egalities—the egalities of due process, to rob student wrath of fresh occasions; the egalities of participation, to offer student temperateness fresh rewards.

Whether these devices have purchased peace—whether they have been successful in their creator's terms—only time will tell. At Columbia, the signs, both current and foretelling, are quite mixed. It does appear, judging from certain evidences, that students do become less dangerous when they are included, and less irritable when they are left alone. By rescinding the power of the president to alter punishments, by creating a judicature heavily composed of peers, the reformers do seem to have meliorated the encounters, heretofore stark and often rancorous, between administrative judge and student suspect; by liberalizing the rules on demonstrations, so that only a grave disruption sets a limit on protests performed en masse, they do seem to have lessened the frequency with which proctor and picket, guard and speaker, clash on these campus grounds. As for the academic legislature that makes one body of two estates, it too seems to perform certain soothing functions: it permits the full ventilation of student grievances, with results that are certainly cathartic and may in some instances be corrective; it increases the flow of authentic information, so that ill-founded rumors may be answered before the community is convulsed; it channels passion through Roberts Rules of Order, thus lengthening the temporal and mental distance between the arousal of feeling and the urge to act. But set against these quieting effects is the visible fact that the loyalties

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of the student body have not yet been captured by these instruments. Disaffection, mistrust, and sullen anger are not, it ought to be noted, sentiments only of the extremes. It is true that the Leninist revolutionaries with their abiding scorn for bourgeois parliaments, the New Left revolutionaries with their cynical anxieties about co-option, the organized black militants with their propensity to perceive every innovative structure as another arm of the white establishment and another complexity to torment their cause, disdain—when they do not revile—the so-called Senate. It is true, too, that many disciplinary hearings, held under the more equitable constitution, have been boycotted or disrupted by these elements: what the reformers had hoped would come to be regarded as strictly judicial prosecutions are seen by the factions of the SDS as palpably political prosecutions and by many militant blacks as legalistic forms of white aggression. But if these were the only forces arrayed against them, the institutions of reform might still hold pacificatory promise. In the long run, revolutionaries presenting themselves as outlaws to a people convinced the laws are just would fail for want of protective sympathy; in the short run, a university that accepted a racial variant of *cuius regio, eius religio* —whose color, his kind of discipline—might earn an abatement of racial tensions, provided it worked to desegregate its all-white territories and made it possible for black students, without apostasy, to opt for an integrated law. What does more to dampen hopes for peace are the hostile or standoffish attitudes of students who are not *outré*—for example, the view, widely held among sober radicals, that the university turns into an oppressor whenever it punishes the violator of a rule who asserts a political reason for the violation; and the view, widely held among the middle masses, that the university, though restructured, has not been altered, because the legal powers of the trustees were not redistributed, or because the decisional powers of the administration were not entirely committed to the Senate, or because the Senate—with its inching processes—is itself an impediment to change. Events have yet to test the depth and obstinacy of these opinions, but the persistent reluctance of students on the left to vote sanctions against students to their left (partly because they do not wish to comfort common enemies, partly because they do not want to risk the scorn of friends, partly because they share the sophism that egregious provocations excuse even misdirected acts) and the persistent tendency of students of diverse sorts to devalue

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incremental changes (on the ground that time is short, sin is vast, and everything in human affairs is malleable) make it doubtful that incorporative devices have brought the peaceful academy within closer reach.

But this is to assume that the success or failure of these devices is properly measured by their sedative effects. In the realm of politics, that may be a sufficient standard: one thinks of the English Reform Acts as successful because they diminished lower-class rebelliousness; one thinks of the American Bill of Rights as successful because it tranquilized opposition to the new-formed state. In the realm of the university, whose prime aim is not to pacify its citizenry but by a variety of means to improve it, the evaluation of reform must be more complex. Similar moves to extend the franchise and similar enactments of self-denying ordinances must here be judged not only for their contribution to stability but for their impact on relationships that sustain the academic life. We would recall what we said at the beginning about the crisis of academic authority—that it reflects the student will to disbelieve in the university as a "special place" run on the principle of generosity. The reforms that have come in the wake of the breakdown of that authority might therefore be put to these inquiries: To what extent have they rid the university of unbenign asymmetrical relationships, to what extent have they sacrificed benign ones to gain a *politique* result? Again, appraisal must be tentative and double-sided. The shift from discretionary discipline to due process seems most clearly to have struck at relationships which, however paternal in intent, always threatened to become exploitative in fact. An errant student at the mercy of a judging dean, while hardly the certain victim of misanthropy, faced an official who played too many roles—parent surrogate, landlord agent, moral sentry, hierarchic underling—to act unambiguously in his behalf. The magistrates he now faces may be less wise and less efficient, but their responsibilities are less complex and therefore less conflicting, and their verdicts do not so severely test the bona fides of emplaced authority. True, the university has not yet dispensed with the many-hatted judge-administrator—the parietal system still requires him. But students, like nuns, are tending to become decloistered, and we may see the day when students, no longer resident in campus hotels at night, will give decanal justice much less to do by day, and when the university, freed of its chaperoning tasks, will be less involved in these duplicitous relationships.

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The shift toward parliamentarism, on the other hand, offers very different prospects. High-level representative campus bodies do have the capacity to ferret out covered evils: they may serve as watchdogs against the intrusion of secret research and secret agentry; they may obstruct an academic building program that would work to the disadvantage of the neighborhood; they may probe into discriminatory practices against academic women or the kitchen help. To the extent that they do these things, and bring the behavior of the university from the level where it is just like that of other firms to the level where it meets its own pronouncements, they will help make the university less paternalistic. But there is a price to be paid even for these achievements, and the price is in that very same coin—the quality of interpersonal relationships. In the Columbia Senate (to take the organ we know best), faculty and students confront each other as representatives of fixed constituencies: how, when the minds of men are deputized, can the declaration of what is in those minds be candid, can any confession of feeling or belief ring true? In that body, each faction tends to vote in blocs, often according to decisions reached in caucus: where, in these partisan encounters, may men find the special delight of arguing issues on their merit and of being persuaded by the other side? In that body, the constitutionally outnumbered delegations (together, the students and the junior faculty have slightly fewer seats than the senior faculty) chafe at what they regard as representational distortions and use all their parliamentary skills to countervail what they regard as a violation of the proper principle of one-man, one-vote: how, when status concerns are thus objectified, can they be kept from becoming magnified; how, when the apparatus of democracy is provided, can the arithmetic of democracy be denied? In the short history of that body, one issue has come to dominate all others: the issue of how far the university, as a corporate body, should go in identifying with contemporary social causes. This is an issue of the greatest magnitude, one likely to determine for years to come the freedom, solvency, and moral stature of the institution. But how, in what quickly degenerates into a struggle of the several parties for symbolic possession of the university, can the members pause to be instructed by distinctions—between declarations of truth by organizational fiat (in my view, always premature, always stultifying) and declarations of truth by consenting persons (in my view, merely opinionative, thus always tentative); between educational

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commitments that may have political implications (in my view, proper and unavoidable) and political commitments that may have educational implications (in my view, usually improper and gratuitous); between scholarly neutrality as an epistemology (in my view, unattainable, at least in the value-laden fields of inquiry) and scholarly neutrality as an ethic (in my view, as real, desirable, and demonstrable as candor and honesty themselves). In the light of this politicization, this almost obliged exorbitance, I would be tempted to conclude that the measure of the weakness of the Senate lies less in the numbers it repulses than in the numbers it beguiles.

The possibility exists that we have dwelled on the side-effects of a medicine that will become entirely beneficial once it has been refined. Conceivably, a better electoral arrangement at Columbia could prevent the conversion of speakers into spokesman, a stronger committee system could impede the deafening use of speech. But we rather think that the problem goes much deeper—that all participatory prescriptions, based on egalitarian premises and applied at higher operational levels, show the same pathogenic effects. All tend to advance the false assumption that the primary purpose of a university is to govern, rather than to elevate and inform. All tend to answer to one anxiety—that the princes and potentates of the university may act in base collusion with one another—but not to another anxiety—that the faculty and students of the university may confirm their worst stereotypes of one another. All tend to instate a half-morality, one that sees the besetting fault in institutional power poorly allocated, but never the corrupting lie in an intellectual problem poorly stated. Consequently, though we might look to technical improvements in the organization of these assemblies, we strongly suspect that the issues brought before them will always be twisted into disputes over pride and precedence and that the discourse they give rise to will always be war carried on by other means.

We grow ever more convinced that the model of equality, however useful as an aid to explanation, fails as a sufficient guide to therapy. Granted that we are not likely to find a sovereign remedy, granted that internal prescriptions will always carry toxins from the outer world, we are led to wonder whether the model based on religious metaphor, which we offered initially as a supplement to the other, might not yield a better nostrum for our needs.

A different imagery does not insure a different physic. Any-

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one with an intrepid eye for parallels can fit the reforms of the academic present into the context of the religious past. Enactments of more liberal rules of student conduct can be likened to Acts of Toleration passed in the post-Reformation period to privatize what authority could no longer harmonize—sectarian divisions over rites and creeds. The entry of student *novi homines* into the councils of the university can be likened to the entry of the laity into the councils of churches that had once been episcopal in form. Indeed, these comparisons may lend a certain grandeur to today's restructurings: when one considers how long it took religious latitudinarianism to conquer the appetite for coerced conformity, when one considers how long the issue of church polity delayed ecumenicalism in the Christian world (no bishop, no king, said James I; no Pope, no communion, said the Jesuits), one may detect some largeness of spirit at play in the revamping of academe.

But these exercises in translation do not break through the limits of current cures. Of all the analogies that might be suggested by religious reference, we would make one the principal object of attention—the close historical and functional connection between the academic's profession and the priest's vocation. Of all the reforms that might be suggested by this analogy, we would mark off one for current reference—the need that occasionally arises to revitalize and reconsecrate hallowed offices. Concerning the connections of the two endeavors, we would maintain that academic faculties, like the clerics they once were and have in part supplanted, have pastoral functions to perform (in their case, the uniting of contemporary man with his cultural ancestry, the shepherding of each novice generation into seemly and fulfilling pursuits), and a dogmatic mission to accomplish (in their case, the defense, as a matter both of faith and morals, of free, critical, and sustained inquiry). We would also maintain that academic faculties, while they are no longer annointed and no longer frocked, share many of the strenuous ideals of those who believe they are divinely summoned: they must be conscious of their occupation as a calling, must be dazzled by a vision of honorableness no less than by a vision of competence, must believe they reach a limiting line of impropriety long before they reach the limiting line of illegality—must, in short, aim at the exceptional "presentation of self" in something more than "everyday life." Concerning the bearing of these analogies on reform, we would note that a great

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crisis was precipitated in the Roman Church when some of its clergy and religious could no longer adhere to these standards and perform these ministries, that this decay of charism was deemed to threaten the saving mission of the church itself, and that, in consequence, vast efforts were devoted to sacerdotal rehabilitation —viz., the Trentine reforms, which sought to renew the religious orders, reassert religious doctrine, and tighten clerical vows. In the modern university, where many students recoil from academically-favored paths of life and doubt the virtue of increasing knowledge, the academic faculties have also lost their capacity to steer their flocks, their power to preach a persuasive gospel. Yet we detect, in the modern university, no movement to rehabilitate those special talents. We do not find the leaders of the profession joining to set forth a more insistent ethic, to recruit more dedicated acolytes, or to reconstruct seminarial (that is, graduate school) instruction. Though there are numerous conferences on the university, we perceive no conciliar effort to set new directions for the profession, to resolve its conflicts of roles, to increase its pastoral skills, to work out its problem of authority. In the large literature critical of the profession, one can find various intrinsic reasons for this default. It is argued that the cut of specialty runs so deep that there is not one profession, but sixty shards, each encased in a different room in the house of learning. It is argued that professors are as conservative about their routines as they are adventurous about their products, that role innovation is as rare as gnostic innovation is common. It is argued that the profession has grown so large and so fast that it cannot know, let alone heal, itself. For my part, I am not so sure that this profession is congenitally unrenewable. I would observe that common troubles have recently created common bonds: the academized professional no longer overwhelms the professionalized academic. I would observe that role changes are not unknown to this profession: a century ago, in response to signs that it had become outmoded (today we would say "irrelevant"), its leaders not only introduced new contents—the scientific and vocational curriculum—but also new professional roles—graduate teaching, research, consultation (which may go to show that the innovators of one era may be seen as custodians by the next). Finally, I would observe that professional growing pains are not always fatal to collective action. A half century ago, a similar swelling of numbers, producing a similar erosion of norms, led to the creation of new standard-setting

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bodies: the accrediting associations, the same-type institutional associations, and the pan-academic AAUP. I find no immovable barriers preventing a venture into self-reform, but I do find certain counterpulls in the reforms already ventured. Reforms that try to win over students by manipulation do not try to do so by introspection; reforms that create artificial symmetries do not attempt to restore natural asymmetries; reforms that ask professors to show what it takes to be political do not ask them to rediscover what it means to be professional. But these counterpulls can be offset.

We would propose, for this profession, an *aggiornamento* (in modest deference to apposite simile, we shift our allusion to the Second Vatican Council in order to avoid, even by connotation, the anathemas and infallibilisms of its predecessors). What schemata might be brought to deliberation? In this cramped space, I shall comment on only one—the pastoral function of the academic ministry—and on this offer only a few subtitles along with a few interpretive asides. But much more than this is in need of reconception, and I would contemplate, in my furthest fancy, a document on the spiritual needs of priests (the gratification levels of the faculty), on the means of support of the priestly life (the financing of higher education), on the hierarchical status of the priesthood (the rights and duties of a bureacratized profession as opposed to those of an entrepreneurial profession), and on the proper mission of the church (a *lumen gentium* for the multiversity, in whose many purposes great ends get lost). To speak only of the pastoral constitution, I would ask for devoted reflection on the following:

(1) *The Reordering of Roles.* A profession does not enhance itself when it subordinates the ethic of immediacy—serve the client-before-your-very-eyes—to an ethic of remote good works—serve society, government, posterity. And the academic profession has not enhanced itself by rewarding those who do research, which is moral action at a distance, far more than those who engage in teaching, which is charitableness rendered vis-à-vis. At the same time, a profession may also be imperiled when it becomes too client-centered. For it then may abide by the virtueless doctrine that its services are for those who can afford them or who can pass certain discriminatory admissions tests—"love thy neighbor" is a warped commandment when the "neighbor" is defined by restrictive covenants—and it may, walled in by routine, become doctrinaire, quackish, or simply dull. And this would surely happen to

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the academic profession if it cared only about teaching the enrollee and not about education in broader compass, or if it retreated to the older impotence of omnicompetence and the stringencies of the schoolman's role. To resolve this dilemma, it has been frequently suggested that the academic profession be divided into teachers pure and simple and into researchers who may never teach a class, or at least never a class of undergraduates. But drastic *role differentiation* would have the effect either of creating an academy-university dichotomy (if the experience of Eastern Europe is a guide, this would be of doubtful value) or of creating two kinds of academic citizens within the American university (if native efforts up to now are any guide, this would be of almost certain harm). Perhaps the solution lies in more regular *role alternation*—that is, in the division of the academic year, especially in major universities, into periods of unstinted teaching and periods of undisturbed research. To play equally requisite roles sequentially rather than simultaneously might let each be played with required seriousness and destroy the invidiousness of a ranked role-set. To be sure, a change in the cadence of instruction might involve a change in the format of instruction—instead of courses given Monday, Wednesday, Friday, 1:00-2:00, a set of six- or eight-week convenings undeterred by clocks; moreover, to avoid fatigue and to gain other benefits, high-intensity instruction might well be carried on by teams. But the schedule, of all professional creations, is least entitled to the claim of sacredness; the liturgies of the classroom, whatever other traditions they should cling to, would well be relieved of the killing effects of bells; and solo instruction in hermetic settings, though it has the aura of a sacrament, is not as obligatory nor as certain to distribute grace.

(2) *The Preparation of Neophytes.* Jacques Barzun has remarked that the academic profession is the only profession, save for the proverbially oldest one, that does not formally instruct its entrants in its most common practices. Whether this is because the practices are too artistic or too depraved—or possibly too elusive—he did not say. But it is clear that no profession truly worthy of its name can afford to regard its practices as uninteresting, which is the impression given by the conventional program of academic preparation. The usual doctoral program consists of a major, a minor, and a vacuum—the last describing the time and effort given over to pedagogical concerns. To imagine a comparable situation elsewhere, one would have to picture a

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medical school that offered no clinical training but sent its graduates out to heal the sick. To be sure, the graduate student, while in training, may teach and may thus share with the medical intern a number of common conditions, including taxing work and token pay. But he does not share with the medical intern, or with any other professional trainee, that which is most essential to an apprenticeship—close didactic supervision. Nor does he acquire, in the course of that apprenticeship, any instruction in the ethics of the broad profession. It is not here that he will take the pledge to service, confidentiality, and collegial comity that is this profession's substitute for sacred vows, its implicit Hippocratic Oath. It is not here that he will be taught that academic tenure reduces the stakes of intramural conflict and thus raises the probability of free expression, or that academic freedom has a history and nourishes a way of life. A profession is in serious trouble when it cultivates ignorance in its novices and lets its canons be picked up off the streets.

(3) *The Authority of the Teacher.* Here, again, is the ultimate problem, faced in professional terms. In these terms, the complexities of the problem can be resolved to this: How can authority be removed as an issue and yet retained as a resource? Removing authority as an issue would require yielding certain shibboleths about the learning process. One of these is the assumption, which many academic teachers seem to harbor, that the only constructive forces in the classroom are their own benevolence and each student's appetite. Some perverse intuition, possibly growing out of their own humiliations at the hands of the young when they were young, makes them look on student collectivities as antagonistic forces that must be combatted, either through neutralizing distractions (the second curriculum of fun-and-games) or through fragmenting tactics (the dispersion of students into varied classes; the conversion of classes into audiences). Often these fearful prophecies fulfill themselves, for student groups in the interstices of the academy do often develop anti-academic norms; meanwhile the considerable evidence that students learn a great deal from one another and may work prodigies when they work in groups goes very largely by the boards. The adoption of third-force strategies—the harnassing of group power to didactic ends—must await the educating of the educator, who all too often lets the rituals of domination obscure the virtues of the pedagogy of restraint. But retaining authority as a resource also requires wis-

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dom about the learning process. It requires the wisdom to know that we are not yet wise; it requires the fortitude not to be persuaded by every psychologist and educator with a favorite axiom to grind. We do not yet know whether the symmetricalness of friendship, which is usually not a constantly equal joining but an ad hoc alteration of deferences, does more to facilitate learning than more structured and predictable disparities; whether the teacher-student relationship has anything to learn from the analyst-analysand relationship, with its one-sided invulnerabilities, or the master-journeyman relationship, with its heavy emphasis on emulation; whether distance or intimacy induces conflict, and whether conflict, clarified and open, has good or bad instructional effects. To ask these questions with an open mind is to show professional fiber; to assume that they have already been answered by the popular outcry against elitism is to reveal very little more than a failure of professional nerve.

The profession may not be allowed to seek and apply the answers. As in the days of King James and King Charles, there are men in high public office who would make students conform themselves or would harry them out of the land (that is, expel them without procedural ceremony) or who would eject disruptive students from their livings (section 504 of the Higher Education Act of 1968) or who would use police force without invitation and to the hilt. Nor is the threat to self-rehabilitation posed exclusively by the brute repressers. Everything that rips the ligatures of the nation separates the profession from its better nature, keeps the university from its own solutions. Accordingly, we arrive at no end but uncertainty. If the academic world has the will and is given the chance to heal itself, now may be the dark moment before the dawn. But if it flags or if other authority undermines it, then we have yet to go through the worst moments of the Reformation—wars between left and right confessions, between the Cromwellians and Diggers of change and the Roundheads of law and order. If this is to be the case, then it is, as John Milton, Lamented, "dark, dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon."

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ROBERT S. MORISON

Some Aspects of Policy-Making in the American University

IT HAS been frequently noticed that the modern American university is trying to do a great many different things at once. Nevertheless, it is possible to disentangle a limited number of themes which set the tone of the enterprise and give it a certain kind of unity.

Since their inception, universities in general have been dedicated to the "life of reason," but the form and meaning of the term have varied with the times. The original conception of reason as a largely deductive process for arriving at absolute or objective truth about the ultimate structure and purpose of the universe is now largely a matter of historical interest. Current definitions, especially as they relate to the purpose of the university, derive primarily from the eighteenth century. Reason is seen as working cooperatively and continuously with experience to produce useful and, therefore, verifiable knowledge of the external world. Today's university administrators are at one with the philosophes in believing that such knowledge is not only interesting in itself, but offers the best hope for ameliorating the condition of man. The results of this attitude are most clearly seen in the sciences, but the philosophes made less distinction than we do between the natural sciences and the humanities. The same kind of reason was thought to underlie both. This attitude resulted in a philosophy which Cassirer and more recently Peter Gay[1] have extensively discussed as the organized "criticism of life." This tradition still appears to be the dominant one in the humanities departments of most universities.

The concept of reason as criticism and growing doubts about absolute truth in general have led in turn to a stress on the importance of methods and means and to a considerable skepticism

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about ends. It is probably true that in all ages the deepest thinkers have doubted the ability of man to come to grips with his ultimate purpose. The reluctance of the modern university to talk very much about ends goes a great deal further than this, however, and the detachment of many scholars, the lack of an emotional commitment even to a point of view, strikes many of their students as nothing more respectable than a simple "copping out" on their responsibilities.

Closely related to the preoccupation with means is the division of the university (and of the knowledge it is supposed to be seeking) into various "disciplines." The drawbacks to this arrangement have been extensively examined by others. It is sufficient for the present purpose merely to point out that the criteria for identifying a discipline as such lie primarily in the methods it uses and not in the end pursued. In point of fact, the growing criticism of the disciplinary structure of universities centers on its incapacity to achieve even concretely definable ends like a solution to the problem of pollution or overpopulation.

Still another kind of theme running through the modern university is the belief that research and teaching are best pursued within the same institutional framework. More recently this duet has become a trio and the university is increasingly engaged directly in various forms of public service. Finally, we should notice what is perhaps the most characteristic theme of the university, the notion of academic freedom. This is usually thought of in terms of the need to protect individual professors from outside influences and pressures, but it has equally important corollaries which are not quite so clearly seen, or easily understood. As Allen Wallis[2] pointed out some years ago, the pursuit of academic freedom requires that decision-making in a university be decentralized to an extent absolutely unimaginable in any other organization of similar size and complexity. This means, in turn, that a great many important things happen in universities as the result of decisions of single individuals acting on their own. Only by wildly forcing the facts can such decisions be regarded as the product of some formal power structure or decision-making apparatus.

Current criticism of the three accepted functions of the university, teaching, research, and public service, reflects a deeper though not always clearly expressed dissatisfaction or doubt regarding what we have called the major themes underlying the

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whole idea of the modern university. Two years ago, for example, Carl Schorske in a brilliantly written, although still only privately circulated, paper discussed student unrest in terms of dissatisfaction with the eighteenth-century definition of reason. In his words, the bombs which Diderot had rejoiced to find falling "in the cathedral" are now raining down on the university. Paul Goodman,[3] writing only last fall, was even more poignantly dismayed to find that his one-time protégés among the younger generation are aggressively unwilling to do the intellectual work necessary to produce a reasoned critique of modern society. Finally, Kingman Brewster in his Phi Beta Kappa lecture at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, in December 1969, found it necessary to recognize the crisis besetting the major theme of the modern university under the provocative title "If Not Reason—What?"

Dissatisfaction with the eighteenth-century definition of reason is scarcely a new thing, nor is it confined to the present generation of students. Those who agree with Stuart Hampshire[4] "that the philosophical attitude" (as exemplified by David Hume) "has its fitting style: that of irony" will no doubt derive some satisfaction from contemplating the fact that shortly after his inauguration in 1953, Nathan Pusey publicly questioned whether humanistic reason as exemplified by President Eliot provided a sufficient faith for the twentieth century.

Even though many of us will prefer to join President Brewster in his defense of reason, we must still re-examine the validity of the subsidiary themes briefly mentioned in this introduction. Does the necessary preoccupation of the university with methods really preclude a decent concern for ends? To be specific, can the scientist whose discoveries find a too-ready use in the production of weapons renounce all responsibility for their use or control? Can the professors of entomology who help to elaborate ever more toxic and persistent insecticides leave their deleterious effects to "society" to worry about? Does the doctrine of academic freedom really mean that individual professors should be completely free to pursue any research they elect and can find money for? Or should the university develop ways of deciding, at least in a general way, the direction in which its investigations should move? Do teaching, research, and public service always and automatically reinforce each other, or do they sometimes conflict? If the latter, what can be done, within reasonable definitions of

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academic freedom and public accountability, to maintain an appropriate balance?

The more one reflects on these questions, the more one finds that he is asking a fundamental question about structure: Is the university basically a loosely knit company of scholars, each with his individual conscience, or is it an institutional entity with a conscience and direction of its own? Quite obviously it is both. The events of the last two or three years have made it clear, however, that the relationships between the company of scholars and the institutional entity are not nearly so easily defined, nor so well understood, as we might have thought they were. Students and others familiar with hierarchical structures outside the university tend to see it as a vast monolithic decision-making apparatus with a mind and even a conscience of its own, steadily repressing legitimate yearnings of students and faculty while it marches confidently forward, hand in hand with the military-industrial complex, into a disgusting, if not terrifying, future. Others, especially perhaps the more reflective type of administrator with some knowledge of biology, feel the university as some primitive organism formed by a not very well understood coalescence of individual cells, each of which maintains a high degree of autonomy. Parts of the colony may suddenly start to proliferate actively and destroy the whole; others atrophy or become dormant while the administrator tries frantically to develop some substitute for the brains and communications systems possessed by more highly evolved organisms.

If the preceding caricatures have some resemblance to the truth, it is scarcely surprising that recent encounters between students, faculty, and administrators have left all sides bewildered, sometimes irritated, and often hurt. It is now beginning to be clear that the university must become more conscious of itself and more explicitly responsible for the directions which it takes than it has been in the past. For example, some universities are finding it necessary to reduce the amount of military research and increase their interest in other areas. Both changes involve, at least in principle and often in practice, interference with the traditional freedoms of individual professors to choose their own research areas. Even more difficult problems are raised by those members of the university community who feel that the university should take explicit positions on the nature and direction of the society it serves. This essay attempts to contribute to the solution

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of some of these problems by providing an account of how the modern American university seems to have arrived at its present state and by making some suggestions for future changes. For convenience I will discuss these matters separately in terms of teaching, research, and public service, although it is recognized that in practice these functions are often carried on jointly and in ways difficult to separate completely from one another.

I. The Teaching Functions of the University

The most typical and the one essential function of all institutions of higher learning is the transmission of knowledge to the oncoming generation. The most fully developed ones may give equal places to research and public service, but there are many colleges and even some universities in which the latter activities play only a minor role. The teaching function may be discussed under three different headings: (1) training for particular professions, (2) preparation for citizenship in general, and (3) the cultivation of the individual for his own purposes.

Failure to distinguish these subgoals may result in failure to recognize the need for different pedagogical methods. For example, relatively fixed curricula and detailed grading systems may be appropriate for professional education but unnecessarily inhibiting if the goal is one of self-cultivation. Indeed, as one looks back on the development of higher education in the United States, it is not a little surprising to find how easily it was assumed that all three goals and the methods for pursuing them were wholly compatible with one another.

Training for Professions

A peculiar sort of intellectual snobbery has tended to obscure the fact that the typical university developed primarily as a series of vocational schools to prepare professionals for careers in theology, the law, and medicine. This is still the pattern in many Latin universities, especially those in Latin America. The entrant to such a university is supposed to have received his general education at home or in secondary school, so that specialized professional education may begin at once.

In medieval times the strictly professional courses leading to the doctor's degree were preceded by something called the

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studium generale. It is probably a mistake, however, to regard the famous trivium and quadrivium as equivalent to what we now call general studies—something separate from and in a way superior to vocational education. True, they were explicitly designed to produce "free men," but the student could and probably did interpret this freedom in concrete vocational terms. As Samuel Morison explains, "Once you had obtained the Master's Degree at a studium generale like Paris, Bologna, or Oxford, you had the *ius docendi et ubique terrarum,* the right to hire a hall in any university of Christendom and compete with the masters there for pupils and lecture fees . . . a clever M.A., if he tired of lecturing to undergraduates, might attract the attentions of some wealthy patron or kindly bishop who would give him a benefice. While receiving the stipend, he would return to his chosen university to study for a higher degree in Theology or Canon Law; and having obtained that, he was in line for a lucrative position in royal chancery or papal curia."[5]

Indeed, parts of the *studium generale* can be interpreted in even narrower vocational terms. Dictamen, for example, "'a course in business Latin . . . taught one how to write letters—including demands on one's parents for more money—and to draft charters, deeds, and notarial documents.'"[6] At least one thirteenth-century student assessed such elements in the liberal arts curriculum as follows: "'The wise man takes honest subjects, and chiefly those which bring the greatest profit and honors; rhetoric, poetry, and that stuff, lead only to the courtesans: whilst those who follow the science of *dictamen* come to kings and bishops, and are promoted to ecclesiastical honors.'"[7]

Somewhat curiously, critics of the American university like A. Flexner have been particularly bitter about the tendency to include precisely such courses in current college curricula.[8] It is possible that their romanticization of the traditional liberal arts has introduced an unnecessarily confusing note into modern curriculum planning.

Whether pursued within university walls or outside them, training for a profession has always been a rigorously controlled system, with emphasis on working toward a recognized qualification. Whether the student on completion of his studies received a degree, a diploma, or a license, he was recognized by society as qualified to practice a particular profession or art. Thus, the designers of the education felt obliged to see that their students mas-

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tered the knowledge essential for satisfactory practice. Out of this obligation developed the familiar apparatus of set curricula, examinations, and marks to testify just how well the student had run the course. In recent years the major professions have come to realize that no single set of courses can prepare an individual to practice a profession which is continually being broken up into more specialties. There is thus a growing tendency to introduce some flexibility into the major professional curricula and even to develop substitutes for the examination and grading system. Nevertheless, the basic need to testify to the student's ability to meet specified standards is widely recognized, and there is as yet relatively little clamor in schools of medicine and the law for a free elective system or S/U grading.[9]

This is not to say that everyone is satisfied with professional training as it now stands, or with leaving the criteria of what constitutes a good professional training to the senior professors of the particular art in question. Indeed, alert and sensitive students are increasingly questioning the relevance of their training to the actual problems they will encounter in society. What then is the responsibility of the university for the policies of its graduate faculties? The medical school case is particularly instructive, partly because of the fact that in the English-speaking countries much medical education took place until recently in institutions outside university influence, so that we have some of the elements of a controlled experiment.

At the beginning of this century, over half the medical schools in this country were not affiliated with any other educational institution. Even those that were nominally parts of universities functioned largely as the private preserve of groups of individual clinicians who made most of their income in practice. Those who advocated university affiliation and strengthened control did so on grounds that it would immediately improve the intellectual quality of medicine and thus the quality of practice. Much was made of the fact that the German schools, which had always functioned as integral parts of the universities, were far ahead of American ones in the advancement of biological and medical science and their utilization in practice.

The recommended changes were almost immediately accepted, and in slightly more than half a century the American university medical school has become the wonder of the world as far as the advancement of medical sciences is concerned. Thus

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the major thesis of the reformers has been amply proved. The second or minor thesis that advancement of the science would automatically advance practice has fallen short of complete realization. Part of the difficulty doubtless lies in the backwardness of American social planning in general. But a very important reason resides in the nature of the university and the kind of professional attitude it cultivates. The university is primarily dedicated to the search for new knowledge wherever it may lead. Unfortunately, the most exciting new knowledge does not always lead to the solution of the health problem most clearly recognized by the public. Several elements outside the university, including many politicians, are increasingly concerned with obvious deficiencies in the care available to most Americans. Some members of the social science faculties and even some unusual medical teachers are concerned too; but it is interesting that the loudest advocates of reform within the university community are the students. They recognize and resent the inadequacy of their preparation and are forcing the schools to do something about it. Experiences of this kind raise important questions about the responsibility of the university as a whole, and especially of its top administrative levels, for the kind of education offered in its professional schools. How far should the determination of the goals and purposes of these schools be left to the individual faculties and the professional societies with which they enjoy an uneasy affiliation? Should the students and faculty simply be left to fight it out with each other? Or does the university as a whole have a responsibility which transcends its ancient obligation to protect the right of each faculty to determine its own goals? Must those who have the responsibility for training the next generation be forced to look for criteria of achievement and excellence not only in the internal dynamics of the profession but also in the effects of that profession on the outside world?

The same reasoning may be applied to the basic scholarly disciplines, which as Christopher Jencks and David Riesman argue[10] have recently become "professionalized" and like the classic professions are now preoccupied with internal criteria of excellence. The history department is devoted to turning out historians, the physics department to turning out physicists, and the English department to turning out English teachers and critics. All these disciplines can be shown to be related in some way to the needs of society. In practice, however, the experts in particular disci-

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plines do not appear to be ideally equipped for solving many of the social, economic, and technological problems that are forcing themselves on public attention. In the last few years, numerous committees and commissions have reported on the need for breaking down the barriers between disciplines,[11] and for developing interdisciplinary centers devoted to the solution of specific social problems. Some even go so far as to counsel the founding of whole colleges or graduate schools with carefully defined missions. These proposals may be regarded as the adult form of the more spontaneous student pleas for greater relevance. It is not always emphasized that these plans seek, among other things, to take some of the responsibility for planning the instructional program away from the conventional department and to place the initiative higher in the administrative hierarchy. Although such attempts are sure to arouse anxiety and hostility within the classic departmental structure, the pressures are such as to make it highly likely that the attempts will be made.[12]

Preparation for Citizenship

It is, of course, obvious that the modern university, and especially its English-speaking version, is more than a congeries of specialized professional schools. To many members of the faculty the real heart of the enterprise is in the undergraduate liberal arts college. Here the announced purpose is to produce broadly educated men fit for citizenship in a free society. This tradition may be traced to a series of changes in the social, political, economic, and artistic life of Western society which began in Renaissance Italy and rapidly spread through Europe to reach its most characteristic form in Elizabethan England. Learning itself was broadened to include Greek literature. Less emphasis was put on logic and philosophy, which prepared students for practical life in the church, and more on "*bonae litterae*" or humanistic studies that "call[s] forth, train[s], and develop[s] those highest gifts of body and of mind which ennoble men, and which are rightly judged to rank next in dignity to virtue only."

This tradition of "polite learning" was especially well established in Cambridge by the end of the sixteenth century and provided the basic pattern on which Harvard was founded. The American college is still most easily understood in terms of this tradition, although much of the continental flavor of professional-

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ism was added during the late nineteenth century when some of the most important American colleges turned into full-fledged universities. As Samuel Morison puts it, "The central principles of this new conception of education were unity, gentility, and public service. Education must develop the whole man—his body and soul, as well as his intellect—it must teach manners to the boy of gentle or wealthy birth, and prepare him to take his place in the governing class. In other words, it must prepare him to be a gentleman and a man of action."[13]

Again, it should be noticed that the original purpose of even this more general type of education was in a significant sense vocational. Indeed, during the early part of the period, merely being a gentleman was in itself a career. It was soon recognized, moreover, that the products of liberal education were prepared to take a significant place in society as governors, teachers, or merchant princes. The student was left in no doubt that his education would qualify him for a useful, dignified, and satisfying place. Several factors have gradually combined to obscure the original vocational purposes of liberal arts education, however. Many teachers, in a reaction against what they regard as the crass materialism of the age, have sought to separate the pursuit of learning from the pursuit of the almighty dollar. Many students have simply discovered that their cherished liberal arts education has not, in fact, prepared them for a job.

This growing lack of a clear vocational justification for the classical liberal arts curriculum has led to a search for justification on other grounds. The modern view is often traced to Matthew Arnold and his belief that familiarity with the best that has been thought and said in the world is likely to make one not only a more competent professional man but a better husband, father, and member of society at large. In part, this attitude derives from the hope that a generally cultivated mind will be less subject to dogma and prejudice, more open to new experience, more willing to see the other person's point of view, and so on.

General education has also had a more specific object. In a world of ever-increasing complexity and concomitant specialization of function, it has been hoped that general education will provide an important segment of society with a common core of ideas and the techniques and metaphors for sharing new ideas with one another. After some debate about the content of this common core, the choice has usually fallen, not unnaturally, perhaps, on the basic ideas underlying Western civilization.

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Many of us who had such a liberal education are grateful for the experience and feel that it has enriched our outlook on life. Whether it has made us better husbands, fathers, business executives, or citizens remains an open question. What is clear, however, is the fact that general education has fallen upon hard times.[14] Part of the difficulty is purely practical. As shown by Jencks and Riesman, the increasing professionalization of the departments has now engulfed the colleges so that teachers of the humanities, on whom much of the burden of general education must necessarily fall, are more interested in turning out replicas of themselves than in producing good all-around citizens.

Whatever the reasons for the failure, the results are obvious in the complaints of the students who come to college in a far more questioning frame of mind than has any generation in modern times. Many of the more specific demands seem reasonable enough, and, indeed, many universities are in process of meeting them. Major and minor requirements are said to be too rigid and cut and dried; the student is not encouraged to think for himself or to arrange course sequences appropriate to his individual needs. The examination system places too much emphasis on facts and does not evaluate ability to think. Above all, preoccupation with scholarship and method tends to neglect relationships to current problems.

Some of those problems may arise from an unthinking transfer of procedures and attitudes appropriate for vocational education but inappropriate for more general purposes; but even if all these criticisms are carefully considered and all the demands are met, there is some doubt that the student will be much more satisfied than he is now. For it seems to be true that these specific, largely procedural, complaints are symptoms of much deeper, less clearly formulated, frustrations. The first is that general education fails to prepare the student to act adequately as a member of society not only because it lacks a vocational focus but also because it gives him too limited and probably too favorable a view of society as it now is. Worse than this, it actively discourages him from learning how to change or reform the existing order. The second frustration stems from somewhat the same source, but the effects are more personal. Many students find that neither general education nor anything else that goes on in the university provides them with a sense of personal value or meaning. They rarely use the word, but much of what they say can be interpreted as a wish for what used to be termed salvation.

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Perhaps the most obvious shortcoming of the usual general education program when viewed as a preparation for citizenship in the modern world is its parochialism. As we have seen, most general education has dealt almost exclusively with the Western tradition, emphasizing its virtues and minimizing its defects, and very little attention has been paid to traditions of any other kind. Certainly the emphasis in the West, especially since the Enlightenment, has been on ameliorating the external conditions of man. Relatively little attention has been put on the ways of the human spirit as such. To many students, the traditional, usually self-satisfied way of presenting the Western tradition is grossly misleading. It is now clear to them, for example, that Western science and technology are not always or simply ameliorative. Almost every gain is accompanied by some sort of loss. Those who do not remember the bad old days overlook the gains and emphasize the losses. To an increasing number of people the rational systems we have built to control and explain nature seem in danger of controlling us.[15] Even more difficult to explain to a skeptical generation is what now appears to have been our extraordinary complacency about the Western tradition of freedom, which for 250 years lived happily coupled to the slave trade, and for a hundred years thereafter refused to regard the descendants of slaves as persons with equal rights and feelings.

In theory, general education, or what we have called education for citizenship, not only transmits a common core of information, concepts, and values so that men can function together as parts of a common polity, it is also supposed to free the citizen from the constraints of unexamined influences in his cultural heritage. All definitions of a "liberal education" call attention to the Latin derivation of the term and emphasize its role in liberating man from superstition, dogma, and prejudice. Not always included in such expositions is a recognition of the inherent difficulty of conveying a common core of principles and at the same time conducting a critical appraisal of the message. Failure to come to grips with this problem has prompted many students to condemn much of what they receive as a slavish eulogy of the status quo.

The more extreme sometimes seem to urge the university to abandon its primary role as the transmitter of the existing culture and turn itself into a school for revolutionaries. Experience suggests that society at large is unlikely to provide the necessary sup-

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port for such a venture. On the other hand, in its support for universities our society does recognize the need for change as well as for the transmission of the principles governing the status quo. However reluctantly, it has allowed the universities to support the Huxleys as well as the Wilberforces, the Keyneses as well as the Milton Friedmans, and even the Marcuses as well as the Sydney Hooks. Nevertheless, there is much substance in the contention that the university has not provided sufficiently constructive criticism of a society that is badly in need of it.

Many observers try to find structural reasons for the failure to provide an acceptable general education for citizenship in the twentieth century. Certainly there is much evidence that the rigid departmental structure and the high degree of autonomy of individual faculty members impede the development of research programs designed to solve specific social problems. The same factors sometimes make it difficult to give appropriate rewards to the inspired teacher in a general education program. Nevertheless, it may be a mistake to lay the blame for the current plight of the liberal arts solely on administrative and organizational arrangements. There is also the uncomfortable possibility that too many individual scholars, like so many contemporary artists, have looked upon the arts and letters as a means of escaping rather than engaging with the problems of the day.

Protagonists of the humanities sometimes seem to feel that nobody cares about them or the problems with which they deal. Seen from outside, the problem is quite a different one. Many of us care a great deal about the moral, ethical, and aesthetic problems of our complex technological society, but we are beginning to doubt the capacity of the methods of conventional scholarship to deal with them. As the humanists themselves point out, they are primarily concerned with individuals and particularities of all kinds. This is quite right and proper because all of us do in fact experience life (and death) as individuals and as a series of particular instances. The trouble is that our knowledge about the external conditions of life is increasingly being reduced to a set of general principles, many of which are statistical or probabalistic in nature. Worse than that, acting on the general principles, we have built ourselves a technological culture which has enormous general effects on masses of men. In order to understand the moral dilemmas of our day one must understand at least something about this technology and the statistical way it poses in-

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dividual ethical problems. How backward we are about all this may perhaps be illustrated by referring to the great difference in the public attitude to the massacre at My Lai and to the daily bombings of civilians all over Vietnam. Almost everyone reacted with horror to the idea that one American boy could shoot down one hundred individually identifiable men, women, and children. But we accept complacently the fact that all of us are continually responsible for killing much larger numbers of faceless people by employing our mass technology. It is even more of an irony that it is the first rather than the second crime that is said to have been done "in cold blood."

The same statistical complexities are involved in the ethical dilemmas of civilian life, as we will shortly learn when we begin to approach the problem of the environment in the sophisticated way it demands. We must soon come to realize that the pollution problem is not simply a case of Sierra Club versus the robber barons, but a very complex set of economic, ethical, and aesthetic trade-offs. We do not yet see very clearly how to weigh the aesthetic costs of heating a New York lake by one or two degrees against the moral costs of depriving city dwellers the right to cool their apartments by fifteen degrees in the long hot summers. And it does not help our calculations when we remember that it is mostly upper-middle-class people who enjoy the lake while it is the poor who suffer in the cities. Ecologists, engineers, systems analysts, and economists have begun to grapple with such problems but the historic custodians of ethical and aesthetic values are strangely absent from the council tables.

It is this apparent incapacity of any substantial number of individual humanists to deal effectively with contemporary value problems that is behind student demands for increasing relevance. Protests about course credits, rigidity of major requirements, S/U grading, and the like are mere epiphenomena.

Cultivation of the Individual for His Own Purposes

There is no doubt that many people go to college for what may properly be termed selfish reasons. Perhaps the number was greater when education was a private matter, supported largely by fees paid by the student or his parents. This is no longer the case, and it may be difficult to justify public support of an institution on the grounds that it prepares the student to live a richer, more

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sensitive, more satisfying individual life. True, every society has some responsibility for the internal welfare of its citizens, but it scarcely seems equitable to use the taxing power of a whole society to enable a few of its most gifted members to cultivate greater intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction. There is no doubt, however, that one of the effects of a college education is to do just that, and we may as well enjoy it as a happy by-product if not as a primary purpose.

The clearest and least controversial of these private purposes of education is the development of a sense of intellectual awareness and understanding. Perhaps this emerges most clearly in the sciences, where at least the upper half of students may derive genuine enjoyment from contemplating the order of nature and the beauty of the concepts which man has invented to model natural systems. Certainly there seems no reason to deny these students such pleasures and perhaps every reason for trying to present our subjects in such a way that more students will come to share what is perhaps most singular about the human condition.

It is more difficult to say exactly how far the university should concern itself with the cultivation of individual aesthetic sensitivity—in literature or the fine arts, for example. Certainly the teaching of fine literature has a long and distinguished history in universities, but its defense is usually grounded on the better-citizen argument outlined above. Nevertheless, many teachers of literature resent the allegation that what they are doing is useful in any way. Art is for art's sake and their only obligation, if any, is to enable other individuals to appreciate how lovely it is. The idea that society may enjoy any secondary gains from its aesthetically sensitive membership is repugnant. In practice, perhaps the most sensible (if slightly cynical) course for the university is to justify its increasing attention to the arts to its outside constituency on more-or-less utilitarian grounds, while encouraging its faculty to its best efforts purely for art's sake.

In any event, there is an increasing need for what might be called applied aesthetics, just as there is a continuing need for applied science. Indeed, the application of science will become increasingly counterproductive if it is not carefully guided by aesthetic considerations. As nearly everyone knows by now, one of the most critical items on the agenda for the remainder of this century is the preservation of our natural environment and the

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improvement of the design of our cities. Neither of these developments can be satisfactorily guided[16] by reference to conventional criteria of health and general utility. Man's ultimate reasons for being are largely aesthetic and emotional, a fact that a primarily technological society has found too easy to overlook. Indeed, the puritan conscience has put positive barriers in the way of aesthetic arguments in the conduct of public affairs, and as a result we have very nearly succeeded in making life too ugly to be worth living. A possible ray of light may, however, be found in the fact that the more progressive state universities have found it possible to justify substantial efforts, not only in literature and fine arts, but in the performing arts as well. It remains somewhat curious that the traditional leaders among private institutions are still predominantly historical and critical in their attitude toward aesthetic experience.

The Problem of Meaning

Many students come to universities today with a sense of meaninglessness and lack of direction. Often this lost feeling is reinforced by the impersonality of our large institutions. Deprived of any higher or supernatural objectives, students drift into a flabby dependence on immediate sensual gratifications including the ersatz kind induced by drugs. Another, perhaps more useful, kind of reaction is found in their fury at the university for its insensitivity and what is called its immorality.

It must be confessed that some of the older generation, when first confronted with the intensely moralistic attitudes of current classes, have reacted with the mingled horror and contempt aroused in the Prince Bolkonsky by the religious posturing of his daughter Maria; but there must be a better way. Many faculty members may find it quite possible, for example, to display sincere interest in problems of moral value even if they cannot as professionals avow a total commitment to particular views. Similarly, the great majority of students may be satisfied to discover that their teachers are actually as concerned as they are, though in a somewhat different way. Some hope for such a rapprochement may be found in the fact that many natural scientists have abandoned their traditional squeamishness about value problems and are even organizing courses on the social and moral implications of scientific and technological advance. Student response

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in institutions where this has been tried has been appreciative and enthusiastic.

No matter what appropriate ways are found for displaying a concern for ethics and morality, many students will remain unsatisfied by the eclecticism of the modern secular university. In the past, such individuals were referred to the official representatives of revealed religion. For various reasons this does not work very well any more. One consequence is the growth on many campuses of what can only be called cults—astrology, yoga, and, worst of all perhaps, "acid" and "speed." The analogy with what happened when the secular religion of Cicero and Lucretius failed the human race on a previous occasion is not reassuring. It is not yet clear, however, that it would be wise to deal with these particular dangers by restructuring the university.

It appears that the modern university is most successful now, as it has been in the past, when it attempts to provide preparation for a definable career. Nevertheless, even here it must be constantly alert to the dangers of the kind of parochialism that grows out of the essential "inner direction" of the professions and disciplines. It does not appear that there is a need to restructure the university to correct for this tendency. What is needed is a constant monitoring by students, faculty, and the public at large to make sure that the professions remain responsive to contemporary needs. Above all, the central administrative apparatus must listen more attentively to the monitors and have the courage to move in and correct matters by changing personnel, reordering budgetary priorities, and devising interdisciplinary administrative arrangements when necessary. All this can be done as it has in the past within the existing framework for the distribution of power, but the ultimate decision-makers must become more continuously responsive to their constituencies.

The growing detachment of the liberal arts from the problems of the day and indeed from the rest of the universities of which they used to form the core may require more drastic remedies. One possibility is to separate general education still further from the discipline oriented and professional preoccupations of the university as a whole. At its most extreme, such a plan would leave what we have called preparation for citizenship and the cultivation of the individual for his own purposes to preuniversity institutions, the high schools, and the two- and four-year colleges which are multiplying so rapidly. It may soften the initial shock of

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such a proposal to recall the following facts: (1) the suggested pattern is the one actually followed in Europe where, as Sir Arthur Lewis points out, one goes to high school to be educated and to the university to be trained in a profession; (2) much of the teaching in the first two years of the university liberal arts college is poor, often much poorer than that provided in a good independent college and in at least some high schools; (3) in the two universities which for a time conducted apparently successful general education programs, the college faculties were substantially different from those of the graduate school;[17] (4) many of the best students now entering good universities have more or less anticipated much of the material covering the conventional freshman and sophomore years; (5) many universities are already moving in the suggested direction by limiting the enrollment in the freshman year and increasing the number of transfers to the upper classes; (6) finally, it can be argued that if the liberal arts are to be reformed to provide a general education for life in the twentieth century, the best people to do it are teachers whose primary object is exactly that. They might find it much easier to reach this objective in institutions where they were not impeded by the long shadows cast by Nobel Prize winners and the members of specialized national academies.

There are two serious objections to the kind of structural reorganization proposed. First, general education is something that should continue throughout one's whole life. It would be unfortunate if students were given the impression that all they needed to know about it could be delivered in a neat package before they get down to serious business. Second, if there is substance in the contention that the real trouble with the humanities is their failure to provide a "criticism of life" adequate to twentieth-century needs, separating the scholars from the teachers may impede rather than facilitate the required reforms. One asks oneself somewhat uneasily whether such diverse critics as Lionel Trilling, David Riesman, Erik Erikson, or Paul Goodman would have been as effective as they are if they had not made explicit efforts to interact with undergraduate students.

Those who would restructure the university closer to the heart's desire may be left to wrestle with the contradictions. Perhaps, however, the troubled observer may be allowed to make a modest proposal. It is just possible that the university might gain the best of both worlds by regarding its undergraduate college as

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it now regards its teaching hospital. Typically this is an institution of moderate size devoted primarily to working out new methods of care and to teaching the constantly changing art to a relatively small number of students. Similarly, the university could look upon its college as primarily a place for studying what undergraduate liberal arts education should be and for training its graduate students in the new dispensation. In most cases this would imply a considerable reduction in the size of the liberal arts operation because the principal barrier to serious reflection and experimentation in colleges today is sheer fatigue engendered by the need to do something for the masses of largely apathetic students.

It will, of course, be immediately objected that reduction of the undergraduate college will cause enormous economic dislocation. This need not be so. Over a ten-year period, reduction in the number of students who are now floundering about in large introductory courses and of those upperclassmen who are majoring in the humanities only for want of making up their minds could be amply compensated for by admitting more mature students to the upper classes.

The kind of restructuring proposed will of course take time. Pending the millennium we can do a great deal more than we do now to take advantage of the very great morphological differentiation of our apparatus for higher education. It is ironic that having constructed this house of many mansions, which has no counterpart anywhere else in the world, we continue to act as if the houses were all alike. Thus we find an individual student applying simultaneously to Radcliffe, Swarthmore, the University of Colorado, and Bennington. Part of this apparent lack of discrimination is due, of course, to the need to insure admission somewhere, but much of it can be traced to a lack of candor in university catalogues.

It might even help to redirect the revolution of frustrated expectations if universities in general made it clear that they are by nature aggressively secular and skeptical in outlook. The knowledge they undoubtedly have may help an individual student toward the true way but it is not necessarily designed to lead him there. This self-denying ordinance obviously leaves open the question of who is to minister to the lost members of this generation but it might at least relieve the university of some charges of hypocrisy.

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II. Research Policy

The importance of the university as a producer of new knowledge is generally recognized. Much has also been written about the essential contribution of research to the teaching function and vice versa. If there is no quarrel with the basic principle, there are increasing questions about the practical details. Many professors maintain that their heavy "teaching loads" interfere with the progress of their scholarly investigation. Other observers, notably students and writers for the periodical press, hold equally strongly that current fashions in research have very nearly extinguished the great teacher. In recent years, the debate has extended from quantitative to qualitative considerations. Concern currently centers on research supported by the military services, but almost equally cogent questions can be asked about applied research of interest to industry and agriculture. It is not my purpose to argue any of these propositions in detail. What does seem essential is to examine the ways in which decisions on these weighty matters should be made and how they bear on the traditional themes of university life touched upon in the introduction to this essay.

The theory of academic freedom states that the individual professor is free to choose the subject and methods of his investigations as well as to teach and to publish the conclusions he reaches. The university influences these choices only indirectly. Its greatest influence is expressed through the power of appointment. In other words, the university determines what knowledge will be sought within its walls by choosing professors who on the basis of their past activities appear likely to advance in the chosen direction. Secondary influences can be exerted by providing or withholding facilities for a given research, but this power is subject to severe limitations. Finally, such matters as the balance of teaching and research may be influenced by agreements made at the time of employment or, with more discomfort, by negotiation and persuasion afterwards.

Until about fifty years ago, in both the humanities and the basic sciences, the quality of the individual professor was the overwhelmingly important determinant of both the amount and quality of the research done in universities. Most scientists required only nominal amounts of space and equipment, and annual operating costs were trivial. The humanists needed little except access to a library. In neither case could the university exert

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much pressure on the direction of individual research through manipulation of resources, even if it wished to do so. For the same reason, the question of balance between the humanities and sciences scarcely raised its head. Both the university and the individual faculty members were reasonably satisfied—the university because it felt in control of where it was going and the individual professor because he felt in control of his own research.

This idyllic situation began slowly to change during the twenties and thirties as the cost of research began to rise. At more or less the same rate, the private foundations and, in certain limited areas, private industry began to provide modest grants-in-aid for research. For the most part, these merely enabled selected investigators to move a little faster in the direction they were already going. Questions of distorting the mission of the university or the path of individual professors rarely arose. When a few universities expressed anxiety that large foundation grants might lead their flock in undesirable directions, the foundations quickly responded by agreeing not to negotiate with individuals without clearing with the president's office.[18] These arrangements apparently worked satisfactorily. The university administration still felt in control of its own house and the individual investigator, except in rare cases,[19] felt himself in reasonable command of his own destiny. But at least a cloud had appeared on the horizon.

The enormous increase of support for research by federal agencies during the last few decades has enlarged and darkened the cloud. Although as late as 1963 McGeorge Bundy could confidently write about "The Blessing That Is Federal Aid,"[20] the blessing now appears somewhat mixed. Public attention is perhaps unduly fixed on the protests of students and younger faculty that such dependence on federal aid is prima facie evidence of complicity with the military-industrial complex. University administrators are also asking themselves how much control they really have in their own house and whether they may have accepted their many federal blessings a little too uncritically. Facts can be marshaled to soften at least some of the more extreme criticisms. Money from the Department of Defense is only 2 per cent of all the funds devoted to higher education; research grants from D.O.D., A.E.C., and N.A.S.A. total but one-third of all the research funds disposed of by universities. Individual investigators as antimilitarist as Noam Chomsky will testify that the D.O.D.

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bureaucracy has interfered less with their freedom as investigators than have the staff members of private foundations; basic research supported by the military has contributed as much or more to the arts of peace than to the design of weapon systems. All this is doubtless true but the odor of seduction persists.

Nation-wide figures fail to reveal the impact on specific institutions. The government agencies and especially the defense agencies have a keen sense of quality and concentrate their support "where the brains are." Two special-purpose laboratories in one well-known institution receive more money from D.O.D. and N.A.S.A. than all the rest of the university receives from all sources. The management fee alone would be enough to support two or three ordinary liberal arts colleges. In another prestigeful institution on the opposite coast, over $30,000,000 is received each year to operate a single scientific instrument. It seems most unlikely that given the same amounts of money to be used at their own discretion, these universities would have arranged their priorities in this way.

The whole process happened so gradually and so comfortably that practically no one realized what was going on. The government agencies behaved like gentlemen all the way. They adopted all the manners of the old-school foundations. They gave the same research grants and fellowship stipends and were a good deal more generous with travel grants and other luxuries; indeed, they had a lot more money for everything and even helped out with the oil and electric bills. The universities were so busy buying new things, planning new country homes, and trying to keep some sort of books to satisfy the nosey people from the general accounting office, that they rarely had time to ask where they were being led.

Every now and then, protectors of the old-fashioned values would arise at meetings to ask a few embarrassing questions, but nobody paid much attention. Criticism was, in any case, rather muted in view of the obviously unimpeachable motives of the seducers. A very high proportion of their money was in fact devoted to improving health. It was not noticed until too late that a very high proportion of this was for research in diseases which typically afflict congressmen and other elderly people and relatively little to finding out how to give ghetto children a good start in life. The considerably smaller but still appreciable amounts received from the Department of Defense and Atomic

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Energy Commission appeared to be devoted to far higher purposes than they do now. The universities were for the most part proud of the part they had played in defending the free world against the threat of Nazism, and the growing threat of totalitarian communism seemed just as real. Many younger scientists who completed their training during the war years felt embarrassed at having been protected from active combat duty and were glad to compensate by participating in defense research later on.

In the years immediately after the war, most decisions regarding grants were made by individual professors. As time went by the university attempted to control the situation by setting up special offices, often under lay administrators. They divided their efforts between helping individual investigators with the technicalities of making out the application forms and seeing to it that the university's interests were protected. The emphasis was rarely on high policy, however; most of it centered on making sure that the principal investigator was not committing the university to help and facilities it was not prepared to give, and that proper charges were being made for overhead and salary recovery. Unusually large projects like a particle accelerator, a radio telescope, or a material science center did, of course, attract the attention of the policy-makers. Conservative administrations would worry about the permanent commitment of university resources required by many such programs, and there were lively arguments about the allocation of available building sites. But it appears to be only recently that universities have seriously asked themselves whether they are spending too much effort on high energy physics and too little on investigating how children learn to read.

The administrative machinery that produced these kinds of policy decisions cannot be described from evidence on record, but one's impression is that discussions were held primarily between the departments wishing to have the new facility and the administrators in the president's office. Faculty research committees and, in extreme cases, the faculty as a whole might be consulted about the general outlines of the proposal but the final decision probably was made in the president's office. The president usually came to the bargaining table at a disadvantage. In the first place, he and everyone else knew that he could scarcely be expected to understand the technical details of the proposal at hand. For this and other reasons it was difficult to withstand the enthusiastic appraisals of the Nobel Prize winners and government represen-

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tatives on the other side of the table. Furthermore, most presidents of first-class institutions found themselves in a wildly competitive race for personnel and prestige; the proposed facility was almost certain to attract and enhance both. Finally, the figures seemed to show that the new facility really would not cost the university anything. Indeed, it might be possible to use some of the management fee and overhead charge to finance a much needed improvement in the library.

In the face of such facts, it is not surprising that the history of the fifties and sixties is not well provided with examples of universities turning down large government grants and contracts. There is one striking exception to this rule; by 1965 several leading universities had decided not to allow secret or classified research to be carried out on the campus. A few, who are now particularly proud of themselves, made this decision almost immediately after the war. In most cases, both the faculty and the administration were actively involved in the lively debate which preceded the decision, and both shared more or less equally in the decision itself.

These decisions still provide the clearest examples we have of a definite move by the university to curtail the academic freedom of individual professors in the interest of high policy. Two arguments were ordinarily brought forward to justify the infringement. The first and perhaps the most compelling was that the university is primarily an educational institution open to all comers. It is incompatible with this high purpose (and indeed incompatible with academic freedom itself) to allow research to be done which cannot be shared with any otherwise qualified student. The second argument cited the universality of knowledge and the duty of every investigator to share his new-found knowledge with humanity at large. The conflict of fundamental principle remained evenly balanced for a number of years. Some universities terminated all classified projects, others continued a few long established ones, still others reached an uneasy compromise by redefining the geographic extent of their campuses. Recently however, a definite trend has set in against classified research anywhere. Cornell is involved in extensive litigation in a tangled attempt to get rid of the Cornell Aeronautic Laboratory, and M.I.T. is engaged in an agonizing appraisal of proposals for converting its renowned communications and inertial guidance laboratories into an institute for environmental studies.

The most recent resolution of the classified research dilemma

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appears to rest on the principle that the university has not only the right but also the obligation to put some limits on the freedom of the individual professor to develop his own research program. This responsibility has recently been expressed in other ways which have attracted less attention. Partly as a result of prodding from the National Institutes of Health, most universities have set up definite procedures for reviewing proposals for research involving the use of human beings as experimental subjects. Most investigators in the medical and biological areas have long accepted formal and informal restraints on their freedom in order to protect the rights of their subjects, and the new university regulations seem not to have upset them very much. In some instances, however, the psychologists and social scientists have resented the new committees as an assault on academic freedom. At Cornell, for example, they actually succeeded in modifying the proposed regulations so that the initiative in undertaking a review of a suspect project remains at the departmental or even the individual level.

Now that the university has clearly demonstrated that it does have the power and at least the presumptive right to interfere with the freedom of individual professors to choose their own research topics and methods, we must examine some current suggestions for exercising that power. Much student protest can be interpreted as a desire to curtail the research of individual professors. The most sweeping objection to current practice is based on purely quantitative grounds. Some professors, it is argued, are simply so devoted to research of any kind that they neglect their teaching. More difficult to deal with are criticisms of subject matter or source of support. Some would like to ban from the campus all research which might ultimately find a military use, others would make the decision on the ground that any money provided by the military or by industry is "tainted." This form of criticism is not new. In the early days of the General Education Board, southern conservatives in Georgia and northern progressives in Wisconsin refused grants because the money had been tainted by passing through the hands of Mr. Rockefeller. Perhaps such extreme positions, taken by themselves, do not make a convincing case against the historical hands-off or laissez-faire policy which has long governed the conduct of university research. But many men of more moderate views are advocating that the university take more responsibility than in the past for the general direction of its research effort. Late last year, for example, the provost of

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Michigan State, in an editorial in *Science*,[21] observed that institutions such as his had a special obligation to advance environmental studies (and by implication to reduce certain other activities). This special obligation stems in part from the fact that they were primarily responsible for the advances in agricultural technology which have had such deleterious effects on the environment. At M.I.T., a blue ribbon committee representing a wide distribution of political outlooks has apparently recommended the complete reorientation of its two largest research groups to make them more socially useful. At a recent meeting of an informal panel called by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences to consider university research policy, the dean of a large southern university asserted that he personally scrutinizes every research proposal to estimate its probable social utility before passing it on to an outside agency for funding.

It seems to be inevitable that the academic community will have to recognize that academic freedom, like most other freedoms, has its limits. In the last analysis, agreement on what the limits are can only be reached by some sort of political process. As a contribution to that process, we might begin by drawing a sharp distinction between the right of the university to determine the broad general directions of its research program and the right to tell individual investigators at a particular point in time what they can and cannot do. Thus the administration of M.I.T. would be acting well within the limits of propriety if it accepts its committee report and over the next several years sharply reduces its contracts for work on inertial guidance devices and actively encourages its faculty to engage itself with problems of solid waste disposal. There is no denying, however, that such a decision will work a hardship on some individuals who, in perfectly good faith and out of love for the fascinating technical problems involved, spent many years of their lives preparing themselves for the study of inertial guidance. To deny them the space and facilities to work on a problem of their own choosing could be regarded as a breach of faith and clearly restricts their freedom of choice. Whether or not such a restriction is an infringement of academic freedom as usually defined is perhaps a matter of opinion. After all, university administrators almost every day assign space to some investigators and withhold it from others. It is the fact that the decision we are discussing is based not on the skill of the investigator or the likelihood of his success in his chosen field but

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on an opinion about the social utility of his results that raises the academic freedom issue.

In practice, several measures will doubtless be taken to soften this kind of impact on individuals. The changeover will be undertaken slowly to allow time for finding other jobs. Certain individuals, especially those close to retirement, will be allowed to continue undisturbed. Many younger investigators swept up in the general enthusiasm about the environment will actually want to convert to the problem of solid waste disposal and so on. With good will on both sides, the academic freedom issue may be confined to lively lunch table discussions rather than becoming a subject of bitter recriminations and letters to the *New York Times.*

It seems likely that there would be far less tolerance in the academic community for administrative decisions which prevent a particular individual from doing a given bit of research, in a field otherwise acceptable to the university, purely on the grounds that it gives promise of producing knowledge that might later be used in antisocial ways. Although individual investigators have withdrawn from following up their own discoveries, for example in molecular genetics, on such putative moral grounds, it would be a reckless dean who would force them to do so.

If then we are on the right track in concluding that the university should assume more responsibility for the general direction and balance of its research efforts while eschewing censorship of individual projects except those which violate generally accepted guidelines, we are faced with the necessity of devising suitable procedures for making and implementing the necessary policy decisions. There are four potential sources of power in the university. At various times in history, the center of gravity has moved uneasily from students to faculty to administration to boards of trustees and back again. At present the control of academic affairs is said to center in the faculty but this gives a misleading impression. Most universities consist of several faculties, each one of which more or less controls its own academic affairs. However powerful they may be in setting admissions policy, curriculum content, and requirements for their own degrees, they have relatively little to say about the policies of their sister faculties.

Students, who increasingly regard themselves as parties at interest in matters of over-all policy, are in an even less favorable position. However strongly they may feel about the iniquity of

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"war research," the more perceptive and potentially more effective of them quickly come to realize that the problems involved in changing the university stance in such matters are far more subtle and complicated than they seem at first glance. Furthermore, it is in the nature of things that most matters of high policy take a long time to decide; and, as their elders delight in pointing out, the students are around for only a short time.

In spite of these obvious difficulties, it has recently become common for students and some of the younger faculty to argue that they should make decisions that affect their own lives. The idea has a certain plausibility, especially in a land traditionally devoted to democracy, but it will not stand very close examination as an absolute right. The trouble is that most decisions have the property of affecting more than one class of individuals. Thus the degree that a given group has the right to make certain decisions varies with the interests of other groups. For example, most universities are not having much difficulty in giving students the right to determine the rules governing life in their dormitories so long as they do not become public nuisances. But the determination of research policy is quite a different case. Here the faculty and society at large have much larger stakes, while students are affected only indirectly.

Since the faculty have such large interests in research it might seem obvious that decisions in this area should be left completely to them. But here we encounter another ancient principle—conflict of interest. This essentially says that under some conditions individuals should *not* participate in decisions likely to affect their own lives. Admittedly the conditions are not precisely defined and practice varies among the different professions. Judges are expected to be meticulous about disqualifying themselves from decisions that may affect themselves even indirectly. Trustees of foundations bar themselves from voting on grants for institutions with which they are connected. Legislators, on the other hand, have no qualms about voting on bills that will bring them large subsidies for doing nothing.

It would appear to be a mistake for a university faculty or a combined student faculty senate to follow too closely the precedent set by state or federal legislatures. The way the legislative branch ignores the conflict of interest problem is an unseemly example in any case, but it can be defended at least in part on the grounds that the money the legislators distribute is provided by

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the same people who elect them. When a faculty member votes on budgetary matters, he is disposing of what is other people's money, he is a party at interest, and he is not subject to recall if he spends it unwisely. Students have a somewhat better case, especially in dealing with matters of housing, dining, and teaching, where they do in fact provide most of the money, but the same is not true of research policy.

Finally, it must be recognized that neither the students nor the faculty have been selected because of their skill and experience as legislators or even for their general wisdom. The emphasis, especially in the selection of the faculty, is all in another direction—extraordinary skill and erudition in a relatively small area of knowledge. Anyone who observes a faculty for very long must come to question the compatibility of these excellent qualities with those required of the legislator or judge—tolerance of ambiguity, the ability to compromise, a desire to get on with the job, and a nice sense of the possible.

As a result of these apparently inevitable incapacities of the two most numerous constituencies of the university, decisions on what we have been calling over-all academic policy have remained largely with the administration and trustees. But there are also positive reasons for maintaining the center of gravity where it is. The university is a social instrument; the knowledge it generates and the students it trains do have social effects. Furthermore, it is society that provides most of the money for its support.

It is not alone for technical legal reasons that society holds the board and the administration as primarily responsible for the way the university serves what society conceives to be its own needs. The administration, and especially the president, is in a way uniquely concerned with the welfare of the university as a whole. The president is in a position to be responsive to all four of his constituencies, and his success as an individual is wrapped up with the success of the institution as a whole. All his waking hours are devoted to it. Not so the faculty. Their primary satisfactions come from a variety of sources: the fun of doing research, the prestige they enjoy in their own field outside the university, the satisfaction of helping their students grow in strength and wisdom, and so on. They may be angered or depressed if the university follows what they believe is a wrong course, but their sense of personal worth need not be involved.

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Closely related to these considerations is the fact that the president and his associative administrators can all be forced to resign if things go wrong. The faculty cannot. Furthermore, it would be absurd if they could. Their primary function is to teach and do research; their administrative and policy-making functions, though important, are quite secondary. It would be unthinkable to lose a first-class faculty member because he voted wrong on the retention of R.O.T.C. But it is equally unthinkable to put the ultimate fate of any institution in the hands of people who could not or should not resign if things go wrong. Incidentally, a minor but still important function of the resignation of the individual leader is the way it provides for everyone to begin over again with more-or-less clean slates. Indeed it is not uncommon to appoint a chairman or president to clean up a particularly difficult administrative situation with the explicit understanding that he will probably resign as soon as it is all over. Departments or institutions that try to operate as participatory democracies frequently find themselves riven by terrible arguments about policy. Such departments often fall apart because there is no way to get rid of the hostilities between the competing groups except by separating them from one another. Thus it seems probable that a university will remain in a more healthy state if it avoids asking the humanities departments to decide whether or not the physicists should have a new Van de Graff generator or the physicists what to do about the collection in Chinese history. Let the president, backed by his board, make the decisions of this kind. If the decisions prove too tough, or he makes some almost inevitable slip, he can go back to teaching and research or on to some easier job in industry, carrying away the hostilities of the faculty and students who are free to begin over again in a calmer atmosphere.

To at least one rather obviously conservative observer of the academic scene the arguments for retaining the center of gravity for making over-all policy in the central administration seem entirely convincing. This is not to say that the procedures followed by presidents and boards of trustees have been entirely satisfactory. Clearly they have not been. In more instances than not, perhaps, they have failed to give attention to the expressed fears and dire predictions of the more sensitive and foresighted members of both faculty and student bodies. Furthermore, they may not have taken the policy-making aspects of their jobs as seriously as they should, having been preoccupied with the enormous growth in

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their management responsibilities. Better machinery must be found for bringing faculty and student opinions to bear on the president's office. The growth of the university senate as an administrative device representing all the constituencies of the university should be encouraged and watched with interest. If the president is really interested in change it might be wise for him to give more attention to the minority reports than to the majority votes. In spite of the feeling of some outside observers that universities are hot beds of radicalism, the general tendency of the faculty and indeed of the student body, as a whole, usually is in the direction of conservatism in academic affairs.

In summary, the university as an institution should take much more responsibility than it has in the past for the over-all size and for the distribution of its research effort. Inevitably, this will mean some encroachment on the historic right of the individual investigator to choose the subject and methods of his own research. Nevertheless, this right should be cherished, protected, and exercised, whenever possible. Necessary guidelines should be generally discussed and understood. No attempt should be made to censor individual projects which fall within general policy or specific guidelines simply because some individual or group believes that the resulting knowledge might be used for undesirable or bad ends. The ultimate power of decision in policy matters should reside where it now is, in the hands of the president and the board of trustees. These decisions would doubtless be a great deal better than they have been if they took more fully into account the thoughts and feelings of the faculty and student body. The university senates being formed by students and faculties throughout the country should be excellent instruments for providing the necessary advice and consent.

III. The University and Public Service

The land grant colleges and universities established a tradition of involvement in public affairs through "cooperative extension" which is unique to North America. The resulting improvement in the standard of rural life has been frequently described and generally applauded. Its success provides ample precedent for those who now urge the university to take a more active role in urban and environmental affairs.

On the other hand, there is much uneasiness about substitut-

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ing engagement in practical affairs for devotion to pure science and detached scholarship. The dangers are most clearly identified with projects carried out for the military services and industry, even though the direct involvement of the university with practical applications has usually been less in these areas than in agriculture. The degree and kind of participation in public affairs appropriate to a given institution can only be decided in relation to local needs and traditions, and many universities are presently struggling to develop suitable policies. An important general principle is raised, however, by the growing pressure on the university to engage itself directly in political decision-making.

Perhaps the most obvious incidents are those related to the Vietnam war. In the most extreme cases, it is proposed to use the university's financial power either to inhibit activities deleterious to the public welfare, or to stimulate other "good" activities, like the building of housing for disadvantaged people. Such proposals are so new that their implications have scarcely been uncovered let alone seriously explored. Similar attempts to use financial power for social ends by corporations or foundations have, however, been deplored for years. This is not to say that one cannot make legitimate arguments for refraining from investing in enterprises which seem clearly opposed to the public welfare. Many of us, as individuals, do not have tobacco or distilling stocks in our private portfolios, simply because it makes us uncomfortable to live off the bad habits of other people. It seems probable that a good many institutional investment committees informally follow the same policy for much the same reason.

It is quite a different thing, however, for a university board of trustees to set itself up as judge and disciplinarian and to use financial threats to persuade other institutions to change their ways. Even if such activities could be found correct in principle, and it is very hard to see how they could be, it is even more difficult to see how they could be implemented in practice. In the first place, it is exceedingly difficult to trace all the implications of any act of investment. Almost any bank or industrial corporation will be engaged in some activity that many people might find deleterious to the public welfare. Even to determine in a general way what all the results of a given investment might be would require substantial additions to the university staff. Once these implications have been elucidated, how is the university to decide whether the investment should or should not be made? It

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seems doubtful that those most interested in the questions at issue will want to delegate such decision-making to some relatively small committee. We are therefore faced with the horrid specter of an almost continuous debate throughout the entire academic community on whether Dow Chemical is more wicked than Dupont, or the Chase Manhattan Bank more harmful to New York City than the New York Port Authority.

The conclusion seems inescapable that the university must continue to refrain from becoming a political instrument either by taking explicit positions on controversial questions or by influencing the decisions of others through its financial powers. Exceptions to this policy are to be found only in a limited range of questions that involve the welfare of the university itself. It must be quite correct, for example, for the university to explain the effect of the draft laws on its role as an educational organization and to argue for alterations which will minimize the bad effects on its students. Similarly it can quite properly oppose the building of a new super highway which would bisect the campus, but it should not oppose the federal highway program on grounds of general public policy.

Those who urge greater participation of the university in public affairs have developed a picture of the goals and purposes of the university and of its manner of functioning quite different from that held by most people who have observed universities for some time. The former would have us believe that the university is an enormously powerful, boundlessly wealthy, completely monolithic decision-making apparatus which not only supplies ideas and trained personnel to society, but actually decides in large part where society ought to go True, the budgets of our largest universities now compare with those of medium-sized industries, but this is scarcely a sign of strength when so many are dangerously out of balance. The notion about power apparently derives from a play-on-words, or at least a seriously elliptical interpretation of Bacon's aphorism that knowledge is power. It is perfectly clear, of course, that universities have greatly influenced the shape of our society. It is wrong to interpret these changes as results of the exercise of political power. The university is not a power structure in this sense at all. Indeed, the last two years have demonstrated that relatively small groups of individuals with one or two years of intensive training in the use of political power can bring a great university to its knees. Often the

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first to fall are those ruthless administrators whom fantasy has painted in the guise of Asiatic despots.

The modern university has turned out to be what it always was, not a monolithic decision-making apparatus, but a fragile web of human relationships designed to diffuse and indeed to avoid definitive decisions as much as possible. The great overarching purpose of the university is to foster many different points of view; and the one principle all faculty members will fight for is their right to disagree with their fellows. Most faculty members and, until recently, most students as well were not particularly interested in the institution except insofar as it made it possible for them to do as they wished. Furthermore, most faculty members are not men of action; they are interested in coming to conclusions about the nature of things, not in making decisions to do something. The latter process always involves compromises, and compromises—especially when they involve matters of principle—are offensive to university people. What passes for a decision-making apparatus has, therefore, been more or less deliberately designed to avoid institution-wide decisions on important matters. As we have seen, the most important decisions are left to individuals or small groups. Thus the content of courses and the choice of research projects are determined whenever possible by the individuals who give the courses and carry out the research.

Universities today are faced with the need to review the way that they make decisions. The present diffused arrangements do not seem adequate for examining such questions as the effect of heavy outside sponsorship of research on the other functions of the university, the degree to which the present activities of the university involve it in social action opposed to the public welfare, the use, if any, that the university should make of its financial power to alter society, and so on. But those who redesign the present apparently chaotic arrangements must bear in mind that these have not simply grown up by mistake. The existing decentralization of the university is a purposeful decentralization, designed on the fundamental premise that the only thing a faculty should really agree about is the right to disagree. Since the process of agreement is so difficult, the university community, if it does manage to develop an efficient decision-making apparatus, should be committed to using it as sparingly as possible. Only those decisions that must be made in order to assure the continuity of the university community and the rights of the individuals

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within it should be fed into the centralized decision-making machinery. It is sure to become overloaded if it is asked to decide questions whose primary impact lies outside the university's walls.

There is no doubt that the university should foster criticism of society. Indeed, this is one of its primary functions and purposes, but it should not itself be the critic. At a time when society is much in need of criticism, the university should welcome the increasing social awareness of its students and faculty. It should encourage them to express their opinions and exert their influences on social and political decision-making outside the university. Above all, however, it must protect its role as protector, and it can only do so if it remains outside the channel through which the political influences of faculty and students are exerted. To do otherwise would be to give either the public or their government representatives the opportunity to judge the value of the university by its stance on particular issues, a most inappropriate and dangerous procedure.

It is quite wrong to interpret the lack of commitment of the university to particular causes as a lack of commitment to the public welfare. The university was invented to serve the public welfare by protecting free inquiry and free learning. It is, in fact, thoroughly committed to these two great principles and to the proposition that the free interplay of ideas is in the long run crucial to a sound society. In spite of the inherent discomfort of new ideas, society has in general agreed. As a result, the university has managed, with some ups and downs, to survive changes in government, changes in religious convictions, and changes in social stratification—all the turbulence of Europe—for nearly 1,000 years. It should not now put its existence at hazard by descending into the marketplace to take sides on matters of transient political interest.

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Adaptive Response Within the Institutional System of Higher Education and Research

THE "CENTERS of excellence" promoted during the last decade in response to the Russian scientific challenge now drift on seas of uncertainty like so many rudderless hulks. They were fitted out as the armada of our overseas imperium, with heavy emphasis on weaponry and power advantage. An admiralty intent on annual increases in material consumption sensed no disadvantage in their sluggish inability to work their way against technological currents. Nor was there concern over the tendency of each to emulate the pattern of one of the opulent flagships. But we should not really be surprised that the young do not want to sail in them while insisting that they be refitted for more civilized purposes.

The university is a nearly indispensable institution in a society which has come to depend upon the increase and application of knowledge, with a volatile economy strongly challenged by trading partners and a wide array of social problems caused by needless growth and shallow innocence about unmet public needs. The responsibilities thus entailed for universities were not clearly recognized until near the end of a cycle of expansion whose primary directions we must now acknowledge as ill chosen. Many of our most capable young citizens have lost faith in universities and either attack them destructively or simply drop out.

The basic unit of growth and of structure has been the tenured faculty position through which thirty-year careers are bound into rigid formats that resist change. Without resources for major additions to the original elements in the pattern, change comes to depend upon achieving a consensus favoring innovation among faculty members who are usually committed to the system which shaped their perceptions. A recent study by the Institute of Higher Education at Teachers College, Columbia University, of curriculum

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and student regulations at 110 institutions found that institutional inertia is a very general bar to reform, concluding that colleges and universities in the past decade have "collectively approached the status of a monopoly in American culture."[1]

We must convincingly demonstrate that adaptive states can be achieved within universities by improving educational experience so that the university ceases to disappoint the better graduates of our improved high schools, and by affording to the young much more direct exposure to the social reality of everyday life, aiming to transfer their indignation to society at large, which tolerates many greater evils than unresponsive institutions of higher education.

My discussion of the contemporary American university is based on the objectives which distinguish it as an institution. Institutions are set up only for objects that are greatly esteemed, for their establishment entails a grant of power freely to pursue such ends by whatever means are necessary and legitimate. With any change in the social import of those objectives an institution's capacities will grow or diminish, even to the extent of losing the privilege of institutional status. The governance of institutions is the process of specifying objectives and applying them to the conduct of the activities to which they pertain. The calling of a governing board is to fulfill those objects upon which status as an institution depends, to oversee their relation to society as a whole, and to guarantee that they are pursued by means which are adequate and proper.

It is in the genius of institutions to be devoted to objects without defining them well. Consider this statement of objectives drawn from "Rules and Procedures of the Faculty of Princeton University":

1. The education of undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral students.
2. The advancement of knowledge through research and scholarship.
3. The preservation and dissemination of knowledge.
4. The advancement and protection of the public interest and public welfare.[2]

It is wonderful that so vague a formula could be relied upon as a guide to policy, much less as a basis for institutional prerogatives. What character of education is intended and for what kinds of stu-

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dents? What styles of research, what themes of scholarship, and which domains of knowledge? How to preserve and through what media disseminate knowledge? Within what limits shall the university take action on the public's behalf?

In the absence of precise control stemming from institutional premises, universities have greatly altered their social character by multiplying their activities. Practical training is offered in a host of fields where empirical procedures have not been reduced to systematic knowledge. The fine and performing arts entered as objects of study; subsequently the university entered the arts as patron and performer. Networks of financial and contractual arrangements have expanded to take in expressly commercial operations. But it is in the ever-widening curricula of governments that universities have become most deeply involved, not simply as providers of intellectual resources but as designers of public programs and as operating agencies. The objectives of the university, broadening beyond the possibility of equilibrium, have become irreconcilable.

The danger signals indicating malignant incompatibility among objectives have become conspicuous in many universities. It becomes impossible to settle policy differences and the sores of discord do not heal. Competing claims for resources cannot be resolved. The principal officers of administration decline in effectiveness, unable to fulfill the agenda of necessary decisions. Central forums for collective judgment are disregarded by autonomous operating units which do not bear the institution's imprint. External demands gain in influence as the institution no longer generates a field of force to govern its endeavors. If the objects of an institution are not stated so as to govern its commitments its internal regulating authorities will be overthrown by cancerous growth and the institution will lose the ability to pursue objects of its own. If the university presidency is the impossible office it is so often said to be, it is because the institution has lost its identity and become unmanageable. And so the fiercest trials of society come to be re-enacted in a university arena unable to contain them.

Nothing has done more harm to the system of higher education and research than the widespread tendency for many institutions to regard others as rivals to be overtaken in enrollments, service functions, or wealth. In the uncritical mood engendered by this premise institutions multiply their commitments and permit their growth to be governed by the random availability of resources

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from without. The result is not only the practical consequence of unmanageability and the theoretical difficulty that stated objects are not controlling. The members of the institution rightly perceive the accidental character of events and the random pattern of growth. Lacking a community ethic, which must be based upon a strong sense of institutional integrity, they orient their actions to careerist self-interest or honor parochial concerns at odds with the institution's over-all objectives, which are then lost to view.

Trustees must enforce a doctrine of institutional self-restraint to prevent the university from assuming governmental functions or embarking upon commercial operations. The primacy of higher education among the aims of a university places heavy demands upon its officers of administration and faculty that rule out deep social involvements. The various classes of institutions and other organizations must divide the labors of society cooperatively among themselves according to their stated purposes and best capabilities. This is the first aim of governance, and one of its most rarely considered corollaries is that boards of trustees must be representative of many professions.

As an example of institutional self-restraint the university's research function should be circumscribed to exclude product development, market analysis, testing, or large-scale engineering. For its part, industry should liberalize licensing and royalty arrangements in order to reimburse universities for research and design contributions rather than tempt them into competitive efforts at direct exploitation. Most schools of engineering welcome cooperative relations with industry in the form of summer jobs for students and consulting by faculty, while enjoying corporate support for both research and graduate fellowships. Difficulties leading universities to attempt direct ownership or operation of commercial enterprises must be identified and overcome, if for no other reason than that income from such sources exposes these and other operations of the university to taxation.

The research function must be conducted in a close reciprocal relationship to education, especially at the graduate level, through free response of faculty supervisors to student interest. It follows that programed research, proceeding under central direction so as to fulfill a predetermined design, is inappropriate to the academic setting, where inquiry must proceed unfettered on a fundamental plane. There is a distressing tendency for government sponsored research programs to attempt tighter coordination from the fund-

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mg source. Government agencies formerly wrote contracts to support research which they intended to oversee closely as distinguished from grants given on more liberal terms to investigators working independently. The distinction is being eliminated. An avowed managerial outlook is increasingly met with among research sponsors. Yet this is only one of the strong threats with which the universities are now faced as a result of the federal government's primacy in supporting research.

Sponsored research has grown up in an awkward and haphazard framework of program agency interests which officialdom complacently regards as benign pluralism. The National Academy of Sciences has had to create large task forces, field by field, in an attempt to identify areas of neglect or special need, but these efforts have done little to improve agency commitments of sponsored research support. It has proved impossible to evaluate this unwieldy conglomerate by determining the quality of its aggregate response to opportunity. Several of the research supporting agencies have become notorious for intellectual orthodoxies buttressed by technocratic conventional wisdom and there is a disturbing array of problem areas whose neglect by the national government can only be viewed as decisive proof of grave structural defects in the design of responsibilities.

The agencies are certain that the support of academic science relevant to their missions is vital to maintaining their power, so there should be no surprise if they have most consistently rewarded investigators who propose inquiries which extend rather than undermine the foundations upon which the agencies' major programs have been erected. The orientation of health research toward pharmaceutical development and of research in atomic energy toward power plant and weapons development helped to bring about an enormous neglect of environmental medicine, paralleled by a very general neglect of environmental biology.[3] Environmental quality is now a universal cliché in Washington but very little real change has occurred in the assumptions guiding the government's very large environmental engineering programs. The same may be said of the even more questionable posture of the national government in social engineering, from foreign aid to urban design.

Almost every federal applied research program is corrupted by the standing program commitments of the agency conducting it. The universities have become instruments of vested-interest science through needless failure to challenge the policy posture

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of the research sponsors upon whom they without major exception now so seriously depend. Unwittingly we have devised a system which threatens the integrity of universities while appearing to respond passively to proposals independently conceived and submitted by faculty members. It becomes of the utmost consequence to devise new safeguards for academic freedom in this context.

The program agencies of government should be stripped of the power to offer incentives for faculty members to adopt favored approaches on particular problems. The Congress should transfer funds from the affected agencies to a strengthened and expanded National Science Foundation and a National Foundation on the Arts, Social Studies, and the Humanities. Principles of pluralism could be built into the structure of the panels and programs of these organizations and the risk of intellectual monopoly reduced by increasing the proportion of support given as institutional rather than project grants. A somewhat similar proposal to make the National Science Foundation the nucleus of a strengthened agency for the support of university research has recently been advanced by Jerome Wiesner, who hoped it might significantly expand public support for civilian endeavors.[4] I do not see how this could be done unless the Foundation could start out by administering monies destined for university research from NASA and the Department of Defense, gradually decoupling such funds from the objectives of those agencies and eventually receiving direct appropriations on the same level.

As a means of enforcing the restrictions on the character of research to be undertaken in universities, while simultaneously protecting them from managerial direction by research program executives, I recommend that universities restrict their research activities to fundamental inquiry supported only by grants. Mission-oriented agencies should be prepared for transfers of appropriations for academic science to the national foundations controlled by boards composed principally of academic representatives: the National Science Foundation or the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities (the latter broadened to include social studies).

The only form of support which should be given directly to universities by government program agencies is general support for higher education, to be administered centrally by each university, such as fellowships, facilities or services support, or general budgetary aid to the institution. In consultation with the mission-

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oriented agencies, through the Federal Council for Science and Technology and its specialized committees, each foundation would translate program requirements into awards for the support of research which would then be made for the projects of applicants or the development of designated academic fields. A Presidential Reorganization Plan and set of transfer memoranda drawn up by the Bureau of the Budget could implement this change, which could then be given effect through the adoption of rules and definitions by the Committees on Appropriations of each House of the Congress. Some projects have already been excluded from Department of Defense support under the recently enacted Mansfield Amendment (Section 203 of Public Law 91-121) which prohibits support for research projects lacking "a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function or operation." I believe that the vigorous extension of the principle of insulating academic science from the program interests of agencies is among the most urgent necessities of public policy, without in the least underestimating the complexity and extent of the changes that would be entailed in so doing.

With great rapidity the orientation of graduate students even in strong research departments is changing from factual inquiry to inquiry into values. There is growing resentment over agency bias in sponsored research, taking the form of refusal to participate in government-supported projects. The reaction against classified work, always strong in many universities, is now spreading to all projects supported by military agencies and predictably will soon affect projects supported by other agencies. This reaction was very much in evidence at the 1969 annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. If this strong culturally induced tide is not to weaken important components of fundamental research the agencies must be divorced in an unmistakable manner from university projects in areas of interest to them.

The softening of the institutional loyalties of faculty members favored by particular sponsoring agencies would also be forestalled. It would become more apparent to the public that sponsored research funds serve dual purposes of advancing knowledge and supporting higher education, as Carl Kaysen has recently recommended.[5] Agencies would also become more modest about the gains they expect from academic research, which would benefit policy-making and lead to more concentrated attention on program effectiveness. The nub of this recommendation is found in Peter

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Drucker's argument that governmental decision-making should be concentrated on the kinds of problems which public agencies are best able to solve: "What matters, in other words, is that institutions not be run by government, but be autonomous."[6]

The mission-oriented agencies would undoubtedly proceed to strengthen industrial laboratories and specialized institutes such as contractor-operated laboratories if university research were confined to fundamental inquiry aimed at the advancement of knowledge. And as the competence of these other establishments expanded, in keeping with the advantages of large-scale team effort in addressing problems in the governmental context, the pressure to expand university operations ever deeper into the social sphere would be eased, creating the conditions for a recovery of intra-institutional equilibrium within the universities.

If university involvement in large-scale applied research were to decline, practical training would gravitate to outside laboratories, a trend which may already be remarked in industrial technology, as with the University of Pittsburgh scheme for graduate-level internships in engineering. This pattern has proved to be both workable and stable in medical education where hospitals commonly assume even if they do not profess the status of separate institutions. In response to the breakdown of social services in the city and the crisis in environmental quality, universities will be tempted to take on operational responsibilities to support applied social research and practical training. To do so would be to pass an institutional brink of no return toward becoming omnibus social service establishments identified with most of the shortcomings in the social order, abdicating the university's essential role as the source of well-educated citizens able to fashion a tempting future. The manifest impossibility of universities' owning and administering centers for problem-solving across the entire agenda of mankind has not deterred institutions from a large-scale drift in that direction, although shortages of government research funds have slowed the process. In seeking to place the university at the heart of the urban crisis, as John Gardner recommends,[7] or in drawing the limit to involvement in social problems only at the point where research becomes operational, as Kingman Brewster suggests,[8] these leaders threaten to draw the university beyond the limits within which it can exist as an institution in society. The university's role as a research institution is to contribute to the "knowledge capital" of society, to use Michael Polanyi's term, rather than to

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assemble and market expertise by acting as a commission agent for program interests. It is desirable for the university to count the expert and the applied researcher among its faculty, but as individuals contributing to knowledge rather than as members of a collective whose product is marketed under institutional sponsorship.

The preferred course would be to license outside social service agencies where undergraduates might receive credit for fieldwork and where students in the social service professions might receive a significant portion of their graduate-level training.[9] What results from a third year of academic study in law, for example, conceivably outweigh the benefits of a year of socially-oriented in-service training for attorneys? The academic component of training for a host of professions is inadequate and only discredits the universities that sanction it. Outside agencies may be used also as sources for nonacademic staff to come to the university as auxiliary instructors able to relate on-campus instruction more closely to community needs, an alternative I would prefer to the full-time employment of social engineers or systems analysts in the guise of faculty members. Direct involvement in problem-solving by arrays of experts does not strengthen socially oriented education but dilutes it among a plethora of specialties.

My primary concern in making these recommendations is not to deny the universities' social role but to argue that it may best be fulfilled through undergraduate education based upon the following premises:

1. Undergraduate education should cultivate a nonspecialist intelligence and social awareness for the entire enterprise of life.
2. The integration of advanced specialties of knowledge with the process of general learning should deeply engage every element of the university, shaping the institution by joint efforts of administrative officers, faculty, and students.

The humane aims of general undergraduate education cannot be fulfilled without countering powerful institutional trends which have affected the entire system of higher education: the resort to specialized concentration in defense of quality in the undergraduate schools of the larger universities, the strong influence of graduate schools on degree requirements, and the resulting tendency of many of the superior smaller institutions oriented toward

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continued education beyond the bachelor's degree to base their undergraduate programs upon the requirements for admission to graduate schools. There seems no mistaking the fact that these trends are spending themselves and that a restless search for new approaches to undergraduate education has begun, limited however by economic constraints which seem to restrict the instruction time available per student and by the dogged disciplinary loyalties of most faculty. These are formidable barriers to the improvement of undergraduate education which must be surmounted before one can turn with hope toward designs for reform.

The high cost of responsive instruction need not prevent universities from making seminars, discussion, and tutorials generally available. Rather it is a reflection of such structural rigidities as fixed length of courses, excessive regularity of class schedules, and large numbers of courses required for degrees. The combined effects of advanced placement, wider opportunities for independent work, increased recognition of fieldwork outside the university proper, recruiting para-academic faculty, reducing the total number of required courses, and encouraging flexibility in scheduling would be to multiply the faculty time available for meetings in smaller groups.

Too few mature faculty members will consider participating in undergraduate instruction other than within a discipline and their reluctance greatly reinforces the specialist pattern of the knowledge-oriented curriculum. This too is largely a problem of structure, to be met by attenuating the influence of departments, as is being done at the University of California at Santa Cruz, and by encouraging approaches to social relevance proceeding outward from a disciplinary base, as in the new introductory biology program at the University of Chicago. The poor state of undergraduate education reflects an almost universal absence of leaders able or willing to challenge the limits that faculty members impose upon their own teaching and thus upon the curriculum.

Although we commonly aver that modern society is knowledge-based, the statement is too limited. Its vastly important corollary is that much of the resulting capacity for social improvement is unused because knowledge is not shared widely enough. In a far-reaching analysis of the failure of planning in public affairs Gunnar Myrdal identifies inadequate popular understanding as the principal constraint on social progress in the United States.[10] During my service in the offices of the national legislature and execu-

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tive, as well as in an establishment uniquely dedicated to public enlightenment, I have directly witnessed case after case where failures of popular understanding have crippled the response of government. We clamor over crime but fail to control guns or provide means for competent control of narcotics abuse. Public response to health opportunities defeats expectations in family planning, nutrition, daily regimen, and cigarette smoking. Environmental contamination and adverse technological impacts can be controlled only where an informed public exerts itself strongly. The problems which confront this generation cannot be dispelled by elite technical cadres. They are instead the legacy of our success in dealing with more acute abuses open to control by the social techniques of a generation ago. They resemble the diseases of degeneration that come to the fore after acute infectious processes have been controlled. If the university is the institution uniquely qualified to confront the problems of modern society, it is because the condition which allows such problems to continue is the failing of public enlightenment.

The birthright of the citizen of a modern democracy is an understanding of the forces shaping himself and his world. Yet the feeble equipment we provide to students is blunted in their first encounters with reality and they fashion makeshift tools thereafter. The few who intend lifetimes of study, and therefore need academic training least, are almost the sole beneficiaries of formal higher education. I strongly urge that future scholars and professional scientists instead be advanced to graduate schools after two or, at the most, three years of undergraduate study. The university should concentrate its instructional resources to equip the citizen of the future with a basic understanding of the processes of intellectual and social change. Undergraduate education occupies the first years of an adult life that will experience successive generations of technology, vast structural changes in finance and resource use, and ever more rapid shifts in cultural expression. Yet most students spend their undergraduate years falling steadily further behind.

The problem is compounded by our denial of higher education to those most in need of historical and social awareness—the citizen seeking to overcome deficiencies of family situation or childhood environment. We voice doubt about the educability of a majority of our citizens, just as we once doubted that as many as 10 per cent could benefit from a college education, or as men once feared the effects of disseminating the written word in print. We should

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conclude nothing of the educability of the college student from the operation of the present system any more than we should infer anything of the educability of the population at large from their performance in schools where over 90 per cent of city systems operate tracks as "ability groups" at the secondary level and over 75 per cent in primary grades.[11] Instructional strategies can be tailored to overcome weaknesses in the skills of college entrants. Indeed the students themselves can conduct diagnostic routines to pinpoint specific deficiencies which they are then highly motivated to overcome. The New York Institute of Technology has been dramatically successful in involving students in repairing the deficiencies of preparation rather than letting them drop out. Statistics on student withdrawal and failure at the college level and below should be read as indicators of the weakness of our education effort, not as signs that we are reaching the limit of the educability of the young.

The prevailing institutional dynamic in universities is a proliferation of specialisms derived from social involvements and fed by governmental support. Faculty interest in undergraduate teaching has been static by comparison. Our failure to develop a more coherent and educationally effective curriculum reflects the inertia of departmental structure and faculty avoidance of wider perspectives in undergraduate teaching.[12] The sameness of the undergraduate curriculum among colleges belies the pluralism which is foremost among the official virtues of the system. The pervasiveness of standard curricular patterns is ample evidence that the processes generating them inhere in the institutional system rather than in each faculty. As well might a common snail imagine it had chosen the pattern on its shell which is, of course, generic to its kind. If members of faculties realized that curricula were not really their own corporate creation but lower order resultants of accommodation among departments they might insist upon improvements which would come to reflect their peculiar strengths and widely shared interests.

The structural rigidities inhere within the institutional system at large but the curriculum is open to challenge within any university. Should an art historian, a psychologist, and a literary scholar decide to combine their classes as a concerted exploration of irrationality in modern thought, they would probably find no bar to doing so. Harold Taylor cites a number of practical reforms which could readily be carried out in most universities: take immediate

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action in changing one's own teaching, double the credit hours assigned to some courses while halving their duration to allow for more individual effort by students, and inaugurate experimental colleges within the existing structure.[13]

A university had best begin with changes which can be introduced in the regular operation of the instructional program, which of course many have done. But some more fundamental changes should be considered for later introduction. The adverse consequences of heedless technological development should force a re-evaluation of the place of engineering in undergraduate education. A pre-technology curriculum should be devised to introduce undergraduates destined for engineering careers to humane concerns before they embark on intensive specialization. The universities have contributed heavily to the rape of cities and the degradation of the landscape by permitting applied science to become isolated from the study of the civilization it serves. We must explore every avenue by which technologist and citizen may communicate in the future.

Much restless desire for social involvement which students profess should in my opinion be met away from the campus. The more directly students encounter society the more balanced a view they will take of the contribution the university is making to overall progress in comparison to the other agencies they experience at first hand. If the university is to avoid becoming a target for every grievance, it should concentrate on its primary functions of basic research and higher education with a commitment to each student's intellectual well-being that all will sense. Of course, any experimental college should devote a large part of its program to social studies. An important element in such programs might be an adjunct faculty drawn to the campus from many sectors of the community at large. Students, faculty, and lay advisers might share equally in suggesting and approving such appointments. The community service program of the University of Cincinnati using "field teams" of undergraduates to tutor children and assist neighborhood enterprises deserves to be widely copied. The University without Walls being established through the Union for Experimentation and Research in Higher Education will provide formats for groups of students to range out from cooperating colleges and universities into the community in pursuit of fresh and topical educational sequences.

Flexibility in accommodating individual students should be the

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primary criterion for the overhaul of the curriculum, conceding from the outset that styles of teaching must be changed radically. In order to gain time for work in small groups the routine of lectures, introductory courses, and frequent class meetings must be pruned to a bare minimum. The aim should be to join students and faculty in designing exploratory sequences to build a structure of knowledge around those themes where they discover the strongest shared concern. Orientation schemes to acquaint students with the major provinces of knowledge are needed to guard against premature commitments to subject areas. The uninformed accidental decisions that students now take, in almost total ignorance of the structure of knowledge, cannot be excused. It seems likely that participation in higher education will more and more be spread throughout the adult years through alumni seminars, summer and evening programs, and various kinds of open universities.

The question of proper latitude for student influence on the curriculum and other operations of the university must not be answered with sterile legal formulas. The university is the embodiment of an idea, made manifest only where faculty and students alike, and administrators, share in the feeling that they are creating it anew each year and even day by day. In this they can experience what F. R. Leavis enjoins: "bringing the various essential kinds of specialist knowledge and training into effective relation with informed general intelligence, humane culture, social conscience, and political will. Here in this work we have the function that is preeminently the university's; if the work is not done there it will not be done anywhere."[14] What is most remarkable, behind the confused alarms of the last four years, is how far the students have gone in establishing a distinctive approach to the discontents of civilization. Through their "culture of disaffiliation," contesting the central allegiances of our massive technocracy, the young have indicated their willingness to embark on distinctive new adventures of the spirit.[15] A changed institutional pattern will emerge from the coming endeavor. The university will guide the formative energies of the era while undergoing a continuous refashioning in every element of its structure, as its objectives adapt to a regenerating society.

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FRANKLIN L. FORD

Roles and the Critique of Learning

> "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . ." Thomas Jefferson and friends (1776).
>
> "We haven't all had the good fortune to be ladies; we haven't all been generals, or poets, or statesmen; but when the toast works down to babies, we stand on common ground." Mark Twain at a banquet for President Grant (1879).
>
> *New Yorker* cartoon character on operating table, peering suspiciously at masked surgeon: "How do I know you're not George Plimpton?" (ca. 1966).

THE ABOVE quotations admittedly form a somewhat curious trio. However, I have chosen them as epigraphs because they express, with varying degrees of seriousness, some ideals and assumptions which have had to live together, albeit nervously, in a society whose secular theology is egalitarian, but whose needs have brought into being a highly developed, specialized meritocracy. We *do* assert that all men are created equal, at least as regards their right to develop natural gifts, to gain in knowledge, and to acquire skills. But we also know that not every baby can grow up to be President of the United States, or even a poet. More to the point, we greatly prefer to have our physical interiors explored, when that becomes unavoidable, not by presidents, or even by poets, but by trained products of medical schools—and the bigger and more rigorous the schools, the better for us.

It is against the background of this mixture of expectations that certain features of our society, in its present disarray, stand out most sharply.[1] One such feature is a wide-ranging and passionate reassertion of egalitarianism. Not only students but also itinerant prophets of a new millennium and, more understandably, militant

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spokesmen for black and other minority groups, demand an end to privilege, on the one hand, and to exploitation, on the other. From there, it is but a short step to the denunciation of any selection of individuals for special training or responsibility and, at last, of any differentiation whatever among individual or group roles.[2] Nearly all of those who voice such demands do in fact admit the need for *some* selection and specialization of roles, if only to administer the recasting of society. (Lenin would have agreed.) Yet the ideal of leveling remains the sovereign dogma, and any differentiation among people or their activities is assumed to bear the burden of proof and is, to put it mildly, suspect.

Just why the flight from a definition of roles and from the evaluation of abilities should have led to an increasing distrust of knowledge in general, and more particularly of the systematic merging of research and analysis we call learning, may not be readily apparent. In the past, men of learning have regularly taken the lead in challenging special privilege and denouncing exploitation. And it does no good to aver glibly that they have suddenly ceased to do so; for they have not. Why then should they and their institutions have of late become prime targets for other such challengers and denouncers? Some of the claims and assumptions underlying this phenomenon will be noted shortly. For the moment, let me simply complete my explanation of this essay's title by suggesting that the rejection of differentiation and the critique of learning, while obviously separable, are nevertheless closely linked one to the other. This is true, I believe, whether learning is being indicted for inequities in its distribution or for its alleged substantive dangers.

The impulses just remarked have significance not only for the general position of knowledge in our complex of values but also, no less portentously, for the ways in which its generation, retention, and transmission are organized. Universities as they now exist, combining as they do fiduciary obligations, delegated authority, collegial decision-making, and individual initiative, are being put to the test of doubt. Can they meet the barrage of questions: "Why this?" "Why that?" "With what justification?" "To what moral or social or aesthetic purpose?" Each and every effort to answer such queries involves thinking about the structure and the mission of the university.[3] More is involved, of course, than just their "governance"; but that term (whose archaism does not as yet seem to disturb its users) had to be mentioned at least this once.

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When one turns from mere observation to the more difficult effort first to comprehend, then to respond, he cannot fail to be struck by the cacophony of reactions within universities themselves. From some members of the academic community comes an angry outcry against "anarchists," "the new barbarians," "Know-nothings," "Levellers," and "Luddites." Not surprisingly, this wrath is most frequently encountered among the older members of the profession, but it is shared by some increasingly outspoken younger teachers and students as well. I confess to having yielded, in moments of discouragement, to the vocabulary of what might be called "anti-barbarism"; but it is not really very helpful.[4]

On the other hand, a sufficient number of faculty members, of diverse ages and fields, have joined those students who deny the validity of existing academic forms and values so that we are forced to recognize the present situation as unprecedented in one important respect. What is going on cannot be dismissed as simply a campaign against universities on the part of uncomprehending "outsiders" and by some unsuccessful and therefore embittered students. Instead, for the first time since America's universities became worthy of the name, they are feeling the effects of an internal crisis of confidence. Its personification is the professor—it matters little which is his department—who does not himself attack the university but who, when it *is* attacked, discovers that he is immobilized by doubt. His uncertainties may relate to any, or all, of the following: the case to be made for learning as such, the state of his own discipline, his personal popularity as a teacher, his stamina and his aims as a researcher.

I question neither the authenticity of such feelings nor the possibility that they may in some cases produce beneficial results, any more than I question the sincerity of students and faculty members who see themselves as participating actively in the painful birth of something altogether new and incomparably better than things past. I only note that both sets of attitudes help to make the crisis of learning primarily internal. Ominous though public reactions may be for the future of higher education in this country, those reactions can scarcely be rendered more friendly until higher education itself recovers confidence in its own purposes and re-establishes a working consensus within its own house.

If neither anger nor hand-wringing is a satisfactory response to what is implicitly anti-intellectual in much of today's campus rhetoric, what *is* the way that can lead to better answers? First, I sub-

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mit, we need to understand the historical and, to the extent the term applies at all, the philosophical setting. We must start, that is, with an effort at comprehension. Thereafter, we may at least hope to emerge with some positive results from what might otherwise be a paralyzing collision of values.

It should perhaps be said at once, in order to clear the table, that no time will be wasted here on the relatively small number of people who are genuine "Know-nothings." Nor will they be set up as straw men for easy demolition. The pathetic figures of rancor and self-defeat who attack all forms of learning, as in other contexts they attack beauty, style, and simple decency (by which I mean nothing more complex than reasonable restraint and charity), doubtless hold some interest for psychopathologists. For anyone concerned with problems of the mind, as distinct from the nervous system, they hold no interest whatever.

The ideas and attitudes needing to be probed are rather those of a large segment of the nation's population, especially of the young and the disadvantaged. They are also the ideas, as I have earlier tried to make clear, of a not inconsiderable number of critics of academia within the latter's own adult ranks. I assume that they are ideas lying within reach of discussion; but they cannot be meaningfully discussed, in their various permutations and combinations, without a prior awareness of certain features of contemporary history, social as well as intellectual.

One of these features has been the narrowing of the commonly understood definition of "discrimination" and a popular revulsion against the term, thus narrowed. Discrimination against people, especially against black Americans, with respect to education, recreation, access to public facilities of all kinds, purely on the basis of racial bigotry, has gripped our age as the visible symbol—worse than that, as the stubborn vestige—of historic injustice. Poisoned by that tragic association, discrimination seen as nothing more than the act of distinguishing, as the process of choice by an art critic, a magazine editor, a law professor, a student deciding which courses to take, ultimately even a juror or a voter, is threatened with the loss of its extended, useful, and essentially innocent meaning. If it was wrong, as it was and is, to discriminate against a black youngster seeking admission to an all-white school, why isn't it just as wrong to pick some candidates, and not others, for the editorial board of the *Law Review* or to let some connoisseur pronounce one painting superior to another?

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The revolt against comparative rating is nothing new. For as long as men have had academies, clubs, cathedral chapters, military ranks, central committees, people have complained of the fact that positive selection inevitably implies exclusion as well. Still more offensive, throughout history, has been the realization that the ostensible criteria for selection-exclusion have often not been the real ones. There is no need to labor the point: "objective" standards of intelligence, skill, experience can easily be made the screen for the operations of prejudice and "old-boyism." It should be just as unnecessary to overemphasize another obvious point, namely, that foolish or dishonest selection warrants criticism of the agent, perhaps also of the method, but not of selection per se. Where choices must be made, it seems a sterile exercise to condemn the act of choosing. Be that as it may, we shall get ahead very little if we do not acknowledge the extent to which selection, like discrimination, has fallen victim to suspicion directed toward any and all efforts to differentiate.

Still a third term of newly achieved opprobrium is "meritocracy." Indeed, even the seemingly unexceptionable concept of "merit" comes under fire as a natural disguise for hypocrisy and favoritism. In an earlier issue of *Dædalus*, Stanley Hoffmann identified, without endorsing, the prevalent conviction on the part of students that American society is to be sure a vast meritocracy, but one not so much of true ability, or even of promise, as of titles, ranks, grades, degrees—in short, of certification. With this belief, it might be added, often goes a vision of the Establishment as a network of affiliations, deals, and clearances the conspiratorial grandeur of which should console the most nervous member of the John Birch Society, as *he* sets forth to do battle with the "Communist network." I agree with Professor Hoffmann that such attitudes are frequently expressed by our students; and I share his awareness that one of the emotions dependably involved is an individual fear of being trained for, and then forced into, a narrowly technical, professional slot. There is some piquancy in the thought that that fear may prove to be the most important remnant of respect, in the minds of students, for a general liberal education.

The repudiation of the idea of merit by educated or educable people is in one respect a curious reversal of history. Selection determined by ability and, to the extent to which it could be judged, by ability alone has for centuries been the slogan of battle against unexamined privilege. A glance at the other side of the barricades

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may call to mind the source of Lord Melbourne's gruff affection for the Order of the Garter: "no damned nonsense about merit!" Thus one can scarcely avoid an occasional feeling of bewilderment and indignation at seeing the object of His Lordship's scorn also singled out for derision by those it has helped to get where they are.

Yet there *are* things wrong with meritocracy as it functions in our gigantic republic. The disequilibrium of supply and demand, encountered in one profession after another, threatens all by itself to make of meritocracy a thing much more of certification than of anything else. If there were more potentially able doctors than general practitioners and specialists needed, more really qualified engineers, clergymen, judges, administrators of all types than places to be filled, formal credentials would be easier to equate with demonstrated eligibility. Let me add in some haste, out of fairness to colleagues in other fields, that nowhere is the disequilibrium just cited more painfully evident than within the academic world. It would be difficult, and probably unrewarding, to estimate the ratio of Ph.D.'s to creative scholars, or of professors to able and dedicated teachers; but the panoply of gowns, hoods, degrees, and titles is an inviting target for satire—and not just on the part of students.

Well, you may choose to object at this point, even if the tension between ability and certification throws suspicion on all differentiation of roles, inside and outside the university, what has that to do with respect for learning? Nothing, is my reply, if one limits oneself to strictly logical connections. From the first, be it remembered, I have maintained that the phenomena to be examined here are in theory separable. In practice, however, which is to say in the operational thinking of many of our contemporaries, they have become intertwined. One of the forces pulling them together, I believe, is the distrust of *all* authority, be it titular, intellectual, or generational, which future historians are sure to treat as one of the identifying features of our epoch.

If one assumes, as many younger and some older people currently do, that powers and responsibilities are only badges of pretension and the booty of undeserved privilege, one easily comes to repudiate all claims on behalf of qualified judgment, all differentiation of roles, and, finally, all rules of any kind. By the same token, since the qualification most difficult to dismiss is that of superior knowledge, the revolt against authority *must* include the denigration of knowledge, and especially of learning and critical thought, or find itself seriously weakened. No, that is not quite the right way

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to put it. Rather, I should say that because learning has excited reverence in the past, and still does until it is rejected, the first sign of its faltering or failing to solve a given problem brings a peculiarly strong revulsion, especially in the young. To turn against it is, in effect, to clinch the case against authority. The analogy to an abandonment of religion is obvious.

There is, however, still more involved. Knowledge, however it is acquired and organized, poses two specific threats to a wide variety of worried individuals. The first of these threats, as old as man's fear of fire, is the dread that comes from the awareness that knowledge is in fact uncontrollable. Men have always felt some dread of discovery, even as it excited them; but the age of thermonuclear power, infinitely expanded biology, and the psychology of behavioral control has experienced that dread at a new level of intensity. If scientists themselves can be terrified, as they sometimes are, by their own findings and by their inability to control the uses to which those findings may be put, how can we be surprised at the undercurrent of terror in a whole society's view of the generation of knowledge, whatever its immediate appearance of harmlessness or even helpfulness?

Here again there obtrudes the irony of the New Left's joining the Old Right, this time in pressing the query: Is man better off for having invented gunpowder, movable type, the internal combustion engine, the atomic bomb, television? (Some latter-day Malthusians would add to that list contraceptives and even antibiotics.) The fact that virtually all of us feel periodic doubts about the reality of material progress does not alter the fact that the question as put is far less than just to the achievements of science and technology during the past four or five centuries. That, however, is not the most important point. Just or unjust, the challenge is as loud as the misgivings are deep: Show us what all your "new knowledge," piling up generation after generation, has done for humanity!

The second threat perceived by learning's present-day critics is actually the opposite of the one just considered. It lies in the dread of *old* knowledge and of its critical and empirical weight. History's message that although the world may change, it changes slowly, unevenly, and seldom irreversibly is anathema to anyone intent on immediate and total overturn. The stubborn fact that no past revolution has produced, at least for any considerable length of time, the results envisaged by its initiators can scarcely be expected to commend itself to impatient and often benevolent innovators.

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Here again, as in the case of competitive selection and of meritocracy's operational shortcomings, the critics have a point (though very frequently they over- or misstate it). There is no denying that the record of man's failures and frustrations, of humanity's imperfection and immalleability, has too often been used as reason enough to oppose any step forward. There is also considerable philosophical backing for those who fear the dead hand of the past. Aristotle found more "philosophy" in poetry than in history; and much more recently (only something over three centuries ago!) Descartes warned against "cluttering the mind" with old data, which could interfere with the perception of clear, innate ideas and with the process of deduction based upon them. Now, if one can manage to escape both from history and from rationality—out of contempt for all "linear" thinking, whether Greek, Cartesian, or any other kind—one can for a time enjoy a sense of total emancipation.

Such euphoria may be viewed with at least a fleeting envy, but hardly with reverence. To avoid the complications and constraints of factual knowledge through the simple expedient of not learning anything suggests rather too strongly a decision to eliminate all future risk of food poisoning by giving up eating. It remains the case, however, that the twin impulses, to fear new knowledge and to be resentful of old, are very important elements in the troubles through which universities are passing. When encountered in people either unwilling or unable to learn, they are invincible. They are also irrelevant to reasoned debate. When found in people of capacity and promise, they cry out to be understood and to be answered. They spring in part, I believe, from an essentially generous revival of romanticism, sometimes nostalgic (which is not to say truly historical), sometimes utopian, quite often a mixture of both. They express a desire to see the heart given precedence over the head, to have the brotherhood of man advance without being asked to clear hedges of science or history or logic. Mark Twain was neither the first nor the last American to enjoy contemplating the equality of babies, instead of differences among adults.

One final, very different, charge must be mentioned. It is that learning, being to a large extent institutionalized, is itself necessarily an instrument of repression. Or, to put the accusation another way, since not all can learn as much or as rapidly as can some, since in fact some get no fair chance at learning at all, the attack on learning as such is a democratic imperative. The difficulties of this position are not hard to discern. It charges learning with all the inequalities

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of opportunity in society at large, as well as with all the consequences of real variations in ability to benefit from instruction and study. Furthermore, carried to its logical extreme, it would preclude efforts, for example, to overcome illiteracy anywhere in the world. It would, in short, justify the freezing of the present distribution of educational opportunities, with all its inequities. Still, it is a position that has its part in the current spectrum of attitudes; and when it is encountered in people who have despaired, one hopes prematurely but in any case understandably, of gaining any share of the power that is knowledge, it bespeaks a deprivation pleading to be remedied.

The reader, having presumably formed his own impression of today's social, intellectual, and educational scene, can hardly be expected to have accepted outright my particular selection and ordering of those of its elements most urgently demanding attention: (1) semantic confusion over such terms as "discrimination," "merit," and so forth; (2) resistance to authority, however it is defined, delegated, or legitimized; (3) fear of new discoveries; (4) impatience with experience, whether recorded or just remembered; (5) a romantic, not inherently unattractive utopianism; and (6) the suspicion that learning itself is repressive. If, however, the reader is willing to push on from this point, he can be assured of the opportunity to judge not only my descriptive diagnosis but also my by-no-means bland or confident sketching of some possible lines of response.

First, let us return to the matter of terms and meanings. It is never easy to reverse the impoverishment of language that results from conceptual laziness or semantic confusion, but I think we must at least give it a try. Thus, no matter how vicious may have become the connotations of "discrimination," understood as the tyranny of prejudice, we cannot simply throw away the term's other, more positive meanings. When Branch Rickey resolved to break baseball's color line, no one can have doubted that his selection of the first black major leaguer would have to be rigorously discriminating with respect to ability, intelligence, and self-control. A mediocre choice could have been disastrous for the entire venture. Fortunately, Jackie Robinson was anything but a mediocrity. Similarly, Harvard University had to recognize some years ago, when it accepted an endowed professorship of Catholic studies, that only the most discriminating choice of patently qualified men successively to occupy the chair would over a period of time serve its ecumenical purpose.

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Other terms need equally candid reconsideration. I admit that "merit," under even the best, least confused circumstances, is a highly protean concept, one to be defined carefully each time it is used, since an appropriate definition varies with the demands of a specific situation. No doubt there are some qualities—honesty, unselfishness, courage, clarity of mind—that most of us would accept as elements in a generalized conception of merit, welcome at any time, for any role. Perhaps we could also agree that inherited titles and wealth, whatever benefits they may confer on their possessors, and whatever the latter's other, independent attributes may be, do not in themselves belong to the definition of merit viewed coldly as personal quality and nothing else. But I should repeat that in this case a general definition takes one only part of the way to what thereafter becomes an often baffling inventory of qualifications for particular tasks.

We might feel less uneasy about the ideals of genuine meritocracy and aristocracy literally understood (which for Thomas Jefferson, as for many another theorist of democracy, was an ingredient of free government fully as vital as civil and social equality) if we were not so embarrassed by the notion of "elites." What a debasement of usage is there! A word which, in terms ranging from the classical to the Darwinian and beyond, signified only the best in terms of ability, has slipped downward through our language until today it is seldom used save with reference to society events, expensive restaurants, and high-tuition colleges. I am not at all sure that the word can ever be restored to its true meaning. Nevertheless, note the idea it once stood for, as set forth, to take an important example, by Vilfredo Pareto in his *Systèmes socialistes* late in the last century—the idea that in every walk of life, without regard to birth or wealth or accidental status, can be found a certain number of uncommonly, sometimes incomparably, gifted individuals. For Pareto, some elites were politically significant, some not; but all of them, he argued, would in an ideal society be guaranteed an altogether untrammeled upward mobility.[5] If it is charged that the vision of a completely open circulation of elites is too pure and literally too inhuman and ideal, bound to be eroded by heredity, custom, favoritism the moment its realization is attempted, I can only ask in reply whether the same is not equally true of pure democracy or pure altruism. Man has never been able to reach such lodestars, but he has continued to peer up at them in his efforts to set a course.

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What about the rejection of authority, any and all authority, especially on the part of students? Suspicion of power used only to perpetuate the tenure of its holders is understandable enough. So is a healthy distaste for pomposity. The same cannot be said for the sloppy assumption that all authority is inevitably and essentially either pompous or self-regarding. The only way I can see to explain that caricature and the loving attention it receives is to cite a recurrent tendency to consider authority as nothing but the enjoyment of power, not as responsibility and still less as something that often demands self-sacrifice of its wielders. As a matter of fact, ignorance of the realities of power may deserve the palm as the principal source of opposition to any differentiation of individual roles.

It is quite possible that feelings about super- and subordination will continue to skew discussion within, and concerning, universities for some time to come. Certainly it is true that tutors, professors, deans, presidents, trustees, to the extent that they appear as figures of authority, have been having a hard time trying to talk to students—even to students fondest of complaining that "no one talks to them." The question thus becomes: What kinds of roles do, or can, the majority of students (and faculty) accept as justified by differing levels of knowledge and experience, assuming that ethics do not vary with age to the extent some would have us believe?

No quick answer rushes to present itself, and none is proof against doubt. Personally, however, I have found especially helpful two points raised in the symposium on universities held last February under the auspices of *Dædalus* and the Danforth Foundation. One was Kenneth Keniston's discussion of the paradox inherent in students' resentment of and simultaneous demands upon their teachers. The other was Walter Metzger's suggestion, spelled out elsewhere in the present issue of this journal, that "asymmetry" among roles is a more useful concept, particularly in an academic setting, than is any crude assertion of superordination over subordinates. Keniston's point, a part of it at any rate, I take to be that while some students yearn to get professors down from high platforms and deans out of high-ceilinged offices, other students are seeking role models of informed experience, and a substantial number of students are doing both things at once. Metzger, stressing the need for teachers, not martinets, and proposing to distinguish what may in some respects be a paternal relationship from a paternalistic one, justifies a differentiation among roles on these relatively gentle grounds.

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For present purposes, of course, the most important upshot of the discussion just recalled lies in the reassertion of some form of differentiation as at once inescapable *and* valuable. If any distinction in roles is admitted, then a structure of designation, of selection based on discriminating judgment, is clearly justified. We can and should insist that it take account, as regards teachers, of qualities over and above—but not in place of—knowledge. We can and should go on trying in every way possible to make the selection of students take cognizance not only of proven ability, but also of promise, of need, and of past deprivation. Throughout, however, we shall be fortunate, all of us, if we pursue a vision of evolving and improving human relationships, not of dithering chaos.

And now, at last, what of the critique of learning? Does the process of gathering, analyzing, and applying elements of knowledge have about it something that makes universities necessarily the agents of repression, strongholds of unfair privilege, towers covered less with ivy than with dishonesty? For anyone who replies with a gleeful "Yes!" the argument is over. Or more accurately said, there has been no argument. For most people, however, while the issue may remain a disturbing one, it is by no means closed.

I believe that learning has been taking a great deal of unfair treatment lately. Unfair in at least two respects. In the first place, some of the claims on its behalf, and hence of the complaints against it, seem to imply that it encompasses far more of the human condition than it in fact does, or ever could. Every day of one's life, one makes decisions unaffected by the findings of scholarship or science. One may choose a course of action dictated instead by a deeply felt moral imperative, by social and political judgments of immediate priorities, or by the urging of some sharp, though not easily explained, jab of intuition. Learning, after all, is not even synonymous with all of knowledge. The latter is enhanced, to be sure, by disciplined study; but it is also derived from direct, perhaps fortuitous experience, from the appreciation of familiar, immediate surroundings, from candid introspection. If the matter were not quite so serious, there would be cause for amusement in the intellectual snobbery of those who insist that formal learning must either do everything and solve every problem—RIGHT NOW!—or stand convicted, at best, of irrelevance and, at worst, of fraud. We who continue to view the university with pride, but also with some awareness of its inherent limitations, have reason to reply: "Gentlemen, you do us too much honor."

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There is, I have tried to suggest, a second element of unfairness in the critique of learning as it is frequently advanced. Hortatory voices assure us that, in order to avoid oblivion, learning *must now change its fundamental nature.* Insofar as that admonition is anything more than the child of exaggeration, it strikes me as a ringing answer to the wrong question. The question is not whether research, analysis, the critical re-examination of old beliefs, the quest for new kinds of understanding still have a place in human affairs. Of course they do, and they are what learning has to offer. It will not, because it cannot, "change its fundamental nature" to satisfy the whim of any passing generation. The real question concerns not what learning is but what its relationship should be to the other determinants of action considered in the preceding paragraph. In seeking an answer, we shall be well off if learning's defenders show a degree of modesty and its critics, some reasonable forbearance.

Realism about the limits of learning, about its constant need for updating and for mid-course corrections, about the flaws in its institutions, as in all institutions, should, let me repeat, be treated as essential. Realism, however, need not be apologetic; it is by no means the same thing as abject surrender. Learning cannot set all courses, provide all answers, define all efforts to improve the world —as students, among others, urgently and rightly want to do. But it can suggest objectives and means, help to spell out the implications of alternative solutions and give to efforts at improvement a rigor and a tenacity which alone can keep such efforts, however fervent, from being no more than aborted declarations of intention. Is there any great problem before us, of war and peace, of weapons, of race relations, of poverty or population or the environment, that we should do better to face uninformed?

The implications of all this for the university must be stated in general terms, to allow for countless local variations; but general implications are not necessarily vague or intangible. I assume that the university will have to go on selecting its faculty and students, as openly and fairly as mortals can manage, but selecting nevertheless. Among the individuals recruited, there will have to be recognized differences in roles and responsibilities, whatever changes may take place in the way those differences are defined. Finally, the university's central concern must remain learning, not sociability or emotional fulfillment or psychological help, though all those things find their place in any community organized around the pursuit of knowledge.

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By now it should be apparent that, for me at least, neither despair nor rigidity appears an adequate reaction to the challenges of the day. There are long and harsh debates still ahead of us, and no doubt waste and further suffering as well; but this is no time to duck into the library of Alexandria, there to wait out, through our descendants, another age of ignorance. Neither is it a time for clinging indiscriminately to essentials and nonessentials alike. The real task is to try to agree on what *are* the essentials—for I believe most firmly that learning has some timeless claims and values, and that they deserve every ounce of energy that can be mobilized in their defense. Like whole societies, however, learning is organized at any given point in time in ways that are partly formal, accidental, and, if one takes the long view, transitory. Perhaps the very best thing any of us can remember about "learning," just as a word, is that it is more than a noun, solid, august, potentially static. It is also an active present participle.

References

1. In speaking of "our" society, I have had the United States specifically in mind. It need hardly be pointed out that many other developed countries are facing what are now fashionably referred to as post-industrial conditions and seeking to find appropriate combinations of liberal and social democratic—as well as, in some cases, highly authoritarian—means for dealing with new realities. Much of what will be said in this essay applies, at the very least, to Western Europe, to Japan, to Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and to several Latin American nations. Some of it may apply as well to the Soviet Union and to certain of its satellites, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the chief topic of discussion is universities; and the American university has enough features that are either unique, or very nearly so, to make me wary of treating any country but my own.

2. Even the doctrine of "compensatory discrimination" in favor of racial groups which have known centuries of deprivation and oppression is regularly, and I assume sincerely, defended as egalitarian in aim. That is, whatever the short-run differentiation and favoritism involved, it proposes the counterbalancing of an old imbalance and the eventual achievement of a new and finally genuine balance. Whatever one may make of the thesis, it is at any rate not the most bizarre dialectical structure ever erected.

3. As in the case of national emphasis on America, so too in the concentration on universities, I am aware of the danger of sounding parochial. Clearly, there are many important aspects of this discussion that touch the liberal arts college and the technical institute as brusquely as they do the university. It is the university, however, with its characteristic mixture of teaching and advanced research, its complex of classrooms and libraries, museums

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and laboratories, its increasing involvement in public programs, that stands most squarely in the center of the arguments being examined here. Once again, therefore, I ask license to maintain a focus, without ignoring the broader dimensions of the full picture.

4. One of the things most transparently wrong with "anti-barbarism" is that it jumbles together, as though they were synonyms or near-synonyms, terms which in point of fact refer to quite different things. Anarchism, as a specific, and in its pure form very rarely encountered, political doctrine (as atheism is a theological doctrine), is by no means the same thing as Know-nothingism. The latter, in turn, is scarcely a distinguishing characteristic of barbarism. To take only one example from history, contempt for knowledge seems to have been met at least as frequently among jaded Romans of the later Empire as among their eager Teutonic enemies. Finally, there are professors, not all of them in the humanities, whose regard for rank, including their own, certainly rules them out as "Levellers," but whose fear and hatred of academic technology, from programed instruction to computers to audio-visual aids, gives them some claim to descent from England's nineteenth-century. Luddites. Be it said, in justice, that machine-smashing by classicists, systematic botanists, and teachers of comparative literature is not, as yet, rampant.

5. Pareto was too mischievous not to point out that even pickpockets have their own elite—those not in jail.

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EDWARD JOSEPH SHOBEN, JR.

Cultural Criticism and the American College

FAR MORE than the ongoing processes of biological evolution, the dynamics of culture-building account for the human condition. Alone among the planet's animals, man copes with his environment by adapting it to his needs. Into his relationship to the world, he intrudes the vast array of artifacts and ideas that only he can fashion. If most life-forms survive by adjusting themselves, slowly and at a great cost in individual members of the species, to the demands of their natural surroundings, man surmounts environmental limitations by transforming them through the construction, revision, and transmission of cultures. As a consequence, he can live anywhere on earth, essentially uncabined by climate or the character of a natural food supply. Indeed, the highly technologized cultural achievements of the 1970's demonstrate that man can maintain himself *off* the earth—in space and on the moon.

And yet the ironies of our ironic age include two observations that must give us pause. First, the civilizations of the West, especially the civilization of the United States, have reached a point in the history of their culture where that capacity to surmount environmental limitations—that capacity to conquer nature—threatens to befoul the ultimate terrestrial nest from which man cannot escape and to poison the envelope of air from which he draws his basic breath. It is as if the very power and flexibility of his cultural capabilities have brought the human animal to the threshhold of self-destruction. And that melancholy irony dovetails with the second: The massiveness of the modern plight is novel; its fundamental character is not. Cultures before ours have lost their vitality and effectiveness and have died. One need not become a partisan of cyclic theories of history to accept Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* as illustrative evidence here. The central point is a relatively simple one. For all their marvelous intricacy, for all their strength and agility in

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overcoming the constraints of the environment, the ways of life that cultures define rarely contain within themselves the mechanisms of critical review that significantly insure their continuing viability as conditions change. This dark generalization seems to hold (at least to a degree that makes it merit consideration) especially for those cultures that have been, by one set of criteria or another, most successful; and the changing conditions that have fatally undone successful cultures have been primarily challenges arising from within the cultural system to which the overall structure could not adequately respond. Again, it is quite unnecessary to beat Professor Toynbee's theoretical drum to be impressed by the record examined in *A Study of History*.

Cultures, like the animal that creates them, are imperfect things. Among their imperfections is a tendency to be lulled by the signs of success into complacency and a bland conviction that the rewarded ways of an hour will last forever. Like a corporate Faust, they

> hail the Moment flying,
> Ah, still delay—thou art so fair!

and deliver themselves into the hands of a Mephistopheles of their own summoning. And as it is with cultures, so it is with the institutions that they comprise. Locked into an integrated system, they find it exceptionally hard to respond in new modes, particularly critical modes, to the challenges which the system, obedient to its own unchecked dynamics, produces. Higher education in America—the institutional network of colleges and universities—is a special case in point.

Like colleges anywhere—in China and the Soviet Union, in Cuba and North Vietnam, in Nigeria and South Africa—the enterprise of higher education in the United States is maintained and supported by the society of which it is inevitably a part. Its function, again as is true all over the world, is to provide valued services to that society, and its distinctiveness lies in the generally intellectual character of those services. The historic categories of American higher educational service have been five:

(1) the socialization of young people or the transmission of cultural tradition, the insuring of the culture's continuity by passing its central ideals and ideas from one generation to the next,

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(2) the training of specialized manpower to meet national needs—the development of a learned ministry to bring the gospel to the New World's wilderness, of the technicians and engineers to serve the expanding agricultural and industrial components of the mid-nineteenth-century economy, of the scientists demanded by the anxieties evoked by Sputnik, of the technical experts and managers of our emerging post-industrial society, and so forth,
(3) the research and scholarship that clarify and renew a tradition and that supply the new knowledge on which an increasingly technologized culture feeds,
(4) the providing of technical expertise to the central agencies of the culture—primarily governmental departments, businesses, and school systems—through consultation and contractual arrangements, and
(5) the critical analysis and evaluation of the culture's trends and dynamics.

One can cogently argue that in recent years, increasingly since the end of World War II, the second, third, and fourth of these purposes have been strongly and progressively emphasized in relation to the first and fifth and that technical and technologically relevant research has become more and more dominant over the kinds of scholarship that throw new light on an intellectual or moral heritage or that generate new ethical or social syntheses.[1] These alterations in patterns of institutional service have occurred as aspects of major shifts in the larger society, and the much-spoken-of crisis in our colleges is a complex but intimate reflection of the more pervasive crisis in our culture.

As life in the United States has become increasingly subject to influences that are technical, technological, and managerial, college has become less a privilege or an opportunity for a personally liberating, developmental experience and more a necessary prerequisite for a place in the occupational and economic sun. Indeed, the possession or lack of a baccalaureate degree has become the best single predictor of a young man or woman's over-all financial fortunes, and higher education operates as a kind of collander through which youthful talent is sieved into the personnel rolls of industry, government, and the professions. Imperceptibly but rapidly, the service of socialization has been taken over by the service of training, and the examination of a cultural heritage

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has become lost in the development of manpower. This tendency has been markedly accelerated by the professionalization of the academic disciplines themselves. As society has become ever more dependent on specialized knowledge of virtually all kinds, graduate schools have concentrated with greater and greater intensity on the development of technical skills in the various domains of scholarship. It is not that every Ph.D. produced is likely to make an original contribution to his particular field; rather, it is a matter of turning out sufficient Ph.D.'s, all of whom are essentially committed to the values of such an effort, that the probability of such contributions is kept at a high level and that support for the professional enterprise of creating or discovering knowledge is maintained through the visibility and influence of highly trained men who are deeply invested in it even when they do not directly participate in it. There is a real sense in which the nonpublishing professor is the promoter and public relations man to undergraduates for his publishing colleagues. In any case, because faculty members are drawn almost exclusively from the graduate school, their college-level offerings tend to reflect the technical character of modern scholarship and the professional thrust of the disciplines somewhat more than the liberalizing, socializing service obligation of the institution. In consequence, even courses in English literature or philosophy slight the critical examination of our cultural traditions in favor of introducing a potential professional career. The recruitment of bright youngsters to one's own domain of scholarship, it has been found,[2] is among the major motives for a professor's acceptance of undergraduate teaching responsibilities. With no one's quite intending it, this movement toward specialized professionalism has geared higher education ever more tightly into the machinery of American culture. One result may have been a reduction in the availability to that culture of significant sources of critical review that are essential to its self-renewal and to its continuing vitality.

Similar processes seem to have been at work within the realm of research. Stimulated by national funding patterns, the American academy has invested a high proportion of its scholarly talent in the natural sciences and technology and in those aspects of the social and behavioral disciplines that have appeared useful in the prosecution of United States policies as defined by the country's political leadership. As for the arts and humanities, those fields of inquiry in which cultural criticism is in some degree

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inherent, the short and impoverished history of the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities is only one index of the low priority commanded by aesthetic concerns and the long, normative perspectives that historical and philosophical studies *can* provide. The central point is a crucial one. There is certainly nothing "wrong" in the serving of either government or industry by academic men or academic institutions; only the broken quality of our time necessitates this reminder of the inescapable and integral relationship between the university and the larger society. But for that relationship to be productive, it must provide room for significant evaluation, thoughtful judgment, and normative assessments that are not only permitted but encouraged and heeded. Encouragement is not provided by national policies and practices that richly reward intellectual and technical service to established patterns but that merely tolerate or that absorb without answering the intellectual criticism of those patterns. What currently disturbs many people is the credibility of a proposition like this one: Government, the military, and large corporations have captured (some would say "bought") the research capabilities of our colleges and universities, ablated their potential critical power, and separated the quest for knowledge from the quest for values; culpable villains have not brought us to this state, but rather a cultural system that has cut itself loose from its ethical base and the moral constraints and proddings that criticism supplies.

At least three points need underscoring in any considerations of this view of the contemporary academy. First, it is a perception that is widely shared by large numbers of students, faculty members, and people outside the ivy-covered walls, not all of whom can be discounted as extremists or latter-day Bolsheviks. If the perception is an erroneous one, it has yet to be corrected by well-documented and forcefully stated positions from within the community of universities and colleges. The longer that challenge goes indaequately answered, the more probable is the spread of attitudes of suspicion and of doubts about the intellectual independence and educational autonomy of our institutions. Meanwhile, more of us could profitably ponder the decision of Federal District Court Judge John L. Smith, Jr., in his finding for the plaintiff in Marjorie Webster Junior College's suit against the Middle States Association because the latter had refused accreditation to the institution on the ground that it is profit-making.

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"There is a commercial aspect," he wrote, "to the sharp competition for government and private contracts and the quest for research grants . . . Higher education in America today possesses many of the attributes of business. To hold otherwise would ignore the obvious and challenge reality." From quite different angles of regard, observers as ideologically opposed as Clark Kerr and John McDermott[3] have agreed that the dominant functions of higher education in the contemporary United States are the production of knowledge and the training of skilled manpower for an increasingly technetronic society. If, as may be the case, this submerging of colleges and universities in the ethos of industry applies primarily to the fifty to one hundred most visible and research-productive institutions in the country, it is twice open to question: once on the ground that our most distinguished houses of intellect have other and more distinctively contributory services to perform, and again on the basis of their being bellwethers that significantly determine the shape and color of the academic procession[4] and from whose large and prestigeful graduate schools come the most influential bulk of the professors whose attitudes and values define in considerable degree the character of the great majority of our nearly 2,500 institutions.

The second point is illustrated in James Ridgeway's *The Closed Corporation*, only one of the available accounts of academic involvements in governmental affairs, commercial activities, and real estate transactions that, at the most generous, represent dubious investments of both professorial and institutional energies and talents, and that raise serious questions about the sensitivity of universities to the temper and interests of their constituencies as well as of their surrounding communities. In a related way, governing boards modally combine the outlook and values of the upper middle class with a social conservatism that imperfectly dovetails with the concerns on campus or in the neighborhoods of urban colleges, of such aspiring groups as blacks and the poor, that often clashes with the notions of academic freedom most cherished by faculties, and that sometimes opposes on doubtful grounds the forces of social change.[5] In any event, the interlocking directorates of corporations and the academy, the composition of boards of trustees and regents, and the methods of their appointment all suggest, in a manner that is hard to ignore, a pattern of institutional relationships that affects the focus of the critical intellect and a marked underrepresentation of societal

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sectors which colleges and universities can properly be expected to serve.

Finally, the policies of our academic institutions are peculiarly vulnerable to culture lag.[6] In many ways, our colleges and universities are admirably geared to the world of 1945, which, washed by the huge combers of technological and social change since then, has been in a fundamental fashion dissolved. The contrast between the prevailing attitude during World War II and the mood during the Vietnamese war is painfully cogent here. So are the very different dimensions of concern and conflict in interracial affairs, and so is the altered relationship of the greatly enlarged and more sophisticated youth culture to public life in the United States. In a post-Malcolm X age of Chinese A-bombs and a planet quite literally in peril as a supporter of human life,[7] it seems at least reasonable to consider some root-deep alternatives to the methods by which higher education has traditionally served the nation and the species.

Institutionally, the implications of this situation are many and complex. The concept of institutional neutrality holds that a university as a university takes no position on controversial issues except one—that the people who compose its official personnel are entirely free to pursue knowledge wherever that pursuit may lead them. But that classic idea of *Lehrfreiheit* does not assume that the academic efforts enjoying its protection will be free from argument or critical questioning; it only insures that the proponents of those efforts will be free from undue harrassment and intimidation and from dismissal because of their beliefs. Further, the principle of academic freedom neither entails nor does it easily accommodate massive differentials in the financial underwriting of some intellectual ventures as opposed to others. When a university lends its institutional apparatus and the force of its reputation to a faculty member's search for project money, when it provides space to house the project, and when it proudly lists the enterprise in its public information materials as an indicator of its own institutional solidity and vitality, then it is doing far more than protecting a professor's right to follow the gleam of truth. Under such by no means unfamiliar circumstances, the university is perilously close to proclaiming a policy that actively supports the kind of research that the project in question represents, and the investigator is protected by a good deal more than tenure. Obviously, such forms of inquiry are likely to be those congruent

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to the needs of what it is now fashionable to call the Establishment, and it is hard to contend seriously that they are no more secure or "free" than those that question the deleterious effects of marijuana, that report economic stability in Castro's Cuba, or that display the relationship of corporate profits and commercial expansiveness to increases in pollution.

It can be reasonably argued, of course, that research and thought that lie outside Establishment interests or that cross the grain of the dominant order must necessarily take risks and make their own way by their persuasiveness and soundness. Their only entitlement is to the minimal but firm security of academic freedom's guarantees. Such a position stumbles, however, on a faulty implicit assumption and on the rejection of one of higher education's most fundamental functions. The assumption is that there is a completely free market in ideas. There is not. The premium paid for the resources of intellect that are relevant to technologized science and the ongoing concerns of American industrialism far exceeds the support available for their criticism; and that premium includes not only money but more convenient routes to publication, easier access to persons and organizations of large influence, and a general superiority of status that reinforces the weight of the knowledge and notions generated in behalf of the currently ascendant values of the culture. But why not? That question brings us to the overlooked function of our institutions of higher education—the function of criticism.

If the college and the university ever defined the only serious and large-scale knowledge-producing institution in society, they do so no longer. Laboratories in government and business, independent research institutes, and big museums and art galleries abound. From one centrally important point of view, they are still insufficiently plentiful, and it is probably true that the network of major universities remains the basic and most vigorously throbbing engine of research in the United States. At the same time, their research capacity and commitment do not make our academic institutions intellectually distinctive. What makes them distinctive is their capability for cultural criticism. Obligated by its educational mission to examine and to re-examine our fundamental traditions, provided with the leisure and with the stimulation that encourage habits of informed reflectiveness, and free of the deadlines and the requirements of immediate timeliness and mass audience appeal that prevent the press from serving as a genuine

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intellectual agency, the apparatus of higher education is, in many ways, ideally fitted institutionally to serve as cultural gadfly, to furnish the necessary opposition to the stubborn complacency, the adherence to old ways, and the resistance to change that produce from the inside the devitalization and the decay of cultural systems. Intellectual criticism is neither a safety-valve through which literate malcontents can blow off steam nor an adornment that societies can wear as witness to their own security; it is a condition of cultural survival. It is for this reason that the more unpopular fruits of intellect merit some special nurturance in our academic gardens.

One immediate issue here has to do with a seeming contradiction: It is quite obvious that intellectual criticism is a widely practiced function of the American university; yet it is the most neglected form of service that higher education is called upon to provide. What light does this state of affairs shed on the nature of higher education at a time when it—and the culture of which it is a part—is *in extremis* to a serious degree?

The sheer fact of academically based criticism in the United States shows itself, of course, on every hand. Newspapers, the magazines of opinion, and radio and television are filled with accounts of student dissent and the opposition of faculty members toward national policies. Campus protests have become standard cocktail-party talk, and the central core from which the mounting criticism of the war in Vietnam has emanated has been, quite typically, the college classroom and the professorial study. On the other hand, most discussions of the critical function are absorbed in considerable measure into three categories. One is an essentially successful effort to play down its significance and to minimize its extent. Here one hears the characterization of the majority of students as socially apathetic and career-oriented and of faculties as inherently conservative. A second is an explanation of criticism as a consequence of defects in educational practice. Student dissent is a function of the impersonal qualities of a rapidly expanding enrollment; faculty hostility toward public policies results from improperly low salaries made mandatory by ungenerous budgets. And finally, criticism is weakly defended as the price paid for the more valued services of higher education—socialization, training, and the generation and application of useful knowledge. The illustrative comments in this context are that academic freedom includes the freedom to be wrong and that the right of critical ex-

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pression is one of the odd but inevitable epiphenomena attached to the necessary processes of instruction and research.

To understand this strange ambivalence toward the critical services of the college and university, one must be clear about the nature of the critical act itself.[8] Intellectual criticism implies the analysis and *assessment* of culture. Its focus is on an evaluative appraisal of our society's goals and directions, its institutions, its impact on the character of its diverse people, its ideals and its practices, and its meanings for whatever future may be open to us. It not only describes the past and present and attempts to predict what lies ahead; it makes judgments about what we have been and are becoming, prescribes alternatives and new options, and advocates certain directions while opposing others. The element of judgment is what sets intellectual criticism apart from scholarly analysis, which it may encompass and include but to which it is not limited. The critic not only describes the field of his concern; he praises and blames, condemns and extols, according to some framework of values of his own. In one sense or another, he makes commitments to both his valuational base and to the proposals and recommendations to which his evaluative analysis leads him.

To behave critically, then, involves judgment, values, and commitment. Their natural entailment is passion; their natural outgrowth is action. There is little point in discussing "objective" as opposed to "biased" criticism. All judgments, values, and commitments are "biased" in the eyes of those who do not share them. Bias, emotionally colored convictions, and at least incipient action are inherent in critical thought, and none of these characteristics is well received, except by some students, among the plural constituencies of higher education. A variety of reinforcements has installed cognitive rationality as the dominant style of the academy, and too copious a flow of the affective juices is regarded as bad form among dons. Because our historic means of financing colleges and universities has been through private philanthropy or government, and because the distribution of wealth and the actions of public officials are often the objects of criticism, there is an awkward and embarrassing appearance of the academic critic's biting the hand that feeds him—and of the bitten hand's not incomprehensible tendency toward vengeance. The general public finds little joy in being chivvied by intellectuals pressing the case for social change in ways that sometimes border on the uncivil and that

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occasionally erupt into the extracampus life of the community; and when official spokesmen for the gown are harried by questions from the town, they tend to excuse rather than to justify the existence of the critics within the academy. Even more important, the impulse toward action threatens the institutional neutrality that is traditionally the condition of academic freedom. When the cultural critic moves from statement to behavior, he unavoidably implicates in some measure the college or university of which he is a member; the possibility of reprisals affects the institution as well as the man, and the foundations shake a bit under the structure of protection that the American college has built for purely intellectual adventures. Finally, when bias, emotion, and action are linked, the probability of error is by definition significant; the means for choosing between two or more conflicting critical positions is inherently unsure, and the translation of ideas into action when tempers are running high can tragically subvert the critical process and substitute the politics of might for the persuasiveness of authentic morality.

Yet, such is the imperfect and paradoxical condition of man, that that elusive but profoundly valued thing called wisdom is no more than knowledge tempered by judgment—that is, knowledge shot through with bias, passion, and commitment, the very components of uncertainty. And no one can blink the dark fact that exalting the persuasiveness of morality over the politics of sheer power has all too often been a tactic for denying rights to the disenfranchised and for continuing to exclude pariahs of some kind from full membership in the community of men. There is a tension, then—and a strong and frequently painful one—between criticism as a never fully satisfied quest for contemporary (and therefore unconventional) wisdom, the danger in which is dessication and academic aridity, and criticism as a source of precipitate, damaging, and even self-defeating action. There are few problems as serious or as central for the American college as the management of this tension in order to realize and enhance its potentialities in two directions. One is toward a greater fusion of thought with commitment, of knowledge with judgment; the other is toward the closer linking of wisdom and action, toward basing action both in deeply explored ideas and in conceptions of moral accountability.

The importance of this issue lies in large part in the ways in which the conditions of contemporary life erode the classic model

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of higher education's first function, the socialization of youth. Although the variations on this educational theme are many, the basic idea is summed up in the phrase, "the transmission of the culture." On the assumption of a fundamental historical continuity and of relatively slow processes of cultural change, young people best fit themselves for tomorrow by learning yesterday's and today's values, techniques for solving problems, methods of analysis, and understandings of the natural and social worlds. We live in a time of change more rapid, more massive, and more intimate in its effects than history either records or predicts. Who foresaw a generation ago—even ten years ago—the societal dilemmas, the international complexities, the revolutions in moral values and behavioral standards, or the altered material circumstances that are our daily fare as we cross the threshold of the 1970's? And who can foresee the technology of next year or next month and the impact that it will have on our self-concepts or on our interpersonal relationships? What occupations are about to burst into economic existence, and which ones are even now turning obsolescent? In an order in which such questions are so compelling, the legacy from the past must prove its utility. That is, it must be subjected to intensive criticism if it is to yield guidelines of any validity to a future so unpredictable, so discontinuous with previous experience, as ours.

But even if American society were not changing so turbulently and at such a fast pace, the old conception of socialization would be inadequate. Our social structure has a hundred different and shifting facets. Instead of a single and homogeneous society, ours is stratified and organized to accommodate somehow a bewildering variety of classes, regional groupings, and subcultures, all reflecting a diversity of values, folkways, and norms of conduct. The patterns of life once regarded as modal in "the American way" have been sharply challenged from within our own boundaries and are not nearly so broadly shared as has been thought. Virtually every generalization about the culture of the United States requires qualifications; there are few rules without significant exceptions, and values clutched ardently by one group are noisily repudiated by another. When such heterogeneity is an inescapable fact of life, there is no widely credible justification for socialization; education can only enlarge the field of informed choice as students become increasingly familiar with the array of possibilities that society presents. That process of widening options

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implies criticism, the informed analysis and evaluation of the groups and the normative patterns that America rather uneasily comprises.

Perhaps most important of all, the national experience of the past twenty-five years can be read as undermining the legitimacy of not only many of our primary public policies and most common social practices, but of the enterprise of intellect itself. "We are the people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit . . . Our work is guided by the sense that we may be the last generation in the experiment with living." This opening from the Port Huron statement of 1962 was among the first clear symptoms of how deeply intertwined are the crises of culture and of college, of how deeply suspect in important quarters are the institutions of intellect in their relationship to the institutions of power. It is always ominous when youth, especially educationally and economically favored youth, express anxious and hostile doubts about the basic acceptability of the heritage that is willy-nilly theirs. Yet few of us paid attention at the time; and many of us now, often caught up in the disruptive confrontations and the atmosphere of unease that pervades our campuses, still fail to comprehend the significance of the student revolt for our colleges and universities as integral parts of the country's social apparatus.

One way to approach this angry suspicion of the intellect's modern working is through the observation of Albert Szent-Gyorgy: The human nervous system was evolved to meet the conditions of primitive life of some 10,000 years ago. At that time, "fight or flight" was the rule of survival and tenet of adaptation; and it was successful because circumstances changed slowly, giving men ample time to accommodate to shifts in their surroundings. Today, with essentially the same neural equipment, men must cope with processes of change that are both extremely rapid and almost unbelievably extensive in a world that is so crowded and so systematized that to "fight" is to court wholesale disaster and "flight" is virtually impossible. Has man's creativity, Szent-Gyorgy asks, brought him into an environment of his own making that exceeds his capacity for adaptation?[9]

Man's creativity has indeed been increasingly marked by an element of bitter irony. Perhaps the greatest triumph of human ingenuity and human intelligence is the solving of the riddle of the atom's vast stores of energy. Yet this startling achievement has

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left us so far with little to increase our happiness and the great fear of a genocidal weapon that hangs, a contemporary sword of Damocles, hair-suspended above all our heads.

A similar bitter irony shows itself in the accomplishments of agriculture and nutrition and of medicine and public health. Thanks largely to improvements in prenatal care and pediatrics, to new antibiotics, and to improvements in food production and preservation, we currently have a population of slightly over 200 million in the United States and more than 3.5 billion in the world. A quarter of all the human beings who have ever lived walk the globe today, and their numbers presently double every thirty-five years. According to the Committee on Resources and Man of the National Academy of Sciences, the most intensive and technologically efficient exploitation of both the land and the seas can produce no more than nine times the amount of food now available. If this maximum food supply can be evenly divided, if the great majority of people will accept only subsistence diet, and if huge numbers of people will move into areas of the world that will make the task of distributing food feasible, then a world population approximating 30 billion can be minimally sustained with respect to both calories and protein requirements. This ugly possibility is only a century in our future. Meanwhile, the National Academy's report argues that if the society of tomorrow is to be a decently livable one, world population must be stabilized at well under 10 billion. "Indeed," it warns, "it is our judgment that a human population *less than the present one* would offer the best hope for comfortable living for our descendants, long duration for the species, and the preservation of environmental quality."[10]

Such are the fruits, as some conceive them, of the expansive application of technologized intellect—the threat of genocide from nuclear weapons, the threat of genocide from overpopulation. It is not hard to move from these profoundly troubling concerns to highlight the catalogue of associated worries that distress more than the young. Once the atomic bomb was created (a) it was used, (b) it was dropped not on white Germans but on yellow Japanese, and (c) it destroyed not a clear military target but two cities crowded with women, children, the elderly, and the militarily unfit. To refer to the ruin of Dresden here neither answers the implication of racism in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki drops nor provides evidence of gentler, more civilized constraints on the application of a lethal technology. In the present decade, both

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the gross national income and the gross national product of the United States are projected to exceed one *trillion* dollars, but the squalor of urban and rural poverty is all too evident in America while we continue to invest $30 billion a year in Vietnam. More than a century after the abolition of slavery, black people are only beginning to escape subordination and exploitation, partly through an organized militancy that surprises more by its lateness in coming than by the accumulated rage that powers it. Our intrusion into Southeast Asia seems mainly compounded of a pathological fear of communism as a different cultural style and of the necessity for ever-expanding markets to sustain an economy that depends as much on the destruction of products as on their creation; and nowhere does our involvement in Vietnam (or elsewhere) convincingly support our rhetoric of national self-determination and respect for the cultural variety of the world's peoples.

There is more, of course—much more. The point is that to increasing numbers of our youth and to a significant proportion of our informed older members of society, these issues are symptoms of a cultural system gone amok. In their view, refined and highly developed intellectual talents lie very close to the source of the disease; and the university, the basic home of the intellect, is deeply and intrinsically implicated in the system's psychosis. Knowledge is indeed power; and if that power is not restrained and directed by moral considerations backed by effective mechanisms of enforcement, then the probability of its being put to sick and evil purposes is too high to be tolerable. The politics of might is not so much on the horizons of higher education as already evident in its institutions, and one of its undergirdings is a hostile mistrust of the intellectual enterprise when it is not harnessed by normative analysis and when it is not subject to searching and open criticism.

There are at least three compelling reasons, then, for arguing that criticism must assume a new and major role in the educative process. The rate and nature of social change largely invalidates older models of socialization; the diversity of American culture makes it impossible to define meaningfully the values and the groups for which young people can be appropriately socialized; and the growing mistrust of intellect demands that virtually all ideas and all domains of inquiry be deliberately winnowed for their moral and political implications and assessed in the light of explicit values. Such a formulation goes further than suggesting a

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basic change in the content of higher education, although there are still many who deny the necessity for any sweeping curricular revision. It implies a sizable shift in the basic conception of the undergraduate experience and a very different notion of a proper balance of functions within the American college.

Put briefly, that conception holds that whatever else it may be, a college is a place where any issue of human significance can be examined intellectually without limitation. Such a defining notion is by no means without its historical precedents. For example, the *quod libeta* of the medieval universities provided an opportunity within the curriculum of the time for controversial social problems to be considered by faculty and students. In this framework, Stephen Langton, lecturing at Paris in the twelfth century, worked out the "theoretical justification for the opposing of tyrants" on the basis of which he later, as Archbishop of Canterbury, confronted King John. Indeed, much of the history of academic freedom (in the sense of *Lehrfreiheit*) revolves around the establishment and defense of just this principle of unfettered critical exploration as the *definiendum* of the university. If the battle for liberty in inquiry, in study, and in the evaluation of ideas and values is almost surely a never-ending one, an index of its victories to date is reassuringly available in the Supreme Court's *Keyishian* decision of 1966. In Justice Brennan's majority opinion in that case, academic freedom, characterized as "of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned," is for the first time regarded as "a special concern" of the First Amendment.

That acknowledgment, however, of a constitutional base for academic freedom applies primarily to the intellectual liberties of individual faculty members. What we are discussing here is unhindered criticism as the main business of an entire institution. For such an enterprise to proceed in a manner marked by the rules of fairness among contending partisans and by that kind of orderliness that is simply a condition of productivity, a number of points must be considered, some of them bearing on broad curricular issues, others on the nature of the academic community.

Much, for example, has been said recently about the question of "relevance" in the undergraduate experience. With the college conceived as a critical forum, the problem largely disappears. From the educational arguments of the past five years, one can identify four basic dimensions of relevance. One is the dimension

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of society—the meanings of the great social issues that the modern world and its inhabitants currently face and that are unlikely to disappear in the immediately foreseeable future. Second is the dimension of personhood—the difficulties of a developing self in a highly unstable culture and of finding and creating a core of secure individuality in a community that is increasingly crowded and that affords fewer and fewer opportunities for privacy in the midst of burgeoning intrusions of noise, information, and other people. Third, the dimension of man-nature relationships has to do with the changing concepts of our natural environment and of man in interaction with it, focusing particularly on the ways in which that environment has been altered with momentous consequences for the human beings who live in it and on the implications for men of the strategies by which they have coped with the natural world. Finally, there is a dimension of expression—the effectiveness with which a person can articulate his own experience, understand others, and enter into communicative interchanges with his fellows. Given an opportunity to formulate issues of concern within such categories, students are likely to find the processes of study intrinsically motivating and rewarding. Professors must mobilize their intellectual resources along critical more than purely professional lines, and the engagement of the college with its culture becomes less subject to the systemic elements in society that restrict and subvert processes of widespread critical review.

At the same time, the burdens that colleges can properly carry are far from infinite, and our institutions of higher learning would be well advised to make clear that their emphasis is on the *intellectual* development of students. Commitments to relevance must be disciplined by commitments to the life of the mind. Educationally, ethically, and even politically, this recommendation means that, whenever choices must be made, a college must be guided by Apollo rather than by Dionysius, that although it recognizes and honors the noncognitive components of personal development and respects men's passions, its primary (which is not the same as saying its sole) concern is with the roles played by knowledge, reason, and taste in both individual growth and the endless search for more humane forms of civilized corporate life. From the standpoint of both its limitations and its obligations, the college can be neither family, commune, mental hospital, secular sanctuary, nor revolutionary fortress. Although it must make

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every effort to serve personal needs, to provide the widest possible latitude for human growth, including the opportunity for mistakes and failures on which growth sometimes depends, and to create and maintain an environment in which a great diversity of life-styles can flourish, its attempts in these directions must also be understood as necessarily subordinate and instrumental to the furthering of intellectual goals. In so stressing the intellect, higher education cannot legitimately play down the normative, the judgmental, the valuational. Neither can it afford to fall into the trap of an antiquated exclusiveness; the intellect is a universal tool among men, not the special possession of an elitist group of skillful manipulators of complex symbols. But the college can put a fundamental stress on the relationship of thought and informed rationality to the analysis of values and the formation of judgments.

In this context, probably little would be taught but a great deal would be learned. Outside the special domains of technical and professional training, there is ample room to doubt both the meaning and the effectiveness of what is called teaching, and the past few years have seen the breakdown in some degree on undergraduate levels of the traditional model of masters and apprentices. When the educational atmosphere is chiefly one of criticism rather than of either socialization or professional training, there is a greater chance for a community of learners to take form, for people to think, work, and struggle together on problems and issues of common significance. Some individuals may be more widely experienced, better informed, and more constructively provocative than others, but all are concerned with a quest for new ways of formulating questions and for new alternatives among the answers. Teachers, like books, films and recordings, and computer terminals, become resources for learning; and the job of teachers becomes that of managing the conditions of learning—their own as well as their students.

The process of managing the conditions of learning—not the content, not the outcomes, and above all not the changing bases and nature of judgment that learning evokes, but the conditions—provides an opportunity for a far more integrated educational experience than one grounded in the formal disciplines can supply. Concerned with an unresolved issue of intrinsic significance, a student can be exposed to materials and to intellectual processes that engage and challenge his aesthetic response, his logical and information-processing capacities, his moral sense, and his aware-

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ness of himself as a member of the only species that binds time—that is both determined by and acquires flexibility from the past and that has expectancies of the future. There is a rough equivalency here (although only a rough one) in the proposition that a student's learning, when his focus is a critical one, can include, unified by the substantive problem of his choice, ideas and techniques that are artistic, scientific, normative, and historical. Such a translation, however, can be at least as misleading as it may be clarifying. The aim is to provide opportunities for students—and faculty members, for that matter—to develop as persons capable of addressing themselves meaningfully to issues that are to them puzzling and important. It is not, except in the most incidental of ways, to facilitate their discrimination of art, science, philosophy, and history as ways of knowing or as specialized approaches to formalized knowledge. One can honor that kind of discrimination and that type of specialization and still leave them to graduate schools and the apparatus of the academic professions.[11]

If such a critical function, already widely practiced by American higher education, is to supplement in sufficient degree the models of socialization and professional training for undergraduates, *if it is to color strongly the ways in which the university* serves the culture, a distinction may be useful in our understanding of the academic community. If we take the term "the university" as our symbol, it has at least two referents. One is the generic social institution, like the family, the church, or the government. The other is particular academic organizations—Harvard, the University of Alabama, Kenyon College, or the College of St. Benedict's. In the generic sense, the institution of higher education, capitalizing on its record as a cultural critic, needs to justify and to explain indefatigably to the supporting public the necessity for criticism as a core purpose. In justifying the critical service, it must also be prepared to justify its concomitants—judgment, commitment, and action by the various proponents of very diverse views. To do otherwise is to make criticism "academic" in the most derogatory sense and to undermine the traditions of a vital pluralism in American society. The responsibilities of criticism include, of course, the vehement defense of the past and the present as well as the vivid expression of dissatisfaction and, most of all, the responsible and imaginative exploration of new options. Whether in defense or on the attack, however, criticism entails biases, and the productive inevitability of bias requires constant explanation. That explana-

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tion is rarely forthcoming from the national associations that most directly represent United States higher education as a social institution. It is only a slight overstatement to characterize these agencies as primarily addressed to Congress and the executive branches of the federal government, as chiefly concerned with the funding and the management of colleges and universities, and as most responsive to their most prestigious institutional members although most students are enrolled elsewhere. They invest relatively little of their money, their imagination, or their leadership in the quality of the educational experience; they tend to take for granted the current relationships between higher education and other segments of society, and although they work seriously at the anticipation of future financial needs and manpower requirements in our colleges, they are essentially unconcerned with exploring potential changes in the substance of education or with considering or encouraging others to consider alternative ways of dealing educatively with the nation's youth. Least of all, with some significant exceptions, do they depart from the apologetic pattern in accounting for the critical impulse from within the academy—perhaps because the critical function is so foreign to their own style as it has been developed since 1918, when the American Council on Education was created to mobilize and coordinate the efforts of our colleges and universities during the first World War.[12]

The particular academic organization, in contrast to higher education as a social institution, carries a somewhat different burden—that of creating, protecting, and promoting an atmosphere within which the critical spirit can flourish. It cannot as an organization align itself with specific critical positions because its ability to safeguard the over-all critical function would then be undermined. Were an individual college or university to assume the posture of a lobby or a pressure group with respect to some special issue, it would be declaring itself the opponent of those who dissent from its stance and therefore the opponent of an environment in which a critical forum can genuinely thrive. Whether the issue is that of transforming America into a people's democracy or that of escalating the war in Southeast Asia is beside the point. (So, although they are too infrequently recognized for what they are, are the university's feebleness as a political agency and its shakiness as a platform from which to mount a direct political program.) The central task of a particular academic

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organization is to keep itself *institutionally* dispassionate, *institutionally* objective, so that its students and faculty members can formulate the biases and arrive at the diverse normative judgments which are part and parcel of critical thought. The obvious exception is those matters of public policy that may affect its own survival or the conditions of its educational operations, especially its critical operations: appropriations bills, measures touching on questions of intellectual liberty, the impact of conscription on college-age youth, and so forth. In such instances, individual colleges and universities, despite their defects and weaknesses as political bodies, must persuasively make their concerns known in the community and in the country.

One implication of this view is that academic organizations must be prepared to deal swiftly and with whatever help may be necessary to check those who would stifle the critical enterprise. Whether such interferences come from demagogues in the external polity, authoritarians in the faculty or institutional bureaucracy, or ideologues in the student body, they are destructive of the critical spirit and tend to divert it into channels of hostile defensiveness rather than to facilitate the conditions under which criticism becomes the constructive identification and promotion of social and cultural alternatives. Genuine criticism cannot flower in a climate of intimidation even though it may require a degree of noisiness and an engagement of differing and passionately held convictions. This point has two important implications. One is that because the content of unpopular ideas changes both radically and rapidly, appropriate protection must be given to all entries into the critical lists. The response to Arthur R. Jensen's recent study of the racial genetics of standard intelligence[13] is a case in point, where one effort to pursue truth—conceivably wrong, certainly debatable, and arguably ill-timed from the point of view of social policy—has been subject to a degree of vilification and extra-intellectual threat that pollutes the critical atmosphere. On the other hand, academic organizations, for the same reason, cannot accept the job of enforcing the standards or even the laws of the community. It is quite clear that the members of a college or university are also members of the larger society and are fully subject to its rules, just as they are entirely free to work for the alteration of both law and custom. But if the university acts as a substitute for law enforcement agencies, it identifies itself with extant values and shuts its doors on those

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who would reject them and seek new alternatives. It is also true that if the university as an organization depreciates or attacks the values of the community, it barricades itself against those whose critical posture is firmly supportive of them. A straightforward extension of this principle of dispassionate objectivity demands that academic organizations be clear in their policies and prepared to defend them with respect to such matters as classified research, its stance toward ethnic minorities, the on-campus use of alcohol or illegal drugs, the sources of its funds, and the nature of its relationships with such other institutions as the military, industry, and departments of government. Wide variations in decision are possible here; ambiguity and unreadiness of plausible explanations are not. Like any organization, a college must have reasonable standards for judging itself and the capacity to regulate itself according to those standards. It has an obligation to demand honesty and civility from its members because honesty and civility are the conditions of effective criticism, but that obligation is badly discharged if it fails to resist all efforts to limit the ease with which students and professors *as individuals* examine, judge, and attempt to change their culture. Its essential bias is in favor of unencumbered criticism.

That bias is justified on the most urgent and serious of grounds. The culture of the United States, like many cultures before it, is in jeopardy. The hazard comes not from without but from its own massive momentum, from the inner logic of its own technological and managerial nature, and from policies that are too short-range in their vision to accommodate the overwhelming magnitude of their effects. In the past twenty to thirty years, it has become desperately apparent that the processes of social change, so magnificent in some ways, have left us with a debris of avoidable, dangerous, and even tragic ruin: the exclusion from affluence of American minorities, the deterioration of our major cities, the defacement and erosion of our countryside and wilderness areas, the poisoning of our air and water, and our too frequent involvement abroad in support of political administrations whose values are in direct opposition to our own professed ones. The check of criticism and especially the stimulus of thoughtfully conceived new alternatives and deeply considered new conceptions have become mandatory for cultural survival. If civilization is truly a race between education and catastrophe, education has never before needed so stringently the wings of the critical spirit.

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1. There is no implication here of halcyon days when the groves of Academe were an Eden. All that is noted is a trend which can be measured in dollars invested, degree of prestige accorded, or numbers of people involved—by virtually all indices, in other words, except decibels of utterance. Obviously, there are influential works of first-rate scholarship coming out of the minority camp. Historians like Barrington Moore, Appleman Williams, and Eugene Genovese, economists like Milton Friedman, and sociologists of the stamp of Irving Horowitz and Jules Henry illustrate the diversity as well as the solidity of scholars deeply and critically concerned with the ethical state of contemporary culture. In a more polemical vein, the work of such men as Louis Kampf, Theodore Roszak, Henry David Aiken, and Christian Bay is also relevant.

2. See Talcott Parsons and Gerald Platt, *The American Academic Profession* (Cambridge, Mass.: Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1968). Also useful is Edward Gross and Paul V. Grambsch, *University Goals and Academic Power* (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1968), and Gross's "Universities as Organizations: A Research Approach," *American Sociological Review,* 33 (August 1968), 518-544.

3. Kerr's analysis remains remarkably current. See his *The Uses of the University* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963). For McDermott's confirmatory observations although very different evaluation, see "Technology: The Opiate of the Intellectuals," *New York Review of Books,* 13 (July 31, 1969), 25-35.

4. The phrase is David Riesman's. The idea of the academic procession was first and more fully developed in *Constraint and Variety in American Education* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1958). It is echoed in several contexts in his later volume with Christopher Jencks, *The Academic Revolution* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968).

5. A good-tempered, systematic, and empirically thorough description is given in Morton A. Rauh's *The Trusteeship of Colleges and Universities* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969). This most recent investigation can be usefully compared with Hubert P. Beck's older *Men Who Control Our Universities* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1947). See also John R. Seeley et al., "The Trustees/Regents," in *The University in America* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1967), and the story by-lined by Bob Olmstead and entitled "Half of the New Trustees at Catholic U Are Laymen," in *The National Catholic Reporter* (May 1, 1968).

6. See William F. Ogburn's *Social Change* (New York: Viking Press, 1928). For illustrations of culture lag in colleges and universities, several references are of value: Jencks and Riesman, *The Academic Revolution;* two very recent (1969) volumes from the press of Jossey-Bass in San Francisco, William B. Martin's *Conformity* and J. B. Lon Hefferlin's *Dynamics of Academic Reform;* and two pieces of my own, "To Disenthrall Ourselves," in

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7. Two important references here are Richard Rovere's "A New Situation in the World," *New Yorker* (February 24, 1968), and Lord Ritchie-Calder's "Mortgaging the Old Homestead," *Foreign Affairs*, 48 (January 1970), 207-220.

8. This discussion follows closely the valuable leads in Kenneth Keniston's "The University as Critic," in Charles Dobbins and Calvin Lee, eds., *Whose Goals for American Higher Education?* (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1968), pp. 145-164.

9. Szent-Gyorgy's remarks were included in an address at Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, N. Y., January 25, 1967.

10. Committee on Resources and Man, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, *Resources and Man* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1969).

11. The issue of the graduate schools—and, indeed, of the academic professions themselves—in their relationship to the kind of undergraduate education envisaged here is a complicated and thorny one. Although the question deserves and demands a full-scale airing, space precludes any attempt to undertake such a difficult task.

12. Whatever one's stance toward its authors' radical ideology, one will find Paul Lauter and Archibald W. Alexander, "ACE: Defender of the Educational Faith," *Antioch Review*, 29 (Fall 1969), 287-303, a provocative, informative, and challenging article. It is best read together with the ceremonial volume, *American Council on Education: Leadership and Chronology, 1918-1968*, edited by Charles Dobbins and published in Washington, D. C., by the Council on its fiftieth anniversary.

    I must also acknowledge a debt here to an unpublished manuscript, "Who Speaks for Higher Education?" by Frederic W. Ness, currently president of the Association of American Colleges; he bears, of course, no responsibility for my inferences and extrapolations from his ideas and observations.

13. See Arthur R. Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" *Harvard Educational Review*, 39 (Winter 1969), 1-123, and the subsequent two issues (Spring and Summer 1969) for a sampling of this bothersome discussion.

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State Authority and State Universities

THIS IS A preliminary and tentative exploration of the significance of state authority for the governing of state universities during our currently troubled circumstances. My limited purpose is to describe the nature of that authority and its apparent impact on university responses to the changing expectations of a new generation of students and faculty. Eventually I hope to develop the subject more fully as part of a larger effort to understand politically the external and internal relations of state universities. A good deal of similar work is underway, despite earlier explorations of the subject, and this is understandable. Even an excellent and still useful study of a decade ago was necessarily set in a different context from that of our present problems.[1] Circumstances now are surely different although university structures have remained much the same. Like so many other aspects of the American university, state governmental authority is seen in a new perspective, whether alarming or hopeful, and against a new background of events.

The same observation holds for the external authority governing a private college or university. Public and private institutions are confronted by a common challenge to the existing educational order, and there are probably important similarities, for example, in faculty prerogatives and opinions on student participation. And, apart from the influence of size, there may be little private-public difference of a fundamental nature in the strictly intra-university governing structure of administrators, faculty, and students. Yet, there remains a crucial distinctiveness about the state university's situation and, in consequence, about its capacity to respond to the present challenge. Perhaps "distinctiveness" is not the best word for the purpose since state universities and colleges

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constitute the larger and more rapidly growing sector of American higher education. What I mean is that state authority is a distinctive feature of these public institutions, whether or not they are viewed from the vantage point of a private university. The relevance of that authority has not always been perceived by everyone, even those within a state university community. Its relevance may not be entirely negative. State agencies—regents, legislatures, governors, and administrative bureaus—do impose constraints. Some, however, may be welcomed, tacitly at least, by part of a university community. Even faculty members might look to outside help to resist confrontation-based pressure for academic concessions that they regard as unwise but that they themselves find difficult to reject. The authority of the state looks and probably is more formidable than that of private boards of trustees. Moreover, state authority need not always be a constraint. It may be exerted to foster change of a kind favored by one part of the university community and opposed by another, as, for instance, in allocating resources between teaching and research or between graduate and undergraduate education.

The tremendous recent infusion of federal funds in certain private as well as public institutions must be taken into account when stressing the distinctiveness of the state university situation. In some respects, certainly, several private universities after World War II appear to have been converted to federal-grant institutions. There is an unmistakable resemblance to the long-standing land-grant relations of many state universities. But the change has not made the private university a federal government agency in the same way that a public university has been a state government agency. The significance of that status may be more fully appreciated by observing the impact of the newer federal input on the public university. So far at least, it seems to have brought less general external control than that already coming from state government. This holds, I believe, even in the dozen or so state universities where federal funding of the last fifteen years has been massive both absolutely and in proportion to other sources. Admittedly, in these circumstances certain research and graduate training programs in the natural sciences have developed on a scale and in ways that the universities, without the earmarked federal funds, would often have lacked the resources and perhaps also the institutional will to support. I have no desire to minimize the significance of such federally financed programs, or to assume

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that they have been, separately or aggregatively, unmixed blessings for universities. Nor should certain federal requirements for staff-time accounting, patents, and buildings be regarded as unimportant. But it can still be stressed that even massive federal funding of particular programs in particular universities has not been accompanied by the same kind or degree of *general* control, or *general* influence over policy, that is associated with state governing agencies. A suggested explanation is that federal programs, however massive in particular fields and in particular universities, have so far been mainly for specialized purposes of one kind or another rather than for general education, and that these programs have been administered in Washington by several granting agencies rather than by a single agency (like the Office of Education in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare).[2] At any rate, federal financing, despite its cumulatively great effects on major universities, has not meant that the federal government appoints members of a university's governing board, selects university administrators, or establishes general salary levels. Of course, there are other more likely ways for federal authority to be exercised, as through disclaimer affidavits or through the recently threatened cut-off of funds to certain offending individuals. No one should ignore the potential for general control or influence that is implicit in such a policy, or the possibility of federal intervention in general educational matters through policies quite differently motivated and less dramatically controversial. Allowing for the subsequent possibility, however, does not change the fact that our experience so far with general governmental control over higher education is overwhelmingly with state government.

That experience deserves analysis in the context of the many new problems involved in governing a university. No doubt we are bound to look at the university-state relationship more critically, or at least to raise more radical questions about it, than we would in quieter times. As with everything else about a university these days, there is little in its relation to a state government that we are likely to take for granted simply because it has existed for many years. Nevertheless it is worth noting that the experience with state government, while producing certain well-publicized difficulties over the last century as well as more recently, must be regarded as a historical success if judged by the quantitative provision of higher education and by the quality achievement of a number of state universities. The usual comparisons to other

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nations and to private institutions are too well known to be cited again. Still, what has worked successfully until now may do so no longer, either because of a breakdown in the established arrangement or because our standard of success drastically changes.

We have little systematic knowledge based on studies of the relation of a state to its university or universities. In some of the fifty states, especially where public universities have been slow or late in developing, there probably would be relatively less citizen interest and perhaps relatively less support than in Wisconsin and in certain other midwestern and western states whose universities have long loomed large in public consciousness. An obvious reason for the salience of a university in these states is that many state residents over the years have attended the university. Another reason characteristic of most midwestern and western states is the public service function performed by the university. Extension work, including agriculture, is what usually comes to mind, but it is reasonable to add the public entertainment, notably in athletics, that may cause a state to be interested in its university. Certain newer state universities, particularly in New York but also in many urban settings, do not fall into this established pattern, and it may be that the experience of the older midwestern and western universities will no longer appear so representative on every count. Not every state, as in Wisconsin, for example, happens to have its major campus only a mile from the state capitol, thus facilitating communication about mutual problems while also increasing the opportunities for legislative observation of campus events and for student protests at the capitol. Nor has every state been influenced so extensively by its university, and therefore been so concerned with what its university might be doing for it and to it. In the end, however, this kind of interesting variation may matter less now that almost everywhere there is a rise in higher education's share of state budgets along with an increasing importance of universities in the lives of many state citizens.

Given the considerable size and importance of the public university, it is hardly surprising that there should be public concern for how it is managed. Acknowledgment of this concern and of its legitimacy is compatible with the belief that the public's interest would best be served by the most general delegation of the state's authority to a faculty and to faculty-oriented administrators. Such delegation has often occurred, in fact if not in principle,

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and it is defended on the ground that this is the way for the citizens of a state to have the best possible university. Even with the exercise of authority by a faculty and by administrators who often function *de facto* as faculty agents, there remains an appreciation that the management of university affairs is accountable to a public authority representing the people of the state. It is plainly difficult for anyone devoted to a state university to argue against this accountability. The case for government financing of public institutions, as opposed to private institutions, rests on the social and community benefits flowing from these public institutions. The state is to be repaid for its tax-provided subsidy of below-cost tuition rates.

As long as state taxpayers continue at least in this way to support higher education, they have an evident concern whether or not they or their own children attend the university. Would the concern be less if students (and their parents) were charged the full cost of their education, or a very large share of that cost? The habitual concern might well remain. It has not diminished in the last few years despite rising tuition rates exceeding strictly inflation-produced increases even for in-state students. Nonresident students in certain state institutions may now be paying close to full-cost tuition. What can be said, although the state's level of concern remains the same, is that changes in this direction, if continued especially for state residents, might provide students with a new basis for challenging state authority in university affairs. Students have been known to challenge the authority anyway, citing the fact that they already pay a great deal in room and board plus some tuition. But if they paid the whole of their cost of education, even with the help of individual scholarships and loans, their case against state control of university affairs would appear further justified and so gain in fervor.

Our state universities are still a long way, however, from conversion into institutions whose teaching is fully supported by student tuition payments. So far, if state authority were to be threatened at all by the growth in other sources of support, it should have come from the increasing federal portion in the budgets of the leading state universities during the 1950's and early 1960's. But state authority remains much as it has always been despite the fact that a given state's taxpayers are really joined on a large scale by national taxpayers in supporting a university. At the same time, of course, state tax support for a university has

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greatly increased in absolute terms. This may help explain why it is seldom said that there is anything anomalous about the continued exercise of state authority in what have become, in certain instances, strongly national universities with respect to their research and graduate training programs. These programs serve national needs most directly. Their students are recruited nationally and subsequently placed nationally. Moreover, the costs are often borne by the federal government. Yet the relevant universities continue, under state authority, to discriminate in favor of state resident students, both by sharply limiting the numbers of out-of-state undergraduates and by charging much higher tuition for all out-of-state students, graduate and undergraduate. So far this policy may seem odd only as it pertains to graduate students because they are mainly involved in the federal programs. There might be more questioning about a university's preferences for state resident students if there were large federal grants, of an institutional kind, for undergraduate education. Meanwhile the virtually unquestioned exercise of state authority in this area provides clear evidence that we still have *state* universities despite federal financing. Apart from everything else, a state owns its university in the simple property ownership sense.

The most immediate agency of state authority governing a university is a board of laymen, usually called regents or trustees. It must be emphasized, however, that this board is only one of the state agencies governing a state university. Even in a state where a university and its board have constitutional status, the legislature and various executive authorities may directly regulate many aspects of university management. Statutory and administrative controls are numerous in business affairs and not unknown in broad policy matters. Although thus understood as sharing rather than monopolizing state authority in higher education, the governing board remains a useful focus for discussion.

Derived originally by the new state universities of the nineteenth century from the well-established private college device,[3] the public university board has a different claim to legitimacy from that of the private college board. Each has an adequate legal status, whether based on constitution, statute, or state-granted charter. But the state university board is either popularly elected or, more usually, appointed by the governor; other variations include legislative election of board members and the seating, ex officio, of certain elected state officials. The inclusion, here and there, of a

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few members chosen from the narrower university community, as by an alumni association, does not materially alter the fact that state university boards generally have a *political* legitimacy resting on their constituencies of state citizens. This is sharply distinct from the situation of a private college board that chooses its own members, or successors, or that has most of its membership chosen by alumni or other institutionally connected groups. No doubt, there are many variations in the method of selecting private board members, and there are ways of including representatives of the "public" in one sense or another. Yet the private college board need not regard itself as clearly responsible, in the conventional political sense, to any living constituency literally owning the institution. Nor, in exercising authority, can the private board claim to be acting in behalf of such a well-defined popular constituency.

The fact that the public university board can and does make this claim to political legitimacy hardly rules out challenges to its authority. Like the private board, it too is charged with the sin of absentee government, seeking to make rules for faculty and students who argue, separately, that they are the resident community knowing its own problems in a way that a once-a-month meeting of nonuniversity outsiders cannot properly understand. These challenges are real and probably growing. But the capacity for maintenance of authority by state university boards is great. Their consciousness of legitimacy rests on the hard democratic base of at least an indirect popular mandate. Although usually appointed rather than elected directly by the voters, public board members are no less likely to consider themselves (and to be considered) representatives of the public owners of their institutions.

A board of regents or trustees usually began in relation to a single state university. That association has continued even as a given university became a multi-campus institution. Occasionally more than one university, not just more than one campus of the same university, has been placed under an existing board. Many states, however, have more than one board, with each serving either a single institution or a group of institutions. There is also likely to be a relatively new and growingly important state coordinating or planning council for higher education. This is really another lay board that may or may not include representatives of the several university and college boards that are supposed to be coordinated. The recent development of the council is undoubtedly a significant state response to the rising demands for higher edu-

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cational funds. As an institutional agent for the state government, chiefly the legislature and governor, the council seeks to determine the allocation of resources among otherwise competing institutions or groups of institutions.[4] Its purposes are economy, efficiency, determination of priorities, and avoidance of unnecessary duplication of academic programs.

Plainly such purposes cannot be achieved without limiting the autonomy of separate institutions, especially in tightening fiscal circumstances, and it is understandable that both regents and administrators of state universities lack enthusiasm for the coordinating councils. How alarmed one becomes is likely to depend upon how far he thinks a coordinating council's authority is extending in practice. If, in time, a council were to exercise much more of the authority now held by separate university boards, or even to be substituted for existing separate boards, the principle of the state lay governing agency would obviously remain. The new agency, however, might be more independently powerful than the present university board. That is, it might be more independently powerful in relation to university administrators and so in relation to university faculties as well. Detached from any existing institution, the council acquires its own professional staff of administrators and analysts, really a kind of budget bureau specializing in higher education. University boards, on the other hand, ordinarily depend on the staff work of their own university administrations, whose loyalties are enmeshed with those of their faculties.

A university board, no less than a coordinating council for higher education, is unquestionably exercising state authority and it is answerable to the state in most important ways. Either every year or every other year, depending on a state's budgetary arrangements, board members are expected to join officially or unofficially in making the university's financial plea to the governor and legislature. Since they serve (unpaid) out of an assumed interest in the university, their own standard of success in their roles is likely to include success in helping to obtain state financial support. It is also likely to include preservation of the considerable autonomy of the board and so of the university in relation to other state agencies, legislative and executive. Not only is there a desire to discourage new statutory regulations—suspect substantively and as precedents for further interventions—but there is also a concern, in some states, to counter any legislative threats to abolish a board and substitute a new one to be freshly appointed by the political com-

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manders of the moment. This is not to say that boards never act in accord simply with their own principles. But it would be foolish to ignore the possibility of their acting to forestall legislative action. Doing so, however motivated, often seems unnecessary as well as uncourageous in the eyes of the academic community. From the academic standpoint, regents and trustees are to represent the university to the public, not the public to the university.[5] They should be a buffer, not a conduit for transmitting pressures to the university.[6] This asks for greater restraint than that which we usually expect of individuals selected to represent the public, and it is closer to actual experience to describe a board's role more ambiguously as both a moat and a bridge.[7] Being politically responsive is understandable if occasionally unfortunate.

Governing boards can also be political insofar as partisan identification is a factor in the selection of regents and trustees. Such identification is plain enough when regents are popularly elected especially on party ballots, but it is at least as likely to appear in the more common instances of gubernatorial appointments. No precise count state by state can be cited to show how many of these appointments are of a governor's own party (or, particularly in one-party states, of the governor's own faction of a party). This is one of several areas of the politics of higher education that political scientists have not studied systematically. In the absence of such studies, one must be cautious about generalizing from certain well-publicized state situations that give the impression of a nearly uniform tendency for governors to appoint regents from their own parties and factions. But in the one state for which I have the relevant data, there is indeed a nearly uniform partisan tendency, Republican or Democratic. The significance of this does not lie in any improbable fixed party division of regents over a large range of educational policies. Occasionally there may be such a division, but it would still be an exaggeration to say that regents, in their role as regents, behaved primarily as Republicans or Democrats.

One does not have to believe in such a behavior pattern in order to perceive the significance of partisan appointments. The appointments themselves may reflect a governor's desire to have a university broadly responsive to his, and his party's, program for higher education—for example, either to expand a university in certain directions or to introduce economies in its operation. Also, the partisan appointments may be designed to serve a university's

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interest by aligning its governing board with the currently dominant legislative and gubernatorial party, on the theory that regents belonging to that same party (perhaps as major financial contributors) would have good access to the legislative leadership. A less pointed way to state the matter is that a governor may be seeking a board membership that would enjoy his confidence and that of the legislature, when of his party persuasion. Seldom do constitutional or statutory provisions for board appointment appear designed for a rapid gubernatorial accomplishment of this kind. Regent and trustee terms are ordinarily long and overlapping, consistent with the intention of insulating university boards from immediate partisan influence. But, as with so many other similar American efforts to purify or depoliticize the governmental process, the intention is not fully effective when politicians and their publics do not want it to be effective. It is widely accepted that a governor should name his own appointees to vacancies created by death or early retirement as well as to those available at the normal expiration of terms. In a few years, a board majority may thus be changed. University communities do not always object to such a change; it depends on the direction of the change. Even in principle, however, change in membership, including partisan change, can be defended. A degree of responsiveness is appropriate in a public institution. In any case, a state may expect it. And it may serve the interests of the university and so of the state for the responsiveness to take the form of several new regents rather than the blunter form of legislative action (particularly, budgetary cuts). Admittedly a university itself does not have this choice, and it cannot prevent the state's response taking both forms.

Apart from the partisan basis of appointment, there are certain widely established findings about state university board members. They are mainly business and professional men with substantial incomes, and they are not young.[8] Minority representation is occasionally afforded to farm interests, labor unions, and women. Being a resident of the state in which the university is located appears to be generally a requirement for service on that university's board. Although overwhelmingly college or university graduates, often with law, medical, or other advanced degrees, they are seldom professional educators (except for ex officio members from the state's own educational system). Neither are they faculty members from other institutions or from the one at hand. In this respect, state university boards differ from those private college

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boards that have included, notably in recent years, members belonging to the educational community itself, often alumni who have become administrators or professors at other institutions. A similar membership for public university boards would not be impossible. Aside, however, from criticism based on the general principle of representing the *public* interest, it would encounter the difficulty of securing, within a given state, an educational administrator or faculty member who was not devoted to a rival public or private institution. Another way suggested for a state university board to obtain members meeting the expectations of the educational community is to have prospective appointees screened before their nomination by a committee representing teachers, administrators, and others—perhaps students—intimately concerned with higher education.[9] The procedure would resemble the screening of judicial appointees by a bar association committee. Familiar and workable as is this kind of procedure, its formal adoption in selecting regents or trustees would, in many states, involve a substantial departure from the concept of a board of laymen representing the public. That public may well be educated, and its regents highly educated, but it is not a public of educators. If a governing board came to be perceived as another agency representing educators or faculty, its political legitimacy might be lost in the eyes of the state. The consequent gain in a board's political legitimacy within the academic community cannot be assumed to offset a loss in the external community that supports the university.

Acceptance of board authority within a university is nevertheless a serious problem that cannot be dismissed because of an overriding importance of external considerations. What was generally accepted in the past, especially as long as a board chiefly represented the university to the state, has come to be questioned lately as a board responds to its external public by adopting strong disciplinary measures against actual or threatened campus disorders. Here a board is often acting along with gubernatorial and legislative authority, and any challenge from a campus is thus clearly posed against state authority generally. When there is a new or revived intervention "from outside" in campus government, university administrators, faculty, and students all tend to deplore the intervention. Yet an intervention of this kind, with its consequent uniting of a university community in opposition, may not be a typical case or even an important one in the long run. Ad-

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mittedly it is important now, but there is another foreseeable intervention that would not unite, in opposition, all of the participants in the university community.

Suppose that regents, with legislative and gubernatorial encouragement, pressed a state university to devote more of its resources, including faculty time and energy, to undergraduate education, and insisted on curriculum and course revisions by faculty members. Such a pressure would not be new. Almost always the state has had a greater interest in undergraduate teaching than in most other aspects of the university.[10] This is bound to be true of the citizens for whom the university is most important because that importance derives so frequently from their own or their children's undergraduate education. But no great external pressure has ordinarily been exerted in this cause. Earlier it may have seemed unnecessary because of a fairly general satisfaction in the days when even major state universities considered undergraduate teaching their principal business. The facts have surely been different during the last ten or fifteen years for all of the many familiar causes associated with rapid growth in general and in research particularly. Undergraduate student dissatisfaction, arising separately from although subsequently joining broad political discontent, provides evidence enough. On this issue, students do not stand alone. They have potential if not yet actual allies among legislators and regents. Some of the same public officeholders who have been hostile critics of student disruptions, demanding stronger punitive measures, are openly sympathetic with what they conceive, correctly I think, to be the broader student complaint concerning undergraduate education in a large, high-prestige, research-oriented state university. Regents and legislators are capable of distinguishing between student academic reformers and student political revolutionaries.[11] There have even been a few suggestions, from outside the university community, that faculty members should share their academic decision-making power with students.

Those of us serving on a faculty or in the administration of a state university naturally hope that this public concern for undergraduate education, when reflected by public officeholders, will include an appreciation of the need to provide additional funds rather than a reliance on the redistribution of present resources. But we have learned lately not to be optimistic on this point.

Having indicated at least the possibility of a student alliance with state governing agencies to accomplish a jointly shared pur-

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pose, it is fair to balance against this, in more general terms, the additionally frustrating obstacle to student-sponsored change that state authority imposes. Even in a large private university, students have been known to feel understandably frustrated by a complex and diffuse decision-making structure. State universities have the same layers of faculty-run departments, colleges, and committees, all sharing power with administrators in unclear ways; larger size and greater diversity may make this internal structure still more difficult to penetrate. But state universities also have governing boards that are not able to act without regard to the political basis of their own authority, and which can be limited or overruled by other governmental agencies. Response to student desires, whether they be the demands of a confrontation or the studied resolutions of a representative body, can seldom be rapid and it may never come—or come far too late for a given generation of student leaders. Slowness in this respect ill suits the mood and style of student movements.

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2. Michael D. Reagen, *Science and the Federal Patron* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 114.
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4. The coordinating council is rightly studied as a significant element in statewide planning of all post-secondary education, including junior or community colleges.
5. Clark Kerr raised the question in these terms in his discussion at the conference reported in *Dædalus* (Fall 1969), p. 1104.
6. Study Commission on University Governance, *The Culture of the University: Governance and Education* (Berkeley: University of California, 1968), p. 25.
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8. Morton A. Rauh, *The Trusteeship of Colleges and Universities* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 89, 101-102, 150.
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10. Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 105.
11. My own impressions on this matter have been reinforced by reading, in draft form, the forthcoming study by Heinz Eulau and Harold Quinley, *American State Officials and Higher Education*, based on interviews in nine states.

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